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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
OPEC AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
A POLITICAL HISTORY OF DECISIONS AND BEHAVIOR
by
Reza Sanati
Florida International University, 2014
Miami, Florida
Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor
The conventional understanding behind how the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) has formulated its decisions and subsequently behaved in the
international system has consistently centered on the role of market forces. Either
proactively or reactively, it has been assumed that OPEC’s actions were merely engaging
and responding to the supply and demand dynamics in the global economy. Though space
was always given to the political considerations of certain OPEC Member States, and
how that impacts the behavior of the Organization, inquiry into OPEC decision-making
and behavior has generally centered on economic considerations, with politics playing an
intermittent supporting role.
This work challenges the assumptions behind the conventional narrative of
OPEC’s behavior in the international system. By utilizing a historically-based process
tracing method, relying heavily on archival data from OPEC’s headquarters and
declassified American national security documents from the late 1940s to the present, a
more sophisticated model of decision-making and behavior is developed. Accordingly,
OPEC’s decisions and behavior are more accurately a product of four inter-related
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determinants: the role of market forces, the influence of outside actors (usually great
powers) upon the Organization, interstate relations and politics among Member States,
and the pressure of the internal state dynamics within OPEC Member States. It is at the
intersection of these four variables where OPEC’s behavior is more readily understood.
Thus, with a sophisticated understanding of the interplay of these determinants, OPEC’s
decision-making process and behavior can be more accurately understood and possibly
forecasted to a limited degree.
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INTRODUCTION • UNDERSTANDING THE DETERMINANTS BEHIND OPEC’S
INSTITUTIONAL BEHAVIOR
For over half-a-century, the decision-making and behavior of the Organization of Oil
Exporting Countries (OPEC) has been a critical area of inquiry for disciplines ranging
from economics to security studies. Due to its sustained presence in the global economy
and its influence over global oil prices, the ramifications of OPEC’s decisions have
hovered over many of the research questions posed by scholars while affecting the
strategic and policy prescriptions of practitioners. Naturally, the attributes that
characterize OPEC and the behavior of the Organization, particularly its internal
dynamics, have factored into virtually all, comprehensive assessments of OPEC from its
genesis. 1 Nevertheless, while study of the Organization and its influence upon the global
political economy is still a topic of heavy scrutiny, the framework underpinning what
OPEC is and the determining factors behind OPEC’s actions has now long been
conventionalized. 2
In essence, this conventional understanding of the Organization characterizes
OPEC as either a cartel or a sophisticated intergovernmental organization with cartel-like
qualities, whose actions, particularly periods of consensus or breakdown, are primarily

1

See: Fariborz Ghadar, The Evolution of Opec Strategy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1977); Everett
M. Ehrlich, "Structural Change in Opec Member Country Production Decisions," OPEC Review 4, no. 4
(1980); Ian Seymour, Opec: Instrument of Change (London, UK: Macmillan, 1980); Theodore H. Moran,
"Modeling Opec Behavior: Economic and Political Alternatives," International Organization 35, no. 2
(1981); John Evans, Opec, Its Member States and the World Energy Market (Harlow, Essex, U.K. :
Longman, 1986).
2

Theodore H. Moran, Oil Prices and the Future of Opec: The Political Economy of Tension and Stability
in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (Washington, DC Resources for the Future, 1978).
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motivated by the logic of market forces. 3 Though at times, an acknowledgement of
geopolitical factors include the market forces narrative behind OPEC’s behavior, much of
these analyses have been unsystematic, still centered on the economic logic of supply and
demand. 4
As will be detailed throughout this work, this conventional approach, both the
characterization of the OPEC and the understanding behind the determining factors
underpinning its behavior, does not capture the nuances of the Organization’s internal
dynamics, ultimately obscuring a comprehensive picture of OPEC, its decision-making,
which proves ineffective in explaining many aspects of its internal and external behavior.
In light of this, this analysis seeks to reexamine the central concepts behind what are now
the conventional understanding of OPEC, its internal dynamics, and what ultimately
determines its behavior. As such two main premises are put forth in this study. The first
concerns the traditional understanding of what OPEC is, not in its self-advertised name or
what its critics have labeled it, but based upon the functional impact it has had throughout
its institutional life. This work argues that OPEC is neither a cartel nor a trade-centered
intergovernmental organization, but far more politically-oriented international institution,
that while brought together for the explicit purpose of protecting their Members’
economic interests as it relates to their export of oil and remuneration that they receive,

3

Ibid; Moran, "Modeling Opec Behavior: Economic and Political Alternatives."; P.V. Hansen and L.
Lindholt, The Market Power of Opec 1973 - 2001 (Statistics Norway, 2004); A.L.P. Burdett, Opec: Origins
& Strategy, 1947-1973 (Archive Editions, 2004); Mohammad Baqer Heshmatzadeh, "50 Years of Opec and
Politics," Rahbord 20 (60), no. Fall (2011).
4

See: I. Skeet, Opec: twenty-five years of prices and politics (Cambridge University Press, 1991); Moran,
Oil Prices and the Future of Opec: The Political Economy of Tension and Stability in the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries; ———, "Modeling Opec Behavior: Economic and Political Alternatives.";
Hansen and Lindholt, The Market Power of Opec 1973 - 2001; Burdett, Opec: Origins & Strategy, 19471973; Heshmatzadeh, "50 Years of Opec and Politics."
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its actions cannot be quantified nor explained by the simple, singular logic of economic,
profit-motivated rationality. This study argues that OPEC, by reason of the confluence of
several factors that have influenced its internal decision-making, its external behavior,
and its wider impact upon the global political economy, acts far more as a political forum
where economics and politics (domestic, regional, and global) merge, with often times
the latter trumping the former.
To understand this phenomenon, the main determinants behind OPEC decisionmaking are examined throughout the institutional life of the Organization. In challenging
the established thinking behind OPEC’s attributes and behavior, this analysis puts forth a
new framework that incorporates 4 disparate, yet interconnected determinants that
underpin OPEC behavior. In addition to market forces, the following areas have and
continue to produce distinct impact to the internal and external organizational dynamics
of OPEC and its wider influence upon the international system: 1.) Outside actor
intervention into OPEC (via great powers, multinational corporations, etc.); 2.) Interstate
member politics within the Organization (i.e. bilateral relations of member states or
coalition building within the Organization); and 3.) the Intrastate dynamics of member
states (i.e. the domestic political, social, environmental, and economic scene within
individual member states). Collectively, it is argued that the interaction of these 4
variables, provides the ultimate basis and context where OPEC decision/indecision is
made, thus producing external behavior.
It is with this framework in mind, that OPEC’s history as an international
organization, from 1960 to the present, will be examined. In doing so, many of the
decisions and actions (and inactions) that OPEC has made throughout its history, either as

3

a unitary actor within the international system or a composite organization made up of
several differing states, will become more explicable – beyond what the traditional,
singularly-focused market forces narrative of the Organization has offered. More so, in
running this model through OPEC’s institutional life, certain patterns of behavior from its
member states, the unitary conception of the Organization, and its relations with outside
actors in the international system will provide not only more explanatory power, but
predictive capability for OPEC’s future.
The Historical Context of Analysis
Within this study, the institutional life of OPEC will be placed on a historical trajectory
that both reveals the political attributes of OPEC beyond the mere economic or cartelbased characterization and also the determinants that have influenced the Organization’s
behavior throughout time. With over five decades of OPEC behavior in the context of
geopolitics and geo-economics, 5 critical periods become dividing lines in the overall
evolution of the Organization.
Embryonic
Post WWI - 1959

Thematic Phases of OPEC’s History
Infancy
Ascendancy
Fragmentation
1960 -1968
1969 -1979
1980 -1993

Rebalancing
1994 - 2008

The first is the Embryonic phase, which primarily focuses on the pre-OPEC
environment in global political economy, the oil industry in particular, and the particular
circumstances within each individual OPEC Member State. The second phase is the
Infancy, which describes the initial years of OPEC’s growth, from its inception in 1960

4

and ending in the beginning of the 1970s. 5 The third would be the Ascendancy phase,
which witnessed the rise of OPEC on the world stage and the expansion of the
Organization outside of the putative cartel label, manifesting the assertion of its
geopolitical and geo-economic power from the 1971-73, throughout the 1970s up until
the Iran-Iraq war . 6 The fourth is the Fragmentation phase, which many foresaw would
be the dramatic weakening and possible disintegration of OPEC. As internal
disagreements and, more consequently, open hostilities between member states raged, the
first being Iraq against Iran, polarizing inter-member politics within OPEC, only to be
exacerbated by outside forces, and later Iraq against Kuwait, which had a similar affect,
the notion of consensus could no longer be reached amongst members – only to be
compounded by the stagnation in oil prices beginning in the from the mid-1980s. 7 The
fifth is the Rebalancing phase, characterized by not only several important changes
within the internal dynamics of member states and their relations with one another, but
also the massive macro changes in the global political economy, the most important being
the end of the Cold War and disintegration of the Soviet Union. As new, more efficient
upstream technologies increased global production by the ‘opening’ of the former Soviet

5

OPEC’s Resolution 90 of June 1968, and the February 1971 Tehran Agreement can be seen as dividing
lines from the first phase of OPEC to the second, more assertive phase. See: Chalabi, Fadhil, Oil Policies,
Oil Myths
6

M. A. Adelman, "Is the Oil Shortage Real? Oil Companies as Opec Tax-Collectors," Foreign Policy, no.
9 (1972); Ali M. Jaidah, "Pricing of Oil: Role of the Controlling Power," OPEC Review 1, no. 5 (1977);
Ghadar, The Evolution of Opec Strategy; F. J. Al-Chalabi, "A Second Oil Crisis? A Producer's Point of
View on the Oil Developments of 1979*," OPEC Review 4, no. 4 (1980); Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The
Epic Quest for Oil, Money, & Power (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1991); R. Vernon, The Oil Crisis
(Norton, 1976).

7

Y. Ibrahim, The Future of Opec (Middle East Institute, 1984); M.E. Ahrari, Opec: The Failing Giant
(University Press of Kentucky, 1986); S. Shojai and B.S. Katz, The Oil Market in the 1980's: A Decade of
Decline (Praeger, 1992); M.I. Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia (Oxford University
Press, USA, 2010).
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Republics, in many cases with assistance from Western states and international oil
companies (IOCs), OPEC’s impact on the global economy descended into a hibernation
phase. Moreover, as the resurrection of Iraq in the international system, from rogue
nation to a political order, however fragile, that has access to technology and the wider
spectrum of the global markets, which invariably will help it exploit the massive export
potential that was denied it by the Baathist political system and the years of devastating
wars and sanctions that Iraq went through. Coinciding with this internal Rebalancing has
been the continuation of the macro changes since the end of the Cold war: the end of the
undisputed unipolar American moment of domination, consequential changes within the
Middle East regional power structure, the dramatic rise of oil prices by reason of growing
Chinese and Indian economic prowess and the evolution of each OPEC member state. 8
With this chronological division of OPEC’s history providing an aerial picture of the
evolution of the Organization, OPEC’s attributes and the determinants behind its
decision-making and behavior is given crucial context on how and under what conditions
they manifest themselves. Thus, a systematic appreciation of the Organization and how it
has functioned throughout its institutional life is more readily achieved.
The Conventional Understanding of OPEC
Cartel vs. Economically-based Intergovernmental organization

8

M. Al-Seghyer, Opec: Tested by Fire - Prepared for the Future; a Review of Its Development, History
and an Assessment of Its Effectiveness (University of Exeter, 2000); M. Mazraati and S. M. Tayyebi
Jazayeri, "Oil Price Movements and Production Agreements," OPEC Review 28, no. 3 (2004); Marco G. D.
Guidi, Alexander Russell, and Heather Tarbert, "The Effect of Opec Policy Decisions on Oil and Stock
Prices," OPEC Review 30, no. 1 (2006); E.R. Pitt and C.N. Leung, Opec, Oil Prices and Lng (Nova
Science Pub Inc, 2009); Heshmatzadeh, "50 Years of Opec and Politics."; Daniel Yergin, The Quest:
Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World (Penguin Group US, 2011).

6

The conventional understanding behind the nature of OPEC has been rooted in the initial
economic basis of its formation. In viewing the established thinking, OPEC and its
decision-making and behavior has essentially been viewed through the lens of two wide
subcategories, always underpinned by market forces and the logic of supply and demand.
In the first framework, of which was quickly developed early on and in some respects
still exists, analysis of the Organization was looked at through the cartel model, 9 which
during times of OPEC effectiveness and consensus, largely viewed the Organization as a
unitary actor within the global economy and international system. From the unitary
standpoint, the economic motive via the rational model for profit underpinned the major
understanding of not only why OPEC came into being, but largely the focus of its
operational decision-making throughout time. 10 Using this cartel logic, a prime example
would be instances where low global demand leads to price decreases, bringing about
OPEC production cuts, which in turn, is meant to stabilize prices for the benefit of each
member’s domestic revenue. 11 Yet in times where consensus was unable to be reached,
the unitary framework would give way to a composite understanding of OPEC as a

9

Charles F. Doran, "Opec Structure and Cohesion: Exploring the Determinants of Cartel Policy," The
Journal of Politics 42, no. 1 (1980); Richard P. Castanias, "A Test of the Opec Cartel Hypothesis, 19741983: Discussion," The Journal of Finance 40, no. 3 (1985); A. Almoayed, Opec: The Imperfect Cartel
(University of Oxford, 1998); James L. Smith, "Inscrutable Opec: Behavioral Tests of the Cartel
Hypothesis," SSRN eLibrary (2002); Vincent Brémond, Emmanuel Hache, and Val√©rie Mignon, "Does
Opec Still Exist as a Cartel? An Empirical Investigation," Energy Economics, no. 0 (2011).

10

Michael Kennedy, "An Economic Model of the World Oil Market," The Bell Journal of Economics and
Management Science 5, no. 2 (1974); Adelman, "Is the Oil Shortage Real? Oil Companies as Opec TaxCollectors."; G.E. Iyamah, Opec Cartel: An Analysis of Its Strength and How to Weaken Its Hold on the
U.S. Economy (Morgan State University, 1979); Claudio Loderer, "A Test of the Opec Cartel Hypothesis:
1974-1983," The Journal of Finance 40, no. 3 (1985); Castanias, "A Test of the Opec Cartel Hypothesis,
1974-1983: Discussion."

11

Iyamah, Opec Cartel: An Analysis of Its Strength and How to Weaken Its Hold on the U.S. Economy;
Doran, "Opec Structure and Cohesion: Exploring the Determinants of Cartel Policy."; Albert L. Danielsen,
"Cartel Rivalry and the World Price of Oil," Southern Economic Journal 42, no. 3 (1976).
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collective entity with varying states with different economic sensitivities, and often times,
divergent economic interests. This was the fulfillment of what Raymond Vernon and
other economists had long predicted to be the natural demise of cartels, as members
invariably diverge based upon their own parochial economic interests, as opposed to the
collective’s wider, shared interest. 12 However, gradually a more sophisticated framework
developed, viewing OPEC through the lens of an economically-based intergovernmental
organization. This view transcended the Organization outside the parochial cartel label,
taking on a more nuanced, functionary role for OPEC. 13 In this framework, while the
binary between the unitary and composite nature of OPEC still applies, its actions would
be explicable in more functional terms outside the conventional understanding of cartel
behavior. From the unitary standpoint, in periods of supply shortage and high demand,
the explanation of why OPEC would increase output would not only be for fear that the
global economy would transition away to other producers of oil, thus shrinking OPEC
member states’ market shares , or even from hydrocarbons to alternatives, 14 but in such
circumstances, the collective role of OPEC was seen being a principle custodian of global
price stability. In this role, which is principally held by the Organization itself, OPEC’s
function would be viewed as both merging together the producers’ domestic revenue
concerns with the apprehensions of the global economy on prices, maintaining the

12

See: Raymond Vernon, The Oil Crisis. Norton, 1976.

13

Raino Malnes, "Opec and the Problem of Collective Action," Journal of Peace Research 20, no. 4
(1983); Evans, Opec, Its Member States and the World Energy Market; N.D. White, The Law of
International Organisations (Juris Pub., 2005); C. Linde, The State and the International Oil Market:
Competition and the Changing Ownership of Crude Oil Assets (Kluwer Academic, 2000).
14

A.M. El-Mokadem, Opec and the World Oil Market, 1973-1983 (Eastlords Pub., 1983); J.W. Plunkett,
Plunkett's Energy Industry Almanac 2008 (Plunkett Research, Limited, 2007); G. Luft and A. Korin,
Turning Oil into Salt: Energy Independence through Fuel Choice (Booksurge.com, 2009).
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equilibrium that perpetuates the global dependence on oil (and more importantly OPEC’s
market shares) but also acting as a bulwark against volatility. 15
Yet, in times of consensus failure and gridlock, the composite makeup of the
organization would be stressed, being attributable, not just to the parochial member
state’s focus on their own economic interests, but more by reason of the trappings of
bureaucratic or inter-member politics within the Organization, which often led to
organizational paralysis and dysfunction. 16
Why the Cartel and Economically-based Intergovernmental organization labels fall
short
Within both these subcategories, whether OPEC is seen as a unitary actor that acts upon a
consensus-based decision, either as a cartel or an economically-based intergovernmental
organization, or whether consensus could not be reached by reason of varying economic
interests among member states or bureaucratic dysfunction, OPEC decision and behavior
has generally been underpinned by market forces. With only a few exceptions, such as
Ian Skeet’s OPEC: Twenty-Five Years of Prices and Politics published in 1991, 17 the
role of politics becomes either minimized or ignored, and virtually never examined in a
systemic way. This specifically has to do with the larger geopolitical scene in which the

15

M. Marien, Future Survey Annual 1986: A Guide to the Recent Literature of Trends, Forecasts, and
Policy Proposals (Transaction Publishers, 1987); Luft and Korin, Turning Oil into Salt: Energy
Independence through Fuel Choice.

16

Ian Skeet, Opec: Twenty-Fve Years of Prices and Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1991); P.
Wonnacott and R.J. Wonnacott, Economics (Wiley, 1990); Steven G. Lanning, "Costs of Maintaining a
Cartel," The Journal of Industrial Economics 36, no. 2 (1987); James¬†M Griffin and Weiwen Xiong, "The
Incentive to Cheat: An Empirical Analysis of Opec," Journal of Law and Economics 40, no. 2 (1997).
17

Skeet, Opec: Twenty-Fve Years of Prices and Politics; Wonnacott and Wonnacott, Economics; Lanning,
"Costs of Maintaining a Cartel."; Griffin and Xiong, "The Incentive to Cheat: An Empirical Analysis of
Opec."
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Organization operates in, the inter-state politics that seep into the OPEC’s organizational
dynamics, or the intrastate domestic politics at the national level of each OPEC member.
This becomes extremely important when considering that many of OPEC’s decisions, its
inability of forming consensus, its behavior, or lack of action, are often times inexplicable
with

the

market

forces

paradigm,

both

the

cartel

and

economically-based

intergovernmental organization models. As will be detailed throughout the study, such
primary examples that transcend outside the mere economically based logic of decisionmaking are the following: The Arab Oil Embargo via OAPEC of 1973-74, the Saudi
decision to undercut Iran’s revenue during the latter days of the Pahlavi dynasty, the
Persian Gulf Arab exporters of OPEC ramping up production during the latter stages of
the Iran-Iraq war (when oil prices were low); Baathist Iraq’s destruction of much of
fellow member Kuwait’s oil wells in its retreat in the 1991 Desert Storm war; and Saudi
Arabia’s decision to boost production in 2001-2012 to complement the US sanctions
regime on the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The reasoning behind why the traditional framework is simply incapable of
explaining certain patterns of behavior that the Organization has exhibited in its
institutional life is due to the fact that both the cartel and the economically-based
intergovernmental organization labels misconstrue and mischaracterize what OPEC has
been in its functional role within the global economy and the international system –
regardless of the Organization’s self-advertised mantra or the labels given to it by both its
critics and supporters alike. On the cartel label, while OPEC is certainly a collection
major oil exporting states, whose conventional crude oil reserves are roughly 80% of
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global supply and whose production is roughly 42% of global production, 18 it has seldom
acted according to the logic of how a cartel operates. A cartel’s primary motivation, and
thus its raison d'être, is the protection of its market-share. However, OPEC, while
cognizant of the importance of protecting its market-share from either other oil-producing
competitors or from alternate sources of energy, has never really functioned based upon
this principle. In many ways, OPEC’s founding was a reaction to what its member states
viewed as the abuse of another cartel, specifically how the ‘Seven Sisters’ (the major
IOCs that had oil concessions in OPEC member states) would unilaterally reduce prices
or alter production, to protect their own market shares from other competitors in the
global oil industry. As the member states that would eventually form OPEC were at the
time mere tax collectors whose domestic national revenues would derive from taxing
what the IOCs exported from their territories, any reduction of prices or changes in
export volume that would lessen what the particular government gleaned from the IOC
would be to the detriment of that government’s revenues as a whole. Thus, a major
catalyst behind why OPEC was formed was price protection from the unilateral decisions
of the IOCs, and ultimately to have a say in both prices and export volume. Yet,
throughout its history, regardless of the early cognizance of the important of market-share
protection, 19 OPEC decision and behavior gradually became focused on short-term price
protection. During the 1970s, with the confluence of factors in the global political
18
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economy, rising prices were seen, at least from a collective basis, as something positive
from the Organization, and thus supported and even exacerbated by many key OPEC
members. However, as historians now understand, the dramatic rise in global oil prices
was the major reason that led to the shift in alternative sources of energy (particularly
nuclear power in Europe and Japan), the entrance of cheaper Soviet oil in the global
market, as well expanded upstream activity in more expensive areas of drilling, such as
the North Sea. Hence, in supporting price hikes that eventually eroded the Organization’s
market share, OPEC behaved exactly how a cartel should not. OPEC’s collective
behavior at times where supply outstrips demand has primarily been focused on shortterm price protection.
Regarding OPEC’s characterization as an economically-based intergovernmental
organization, there have been several instances in history where the Organization
responded to calm rising prices that would eventually lead towards price volatility, and
thus avoid damaging the consumer market that the Organization depends upon.
Nevertheless, equally or more often, there have also been instances where, due to lack of
consensus, OPEC would allow price increases by not collectively raising production
levels, with each member state responding differently based upon their particular
geopolitical, as well as economic calculations. Often, these geopolitical calculations
would come in the form of coalitional formations, with one dominant member, such as
Iran or Saudi Arabia, leading a group against another within the Organization. And at
other times, collective production levels, even if the economic rationale for profit would
favor stemming back exports, such as in the 1980s, became wholly consumed by
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geopolitical calculations that contradicted both the Organization’s and individual member
states’ bottom line.
These discrepancies within what is ostensibly an economic organization render
the need to take into account the totality of the political and security contexts it OPEC is
embedded in – at the international level, the inter-member level amongst the various
OPEC states, and at the domestic, intrastate level or each particular OPEC member. In
viewing OPEC through the prism of half-century of behavior, there have been many
instances where the conventional framework of OPEC and its behavior has proven
insufficient in explaining certain patterns of behavior by its members and, subsequently,
the Organization. This is acutely aggravated by the concurrent evolution of OPEC, its
individual members, and the international system that the prior two operate in.
A New Framework of Analysis
In challenging the established thinking behind OPEC behavior, it is argued that the
internal mechanisms of the Organization that underpin its behavior, that formulate
whether or not consensus is reached, and the external environment that influences its
actions are more complex and specifically more politically-oriented than what has
traditionally been accepted. While this proposal accepts the logic behind the conventional
economic narrative behind OPEC behavior, which is based upon market forces (i.e.
supply and demand as being the basis for inter-member cooperation and organizational
functionality) this narrative alone cannot fully explain the Organization’s internal
dynamics and external behavior. Thus, this analysis presents 4 disparate, yet
interconnected factors on what influences OPEC behavior, the nexus and interaction of
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which ultimately sets the internal conditions that formulate the climate within the
Organization

that

affects

consensus/non-consensus,

decision/non-decisions

and

ultimately, action/inaction.
In addition to market forces, the following areas, while interrelated, produce
distinct impacts to the internal and external organizational dynamics of OPEC: 1.)
Outside actor intervention into OPEC; 2.) Interstate member politics within the
Organization; 3.) Intrastate dynamics of member states. Collectively, it is argued that the
interaction of these 3 variables, with that of the conventional economic narrative,
provides the logic behind OPEC internal dynamics, which is ultimately the basis and
context where OPEC decision/indecision is made, and thus producing external behavior.
And while these determinants are distinct, they do not operate in isolation from one
another, but display an interactive quality where at times some can be prejudiced over
others while at other times all can be identified as having noticeable impact upon
decision-making and behavior.

Outside Actor Intervention
Market Forces

The

role

of

outside

actor’s,

specifically great powers and major
Outside Actor Intervention

multinational corporations (MNCs),
upon individual states within the

Interstate Member Relations

organization has consistently had a
noticeable amount of influence upon

Intrastate Member Dynamics

the overall structure of OPEC’s
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internal dynamics, with sustained impact upon the interstate relations between members
in general. 20 At times, this influence ebbed and flowed but its presence always remained.
Moreover, as many of OPEC members have had close, intimate ties with great powers,
some of which could be characterized as patron-client relations, and major multinational
corporations (particularly during the genesis of the petroleum industry in their countries)
decision-making by member states, at least tangentially if not out rightly, needed to have
some consideration of the aforementioned and their preferences . Furthermore, the
relationship between member states and outside actors could be both complimentary,
evinced when great powers and MNCs roughly had parallel interests, or in direct conflict,
as other times powerful states outside the Organization had conflicting interests with
MNCs, with the member state being caught in the middle. Reversibly, interactions with
the outside actors, either collectively in the context of the Organization’s raison d’être or
individually, would be of crucial importance, as the purported “standing” of each member
state in the international community, normatively and materially, is invariably affected by
it relationship with great powers and major multinationals. As has been witnessed, both
these players often facilitate, enhance, or hinder individual OPEC member’s systemic
access (i.e. ‘access’ to globalized technology and R&D, etc.), while at the same time
changing the nature of the internal power makeup and relational context of interaction
between OPEC members. Just as like the conventional market driven narrative, this
dynamic is and has been a constant throughout the 50-plus year life of the Organization.
20
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Interstate Member Relations within the Organization
The internal relations between member states, the bilateral or multilateral ties between
actors within OPEC itself, outside the boundaries of great power relations, is of
tremendous importance and carries a logic of its own within the Organization itself.
Throughout OPEC’s lifespan, issues of bilateral or multilateral concern that are nonpetroleum related that derive from other arenas of either conflict or cooperation between
the member states, particularly as it relates to Middle East politics, has bled into the
Organization’s internal dynamics . As power dynamics have changed throughout the last
50 years, not only on a macro geopolitical level (i.e. from bipolarity, to uni-polarity, to
multi-polarity), but also amongst member states themselves, for a whole host of reasons,
the politics between or amongst members outside of the OPEC arena, often affects
internal and external organizational behavior. As the Middle Eastern political milieu has
consistently hovered over the internal deliberations of OPEC members, issues of regional
security, highlighted by regional security complex theory, where the politics amongst and
between regional states do display certain patterns of enmity and amity, has at times
clashed or complicated the national order behind traditional impact of market forces or
great power penetration onto OPEC decision-making and behavior . Hence, it is vital to
appropriate an independent space of analysis for the role of inter-member relations, and
the continuities and changes within these relations and the impact of these relations upon
the Organization throughout its lifespan.
Intrastate Member Dynamics
The internal political, social, economic, and even environmental dynamics that have
evolved within the individual member states of OPEC throughout the Organization’s
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lifespan have proven consequentially influential on internal organizational decision and
behavior. The changing nature or consistency of the political systems of each OPEC
member state, not only affect the domestic politics and economic scene within that
particular country, but also affect the climate of how that state has access to that
technology (i.e. individual member’s extraction, production capacity, and research and
development). The ideological underpinnings behind a member state’s regime typology
have had major implications for the power and influence they yield within the
Organization. Is the state a status quo power? Is it a revolutionary power? Throughout the
history of the Organization, members have passed the gauntlet of political changes that
have swept their domestic political fronts, and thus their interstate relations within the
organization changed, which eventually affected internal consensus dynamics and
external behavior. Some important examples can be clearly seen in the transformation of
Baathist Party in Iraq and its subsequent rise and fall, the transformation of Libyan
domestic dynamics from King Idris to Moammar Qaddafi to the latter’s downfall in 2011,
to the Iranian Revolution and its, to US occupation of Iraq, and ultimately the continuing
integration of GCC states into one unitary union .
Concerning production capacity, R&D, and reserve amounts, the amount of effort
into exploration, drilling efficiency, and spare production capacity that each member state
has allocated from their domestic budgets have massive and consequential impacts upon
their power and influence within OPEC, and thus do affect inter-member relations,
internal organizational dynamics, and often their relationships with great powers. States,
such as Saudi Arabia and monarchial Iran, who put much effort in this endeavor,
eventually became major players within the Organization. Yet, when a member lost this
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“edge”, such as Baathist Iraq or Qaddafi controlled-Libya, due primarily to political
change and a denial of systemic access, their influence within the Organization suffered,
thus changing the context in which decision was made, and ultimately OPEC behavior.
Moreover, the amount of hydrocarbon reserves, in both quantity and quality, which a
member state has under its territory, is not a neutral factor either, for reserve figures
throughout OPEC’s history has fluctuated. A distinctive pattern within OPEC has
emerged that indicates that members with larger reserves, more allocation to R&D, spare
capacity production, eventually attain more clout and power within the Organization,
which affects decision making.
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CHAPTER I • THE EMBRYONIC PHASE: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
CONCESSIONARY SYSTEM & THE BIRTH OF OPEC
The members of OPEC came from extremely diverse backgrounds, located in different
parts of the globe, with varying histories, political systems, languages, cultures, domestic
economies, and geopolitical alliances and relations. Even their individual national
experiences with the rise of the global oil industry were vastly different from one another
other, as some members became enmeshed in hierarchical concessionary agreements to
major international oil companies (IOC), often with consent from a great power, while
others experienced more favorable conditions within the concessionary system as junior
partners. But regardless of the disparities amongst them, three broader attributes that each
shared, united their collective experience and ultimately laid the foundation for OPEC’s
formation: all were members of the developing world with little power in international
institutions as well as being militarily weak, all had substantial amount of hydrocarbon
reserves in their territory that they did not have dominion over, and all, in the years prior
to OPEC’s formation, had their economies, of which oil exports to varying degrees was a
major factor, negatively impacted by forces outside their control.
Within the environment preceding OPEC’s entrance on the world stage, a
confluence of factors at the national, interstate, and international levels ultimately led to
the group’s configuration. These factors, while ostensibly economic in nature, chiefly as
it relates to price and volume of the oil exports from what eventually became OPEC
members, also had a major geopolitical and strategic genesis. What led to OPEC’s
formation was only partially economic in nature, specifically a reaction by the developing
world’s exporters to the lack of price and export control that existed in the global oil

19

industry in the late 1950s. However, there were also important geopolitical factors at
work as well. OPEC’s formation happened in the aftermath of the wave of independence
movements within the developing world, which invariably left indelible marks in regions
that great powers had dominated, primarily the Middle East, North Africa, and to a lesser
extent Latin America. 21 Moreover, OPEC’s birth happened in the midst of a bipolar
international system dominated by the US and the USSR, where virtually every domestic
and regional development, particularly, in the developing world, was viewed by great
powers through the zero-sum logic of Cold War dynamics. 22 Internally within OPEC
states, as the revenue from oil exports made up a sizeable portion or even the brunt of
member states’ economies, the survivability of the political regimes in power and even
the cohesion and continuance of certain post-colonial states lay in the balance, many
times inviting intervention by regional actors or great powers, whose home multinational
firms had a major interest in petroleum-endowed developing countries.
Accordingly, to understand the Organization’s creation, it is crucial to link the
larger macro influence of market forces in the context of the geopolitical dimensions of
great power rivalries, the changing nature of the global oil trade, the internal political and
economic dynamics within the states that became members of OPEC, and later, their
relations with one another. This chapter lays out the environment before the
Organization’s formation, the first decade of OPEC’s institutional life, and how powerful
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outside forces dealt with OPEC’s formation, both the great powers and the major
international oil companies, with the domestic political and socioeconomic realities
within the states that would eventually became OPEC members.
The geo-economic and geopolitical context
Creating the Home-IOC-Host triangle
At the dawn of the globalization of the oil industry, when exploration and production
began the expansion outside the initial American and Russian centers, the growing
international oil companies (IOC) quickly understood the significance of market share
accumulation, from the upstream component to the downstream consumer level. This was
seen initially in the domestic US and Russian contexts in which they operated and their
eventual ventures abroad. This expansion had its genesis at the beginning of the 20th
century, in the major shift in strategic thinking as it related to energy transportation and
for the major economies of the world – specifically the mass transition from coal to crude
oil. As with many future technologies that eventually spread to societies writ large, the
invention of the internal combustion engine quickly became a key area of interest to the
militaries of major powers. As Leonardo Maugeri has catalogued, crude oil’s
attractiveness lay in the following qualities: its 1.) Higher thermal efficiency, enabling
large vessels to ‘travel faster and cover greater distances while enjoying greater selfsufficiency’’ 2.) Versatility of use, in that ‘with oil a ship could be refueled while
underway, whereas the loading of coal required a ship to stop in ports equipped with the
necessary facilities’; and 3.) Storage, in that ‘oil products were far simpler to store and
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move once on board than coal, ‘ requiring less space and significantly fewer personnel. 23
As the major economies of the day, gradually grasped the efficiencies and benefits of oil
and its clear advantage over coal, which up until that time, had been the lifeblood of the
19th century’s economy, grand strategies of the world’s major powers now shifted to
having access to this vital commodity. In doing so, the major powers, took a new or
renewed interest in the activities of their still nescient multinational oil companies that
were based out of their respective territories. And either by default and design, the
foreign acquisition activities of oil firms based in their countries, which was profitmotivated, came to be mutually reinforcing with the strategic imperatives of great powers,
not just for their economies, but to enhance their military might. The result, as the unique
characteristics of crude oil elevated it from being just another commodity to a crucial
factor in grand strategy, military dominance, and economic vitality, was that the home
governments of these multinational oil firms, such as the US, France, and Britain, became
enmeshed in their firms’ foreign dealings in their hunt for oil.
What would become the major catalyst for the grand strategic shift towards crude
oil was World War I, and its immediate aftermath, as petroleum products ‘emerged as the
leading fuels for moving people, armies, airplanes, and naval fleets throughout the world.’
24

Moreover, the dramatic increase of oil consumption during the war caused world

markets and the major powers to augment their concern about supply and access, even
spurring a decline in confidence in American crude reserves, though the US was still
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major exporter of crude oil. 25 Compounded by the increase in consumption because of
the War, what exacerbated concern was the October 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in
Russia and the devastating civil war from 1917-1920, which dramatically cut production
from Russia and within months, led to full nationalization of Russia’s oil fields in June of
1918. 26 Realizing the extent that political and economic volatility in a major producing
countries could impact access to supplies, creating shortages and mass panics, the
international oil companies, already engaged in broadening their acquisition and
production activities outside their home countries, accelerated the pace – in Latin
America, and more consequentially, the Middle East, where the brunt of conventional
petroleum reserves are located.

27

It was this initial catalyst that not only laid the

groundwork for the home government/IOC/host government nexus, and the
complications that it brought, but also, the future coordination between the international
oil companies, to protect their market shares, which later became a consequential factor
in the creation of OPEC.
The Companies scramble
Creating the Concession System
In the Middle East, even before the anticipated demise of the Ottoman State, once
its disastrous entry into WWI ended its political viability as a unitary state, diverse
European powers, including Russia and the United States, had become aware of the large
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amount of oil deposits in the frontiers beyond the Turkish Empire, in Iran, and its former
colonies in the Caucus, particularly in and around the Caspian city of Baku. 28 Once the
Ottoman Empire was dismantled by force by the victorious British and French in the
aftermath of WWI, ‘enormous new commercial opportunities throughout [its] former
territories’ now lay open for both private European enterprise as well as the national
designs of their home states. 29 For years, various entrepreneurs of European, and later
American origin, traveled to the Ottoman territories and Iran in search of lucrative
business opportunities in the newfangled petroleum industry.
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Eventually, these

individual missions, because of the confluence of regional circumstances, were able to
obtain significant concessions in developing states, becoming the forerunners for the
entrance of powerful European and US multinational firms.
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With the centrifugal forces intrinsic to the decaying Ottoman Empire,
compounded by its consequential loss in the first World War, dramatically disintegrating
the state, for the first time in the history of the collective memory of the contemporary
Middle East, the once bifurcated political design that comprised two stable Ottoman and
Iranian states morphed into a 21-state sub-system, comprising of a weak Iran, a truncated
Turkish Republic, later a resurrected Jewish entity, with newly created Arab states that
were mostly vassals and protectorates of the British and French.
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Suffice it to say,
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juxtaposed to the ‘centuries of domination in Latin America and South Asia, the period of
formal European colonialism in the Middle East was short-lived’ as the ‘Ottoman
territories appropriated after World War I were given independence within a decade or
two.’

33

However, sovereignty, either for newly created entities with no history of a

political culture or for weakened states in transition, such as Iran, with feeble civil
institutions and a corrupt ruling apparatus, was quite an elusive notion. As such, this
reality ebbed into every aspect of governance, particularly the state’s economic dealings.
In this new regional reality, the economic designs of the British, French, and later the
Americans, while at times being visibly antithetical to each other, were now mostly
unimpeded by any indigenous forces within the developing states that possessed large
amounts of hydrocarbon reserves.
Reeling from internal political turmoil and edging closer to state bankruptcy, the
first noteworthy Middle Eastern oil concession was made by the Iranian Qajar court to
British businessman, William D’Arcy in 1901. Whether by reason of extreme naïveté or
desperation, the Shah of Iran gave exclusive rights for vast swaths of Iranian territory for
oil exploration and production for the next 60 years, in exchange for a paltry £20,000, an
equal amount in shares of D'Arcy's company, and a promise of 16% of future revenue. 34
Coincidentally, this was the same Qajar court that a decade earlier had granted a
monopolistic concession for the entire handling, buying, and selling of all tobacco raised
in the country to a British firm, eliciting massive public discontent to the point that the
concession was revoked a short time later. Yet, though the weak Qajar potentate was
33

F. Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology (Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 82.
34

S. Kinzer, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (Wiley, 2011), 48.

25

virtually stripped of most kingly powers in Iran’s constitutional revolution in 1906, the
newly formed parliament found itself devoid of any meaningful liquid assets in the
national treasury, and thus, the concessions to D’Arcy remained. 35 After years of toil in
the Iranian hinterland, William D’Arcy discovered that his own funds were drying up,
and in a last ditch effort to save his enterprise, he combined investments in Iran with the
British-owned Burma Oil Company in 1905. 36 After striking the first well in 1908, the
first payment of £2,900 came to a cash-strapped Iranian government in the years of
1912–13.
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With now tangible proof that Iran contained oil, this allowed D’Arcy to

continue his business endeavors, transforming Burma Oil into the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company (later to be renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the modern day British
Petroleum).
As ‘the world’s great industrial and military powers’, realized that unlike other
commodities and resources, oil was an unique strategic asset for the long-term
advancement and economic, political, and military aggrandizement of their nations, both
domestically and globally, they implemented policies to control ‘critical strategic
resources as an advantage over their geopolitical and economic competitors.’ 38 For this
reason, Iran, like many of its neighbors and other developing states with large quantities
of oil reserves, quickly transformed into an arena of confrontation amongst the major
powers, often times in collaboration with powerful multinational oil firms. 39 For the
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British, noticing that a domestic firm had unimpeded access to large quantities of this
strategic resource was an opportunity that had to be harvested, protected, and exploited.
This strategic repositioning merely coincided and, in many ways, was a response to the
British Royal Navy’s decision to convert its warships from coal-fired boilers to diesel
motors, prompting London to acquire a 51 percent interest in D’Arcy’s enterprise. 40
Britain’s fateful decision, providing ‘a monopoly over Iranian oil for the next forty years’,
41

to be maintained at all cost, despite indigenous resistance that witnessed a change of

Iranian dynasties, massive internal modernization efforts, and transformational regional
events, 42 essentially marrying the national interests of the empire, the profit motivations
of the firm (Anglo-Iranian), with internal events within Iran. In other words, there now
was clear link between domestic Iranian politics and socio-economics, the profitability of
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and the domestic and international interests of one of the
globe’s superpowers. Although initially, the British were focused on obviating
Russian/Soviet attempts at forcing concessions upon the feeble Iranian court, fearing that
any concession may undermine its own interests in the country, (only to be proven later
by kinetic Soviet attempts at occupying Iranian territory in World War II), London’s
efforts quickly moved to quelling any indigenous nationalistic tendencies at concessional
revisionism, which became a hallmark of the Iranian government’s dealings with the UK
and the US, in nationalization attempts in 1933, 1953, up until undisputed total
dominative control in the OPEC era.
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The interaction between Iran, its internal dynamics, and the great powers in the
height of geopolitical factors disallowed any firm to enter into the Iranian state, granting
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, buttressed by British military, economic, and diplomatic
might, total and complete monopoly over all of Iranian energy. Within this dynamic, a
weak Iranian state, trapped in the contours of power politics, became incapable of
mustering the negotiating power to alter its fortunes. It was this dynamic, also evident in
other developing, oil-endowed countries, that formed the underlying basis for the internal
modernization and later nationalization efforts that would be witnessed intermittently in
the decades ahead.
Expanding the Concession System in the Middle East
As developments were progressing in Iran, and partially spawned by AngloIranian’s successful efforts, German firms were garnering simultaneous interest in the
Ottoman Mosul province. Just as the British synthesized attempts to maximize domestic
corporate profits with the national security interests of the state, German entrepreneurs
began a rigorous campaign at exploration in establishing the Turkish Petroleum Company
(TPC). 43 Albeit, as war broke out in August of 1914, only to be followed by Germany’s
defeat four years later, all Turkish rule over what later became Iraq, fell under Allied
control. Naturally, Anglo-Iranian and Royal Dutch Shell, a hybrid Dutch/British venture
created a little more than a decade earlier, ‘gained a controlling interest in the TPC’,
while turning Germany’s share over to France. 44 As the limbs of the former Ottoman
state were being strewn to France and Britain, the mandate that the League of Nations set
43
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forth allocated Syria and Lebanon to France while Britain controlled Jordan, greater
Palestine, and Iraq, with Turkey, Yemen and what would later become Saudi Arabia,
emerging as independent entities. 45
In this geopolitical flux, the US, under the Wilson administration, realized that
sole European attempts at
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although later than its counterparts, traded ‘some of its Syrian territorial interests’ in
exchange for the French IOC, Compagnie Française des Pétroles (CFP), the ancestor of
Total, to take part in the TPC. 48 Having been formed in 1924 on the Paris government’s
initiative, but ‘wholly administered by private interests’, CFP was proof that regarding oil,
the synthesis of domestic private enterprise with the national interests had now been
adopted by the French.
Within Washington, this mixture had a direct impact upon policy. The Standard
Oil Company of New York (SOCONY) was particularly adamant about being included
into what was rapidly becoming a multi-party affair, persuading ‘the State Department to
step up its pressure on the British to permit U.S. multinationals to buy into the TPC
consortium.’ 49 With Britain having de-facto say on the business climate in the embryonic
Iraq, and fearing economic retaliation by Washington, the terms were negotiated into
allowing US partners. Therefore, SOCONY and Jersey Standard split a 23.75 percent
share of IPC stock while Anglo-Iranian, Royal Dutch Shell, and CFP received 23.75
percent respectively. 50 The remaining 5 percent was allocated to Calouste Gulbenkian, a
former Ottoman subject, ‘who had helped win the original concession from the Turks.’ 51
Moreover, in a move to further quell the US government, the British agreed to a joint
venture between Anglo-Iranian and the American Gulf Oil into their Kuwait protectorate.
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52

Within a short amount of time, TPC was conveniently relabeled the Iraq Petroleum

Company (IPC), to represent the region’s new political realities.
The wrangling between the diverse IOCs, their home governments, and the
administrators of the new state of Iraq proved to be a watershed moment in the
interaction and cooperation within the emergent home-IOC-host nexus, creating, within a
relatively short time, a ‘global map’… of ‘cross border company interests supported by a
concentration of the oil industry.’ 53 As the network between home, host, and the IOCs
became more complex, ‘competition between exporting countries could take place only
through competition between the international oil companies, ’ 54 garnering a collection
of strange bedfellows. This was evinced by the sudden glut in international petroleum
supply. The great panic caused by WWI, the subsequent scramble of the IOCs into Latin
America and in the Middle East, and the rebound of Russian/Soviet exports from the
instability caused by the October Revolution of 1917 had so succeeded into bringing
additional supply into the global oil market, that nearing the end of the 1920s, prices had
decreased extensively. As the global oil market became saturated, fearing profit reduction
and in attempt to ward off other oil-seeking entrepreneurs and firms from future
exploration opportunities, the participants of the IPC in July of 1928, with tacit approval
of all home governments, designated a zone, known as the Red Line
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prewar Ottoman Empire, an area that included Iraq and Saudi Arabia but not Iran or
Kuwait,’ with a gentlemen’s agreement that all members would refrain from seeking new
concessions inside the settled territory without the approval of the consortium as a whole.
56

However, as market saturation only increased, only months later, in September of 1928,

the major IOCs Standard Oil of New Jersey, Anglo-Iranian, and Royal Dutch Shell, met
in Achnacarry in Scotland, UK and set up the “As-Is” or Achnacarrry Agreement, to
coordinate oil output in order to organize the market, in an effort to halt the decrease of
prices and bring about market stabilization. 57 To do so, companies agreed on a quota
system in differing markets, according to the their respective percentage shares of
consumer consumption in a respective country, and would only increase oil output if total
demand rose – again, based upon their particular shares. 58 These efforts, nonetheless,
were futile as too many intervening factors, both economic and political, undercut any
real sustained impact from collaboration of the three major IOCs. Amongst the most
consequential were the Wall Street crash in 1929, the interwar economic crisis within
Europe, the Great Depression, the large oil discoveries in East Texas in 1930-31, the
advancing nature of the technological efficiency in oil extraction and refinement, and
rudimentary efforts at conversation from the major economies of the world, all of which,
in combination, led to unprecedented decline in global oil prices. 59
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The Seeds of Nationalization and the beginnings of the ‘domino cascade’
The resulting 1930s oil glut and collapse in prices set off a chain of events that
would forever remake the architecture of the global oil industry, altering the nature of the
interaction between the developed world and oil-endowed countries of the developing
world. As previously mentioned, while the concessionary agreements led to an interactive
nexus of cooperation amongst the major IOCs, often backed by their great power home
states, what the 1930s oil collapse engendered was the rise of the ‘domino cascade’ of
nationalization attempts and concessional revisionism from host governments, as one
producing country’s actions would set precedent, in which other producing countries
would either learn from, directly mimic, and/or integrate in their national energy export
strategies. Virtually no producing country could ignore the tremors of this tectonic shift.
And as the IOCs, with the great powers, responded to each case rather differently, the
slow process of power transfer gradually began from the IOCs to producing countries,
although the road was long and arduous. The end of that road was OPEC.
The Mexican Catalyst
The genesis of the host state pushback, incidentally, happened not in some remote
corner of the world where the US and European powers had little control over, but in the
what was traditionally seen as America’s backyard, Latin America – more curiously, in
Mexico. It is here where the importance of what transpired between the Iranian Qajar
court and British entrepreneur William D’Arcy manifests again. As the early hunt for oil
spread into Latin America, another British entrepreneur, Weetman Pearson, an expert
engineer in large-scale national infrastructural projects, was invited by Mexican President
Porfirio Diaz and commissioned to aid Mexico’s development plans, chiefly in national
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railways and canals. 60 However, in the course of time, Pearson discovered that Mexico
possessed large oil reserves, and therefore, shifted from being a foreign commissioned
engineer to becoming Mexico’s D’Arcy. In approaching Mexican President Diaz, the
Iranian concession agreements to D’Arcy acted as a template for how Pearson would set
up the arrangement for extracting Mexican oil. As Leonardo Maugeri has pointed out, the
concession arrangements that Pearson agreed upon with Mexico ‘followed the scheme set
up by D’Arcy in Persia and would set the model for all eventual contracts in Mexico: a
modest royalty for every ton of oil produced, a tax on surface occupation, no income tax,
and the direct ownership of subsurface findings.’ 61 However, though Pearson’s Mexican
oil venture, Mexican Eagle, successfully crafted many of the mechanisms that defined
that country’s oil industry, he decided, just like D’Arcy in Iran, to merge his company
with a larger IOC, eventually selling his company to Royal Dutch Shell near the end of
WWI, which added to the further homogenization of the global oil industry under the
domination of the major IOCs. 62
But for Pearson, profit motivation in selling Mexican Eagle was not the only
factor. The massive political instability caused by the Mexican Revolution of 1911, and
the uncertainty in that country’s business climate certainly altered his perception about
continued investment. The immediate post-WWI oil scramble, nevertheless, made the
major IOCs more risk averse than their smaller competitors, and thus Royal Dutch Shell’s
takeover of Mexican Eagle, and the huge potential for profit, rendered its mass entrance
60
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into Mexico a worthy gambit. Yet with time, Royal Dutch Shell would experience
firsthand that even a major IOC with an army of human capital, endless resources, and
substantial geopolitical clout with the great powers, was not immune to a developing
country’s alacrity towards concessionary agreements that it felt was imposed upon it by
an unpopular government in cahoots with a foreign firm. In 1917, though the central
Mexican government had its heads of states removed intermittently by reason of
continued political turmoil, the post-Diaz parliament collectively voted to extend the
central government’s writ over all Mexican resources, including oil. 63 Immediately, the
IOCs, Royal Dutch Shell being the largest, took notice and fought back against the
Mexican government. As negotiations reached a deadlock, due to both sides’
irreconcilable positions, and fearing that continued instability would make normal
operations within Mexico very difficult, the major IOCs decided to gradually cut back
and even halt certain operations in the country, and look south to Venezuela, where more
hospital conditions prevailed. As Daniel Yergin has chronicled, the government of Juan
Vicente Gomez of Venezuela was not only unusually cruel and authoritarian, but more
importantly, Venezuela under Gomez had very little domestic institutions that were not
fully controlled by Gomez and his family. 64 Thus, this rendered Venezuela an attractive
place for IOCs as foreign firms only needed permission from one small segment of the
country’s elite, as opposed to waiting for parliamentary decision-making or even
popularly based consensus from the ballot box. 65 And just as Mexico’s Diaz years before
63
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him, Venezuela under Gomez, essentially adopted D’Arcy’s Iranian model of concession
agreements with Royal Dutch-Shell holding the brunt of Venezuela’s oil concessions.
With the oil glut of the 1930s however, the home-IOC-host nexus in Latin
America started to unravel. Early in the 1920’s, Argentina managed to nationalize its
own oil industry, but due to the insignificance of Argentinean oil exports to global supply,
there was virtually no long-term impact to the other host producing countries and little
reaction from the bourgeoning concession system that the major IOCs were building.
Mexico was a different case altogether. Before the fall of Mexico’s Diaz and the IOCs
southern migration into Venezuela, its exports were very substantial for the US and
global economies. As some semblance of political stability took hold with the beginning
of Lazaro Cardenas’ presidency, the central Mexican government, once again, sought to
tighten its control of Mexican oil. Like many developing countries, the impact of the
Great Depression, particularly on the Mexican oil industry, was very debilitating. Early in
the Cardenas presidency, as oil workers went on strike to protest for better pay and
working conditions, the Mexican government overtly supported the workers against the
IOCs. 66 Buoyed by the prospects of having a Venezuelan alternative to Mexican oil, the
IOCs hardened their positions. As “tit-for-tat” recriminations were lobbied from one side
to the other, President Cardenas abruptly nationalized all seventeen companies that were
operating within Mexico – a move that shocked the IOCs and the global oil industry writ
large. 67 The IOCs had previously figured that due to the political instability unleashed by
66
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Mexico’s revolution, the normal operating conditions that they were accustomed to were
not present in Mexico, rendering operations within that country more difficult, which
increased the importance of alternative sources, namely Venezuela. Moreover, as prices
were at historic lows, the IOCs also assumed that the Mexican government would be far
more dependent on them for export and pricing, and hence more pliable, as opposed to
periods where supplies were tight and demand was high. Yet, total state expropriation
was something that very few expected, especially in such an important producer country.
Once nationalization became a reality, the majors, both individually and collectively,
sought help directly from their home governments – a pattern of behavior that would be
exhibited many more times to come. It was only with the US government’s reaction to
the Mexican expropriation that acted as the catalyst for the domino cascade of
concessional revisionism. Based upon his administration’s “Good Neighbor” policy,
which essentially came to signify a reworking of the US relationship with its much
weaker neighbors in the Western Hemisphere,
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President Roosevelt chose not to

intervene on behalf of American IOCs in Mexico. Without the US backing its firms in
Mexico, the other IOCs, most notably Royal Dutch Shell was unable to obtain sufficient
British and Dutch support to challenge Cardenas in a meaningful way.
Mexico’s nationalization, though successful, came with a heavy short-term price.
Most of the high skilled engineers and operation managers from the IOCs immediately
left the country. PEMEX, the new Mexican national oil company, had to rebuild a new
managing echelon to substitute the tremendous amount of the industrial brain drain that
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had left. Nevertheless, the successful nationalization created a powerful and enduring
precedent for the other producing countries in the developing world. Half-way across the
globe from the Middle East, the news of Mexico’s nationalization brought intrigue to
Middle Eastern countries, including to vociferous Iran, whose 1933 ill-fated
nationalization attempt under the Shah Reza Pahlavi had the left the monarch partially
humiliated. Just like Mexico, the global economic downturn and the subsequent Great
Depression dramatically plummeted oil prices, which cause the governments of
producing countries to agitate for more control over their oil. In the Iranian case, the host
government was far too weak to stand up to Anglo-Iranian and their British backers. Yet
for Mexico, the timing was a great contributing factor to its nationalization success, in
addition to the fact that it was dealing with a more sympathetic US government, as
opposed to a recalcitrant Britain. Having transpired on the eve of World War II, and born
out of the same vein of concern, Mexico’s nationalization provoked a new sense of
caution amongst IOC executives and their home governments. It was at the height of the
World War II in 1943, where the fear of a domino effect materialized in Venezuela, when
the countries oil industry underwent a ‘thorough reorganization’, ‘spurred on by a
number of different factors of which pressure for higher taxes’ on foreign firms was an
‘important one.’
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Fearing a Mexican repeat, the US actively chose to midwife the

negotiations, which produced a much more compliant, though determined Venezuelan
initiative. Throughout the deliberations, the principle Venezuelan concern was the
readjustment of tax laws, which ultimately made all multinationals liable at 12 percent,
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crossing all sectors of industry. 70 Coincidentally, the Caracas government was looking to
implement the same the relationship with foreign multinationals that the U.S. had with
the foreign firms that leased oil rights offshore or on federal American land. In
successfully doing so, ‘Venezuela’s sovereign right to set the rate of income tax was
established’, using its newly acquired power to ‘increase the rate of corporate tax in 1947
so that the total “government take” of royalties and tax would always be 50% of the
profits’, while the IOCs would retain the other 50%. 71 This arrangement became official
in 1948. And while the Caracas government was overthrown in a military coup shortly
afterward, unlike the Iranian case where oil agreements often vacillated with particular
regimes, the 50/50 template that was born in Venezuela ultimately remained. 72
Whether the Venezuelan case was a result of the original concessional framework,
the Caracas regime’s adept negotiation skills, or Washington’s fear of an impact on
global oil supply during a time of war, in all probability, all of the aforementioned
variables were contributing factors in how a developing state secured its rights from
powerful multinationals and the world’s great powers by non-violent means. Nonetheless,
as word of the 50/50 profit sharing arrangement swept the Middle East, it elicited
different reactions from all parties concerned, with the Americans ambivalent, resigning
themselves to an inevitable Venezuelan type outcome, the British strongly resisting,
while each host state attempted to reconcile the Venezuelan precedent in their own
dealings with the IOCs.
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The spread of the 50/50 arrangement
While events in Mexico and later in Venezuela set the precedent for the 50/50
arrangement between IOCs and host governments, it was WWII, and its immediate
aftermath, particularly the Korean crisis and the beginnings of mutual antagonism
between the US and USSR that created the context for its expansion. Just as WWI created
the major scramble for oil by IOCs, the beginning of WWII resurrected the specter of
possible shortages and supply disruption to the advanced economies of the major world
powers. As a result, the IOCs renewed their efforts to secure new sources of supply,
particularly in the Middle East. For firms left out of concessionary arrangements in the
Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), especially American multinationals, such as Standard Oil
of California (SOCAL) or Texaco, this was a prime opportunity to recoup what they had
lost when the doors of the IPC closed. As exploratory efforts were underway in the
Persian Gulf island of Bahrain, US IOCs looked to the new Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
which in 1933 SOCAL had signed a concession agreement for exploration. In a joint
venture that produced the California Arabian Standard Oil Company, or CASOC (later to
become the Arabian American Oil Company, or ARAMCO), SOCAL and Texaco began
to rapidly expand exploratory efforts, which eventually paid off when oil in commercial
quantities was discovered in the Kingdom in 1938. 73
Furthermore, as the war clouds over Europe loomed once more, US concerns on
supply and future access to energy were again resurrected, boding well for the
SOCAL/Texaco venture as Washington once again displayed intense interventionist
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behavior in hopes of keeping the foreign concessions solely for American firms.
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Subsequently, to entice the new Saudi government, ‘on the initiative of the State
Department, supported by SOCAL and Texaco, President Franklin Roosevelt declared
Saudi Arabia eligible for American Lend-Lease assistance in February 1943’, with a tacit
quid pro quo offer that, in no uncertain terms, proposed that the joint SOCAL/Texaco
enterprise ‘would create an oil reserve in Saudi Arabia whose contents would be made
available to the U.S. government at prices below those on the world market’ in exchange
for future loans and credit. 75 Nevertheless, Washington’s ostensive involvement had its
limits, with a failed attempt to create an Anglo-American Agreement, which many feared
would result in a joint British-American cartel. As a result, the US, like its European
counterparts, utilized its multinationals as vehicles for the state’s interest.
As production in Saudi Arabia grew, it was soon realized by the newly formed
venture that both SOCAL and
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of New Jersey and SOCONY, both firms that were bound to the IPC, were in such a
position to meet that need, with Jersey chronically suffering from limited access to crude,
and ‘concerned about being excluded from the richest, lowest-cost concession in the
world.’ 77 Yet, as both Jersey and SOCONY were bound to the IPC and the Red Line
Agreement, an overt violation would set bad precedent. Notwithstanding, this did not
dissuade Washington, and behind the scenes, though with strong objections from the
French, ‘the terms worked out among the IPC members dissolved the Red Line
Agreement’, however leaving the skeptical French the right to ‘draw larger shares of oil
from IPC production than their proportionate holdings in IPC would have allowed.’ 78
Eventually, what became ARAMCO, a sole multi-party American concession,
allocated 30% to Standard Oil of California, Texaco, and SOCONY respectively, with
10% provided for SOCONY. With the end of hostilities in Europe, only to be followed
by the beginnings of the US-USSR Cold War, the US government took an active role in
the relationship that American IOCs had with the Saudi government. 79 Fearing Soviet
designs on Middle Eastern oil, which had been recently manifested in the Azerbaijan
crisis in Iran, where the Soviet military only grudgingly withdrew from Iranian territory
by reason of American pressure, 80 the US increasingly became sensitive to the legitimate
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concessionary grievances from producing countries and the possibility of Soviet
exploitation of those grievances. And as Francisco Parra has explained, by reason of this
concern, the US figured that more favorable concessionary arrangements for the host
governments ‘were desirable and probably inevitable after the adoption of 50/50 in
Venezuela,’ and thus, the 50/50 arrangement that US IOCs and Saudi Arabia eventually
agreed upon ‘became a well-orchestrated joint undertaking of ARAMCO, its parent
companies, the US State Department and the US Treasury, designed to offer to Saudi
Arabia promptly and voluntarily what many recognized would sooner or later have to be
conceded throughout the Middle East.’ 81 This made Saudi Arabia the first regional
country to adopt the 50/50 profit sharing arrangement, which only a few short years later
spread to both the Iraq and Kuwait consortiums, despite British reluctance. 82
Changes in the Imperial roles in the Middle East and 50/50 challenged in Iran
When news of the 50/50 arrangement that American IOCs, in collaboration with the US
government made with Saudi Arabia, reached Tehran, it both enraged and emboldened
the Iranian government. Shah Reza Pahlavi’s ill-fated nationalization attempt in 1933,
five years prior to Mexico’s, and his 1941 forced abdication of the throne and subsequent
exile by the British and Soviet invasion of Iran in the midst of WWII, had severally
antagonized all segments of Iranian society by reason of the constant intervention in
Iranian domestic affairs, and stringent hold that Britain, through Anglo-Iranian, had on
Iranian oil.
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Under these conditions, after decades of attempting to incrementally change the
structure of the original concession, ‘Iranian resentment against the British oil monopoly
flared into full-scale confrontation.’

83

While Iranian methods were reactionary, their

stipulations were quite banal. Tehran, witnessing the 50/50 paradigm being offered and
eventually adopted by the major host countries, ‘called for legislation forcing AngloIranian to split its profits with Iran fifty-fifty, as ARAMCO had recently done across the
Persian Gulf in Saudi Arabia.’ 84 The initial British reaction was to fully reject the Iranian
government’s demands, confidant that Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who they helped install
after the forced exile of his father, was able to confront nationalist Iranian politicians
calling for expropriation. However, as protests only grew, under newly elected Prime
Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, just like the Mexican nationalization under Cardenas,
the oil nationalization issue had evolved to being one of national sovereignty and
independence. And while the British only later grudgingly accepted terms to negotiate,
possibly to arrive at the inevitable 50/50 profit sharing arrangement that had become the
norm in the concessionary system, delays on their part and the mutual recriminations
from one side to another had already unleashed the desire for full nationalization – just as
in Mexico.
Yet, the Iranian expropriation was dissimilar from what Cardenas managed to do
in 1938, which ultimately rendered a completely different response from the major IOCs
and their host governments. While both Iranian and Mexican oil had significant impact
upon global supply and the roots of their respective governments’ nationalization
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attempts were generally the same, the context in which the nationalization’s occurred
were very different, ultimately leading to vastly different outcomes. The first important
difference was the nature of the concessionary system in Iran, as opposed to other host
states. While in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, along with their Latin American counterparts,
there existed the presence of several IOCs, often times from differing home countries,
which allowed the respective host government to varying degrees to play one off against
another, Anglo-Iranian’s exclusive concession left the Iranian government alone to
negotiate with a powerful IOC, backed by the dominant British government and her allies.
Furthermore, as Anglo-Iranian was the sole concession holder in Iran, other IOCs,
whether the majors or smaller independent firms, were either to weak or unwilling to
challenge Britain’s prevailing position in Iranian oil. What this eventually created, which
coincided and was exacerbated by the immense importance that the British Royal Navy
placed in Iranian crude, was a British dependency on a subdued and strangulated Iranian
state, with little control over its resources. These concessionary arrangements and the
dependency that Britain had on Iran did not exist in Mexico from other IOCs or home
governments.
The second major difference was timing. Mexican nationalization occurred on the
eve of WWII, where the major economies were concerned about supply shortages and
access. Due to this concern, as mentioned previously, the home governments of the IOCs
operating in Mexico, particularly the US, chose to cautiously approach the Mexican
nationalization as not to antagonize the government, ultimately accepting the outcome of
Mexico’s actions and the subsequent Venezuelan initiative that was the catalyst for the
50/50 paradigm of profit sharing. This helped dampen concerns and avoid the crippling
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supply disruptions that so many feared. Iranian nationalization, however, both its 1933
attempt and its successful implementation in 1951, transpired at a time of relative global
political stability and in eras of low oil prices, where the concerns of supply shortages,
access, and prices were almost nonexistent. This evoked far less sympathy for the Iranian
government’s decision by the home governments of the major IOCs. In other words,
unlike Mexico or Venezuela, Iran had no advocate within the international system. And
while the US initially attempted to mediate between the two parties, because of Britain’s
insistence, 85 and the overarching fear that the US had of supposed communist elements
within Iran, the US ultimately sided with London and Anglo-Iranian. 86
The third major difference was geographic in nature, in that Iran’s borders with
the USSR automatically evoked tremendous American and European anxiety regarding
Soviet designs on Middle Eastern oil – which considering Moscow’s behavior towards
Iran during the immediate aftermath of WWII, was clearly logical. So deep and pervasive
was this concern, and heavily influenced by Iranian nationalization in 1951, that the US
and the UK began to develop a joint policy of “oil denial” in the Middle East, in the event
that hostile forces, whether intrinsic to the host producing country or foreign in nature,
such as a Soviet invasion, would attempt to take over oil production in a respective oil
producing state, chiefly in those states that the US and European IOCs were operating in.
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Under the oil denial agreement, the US and UK had devised sabotage plans for the

‘removal of key parts, destruction of stocks and demolition of surface facilities …that
would be usable by an enemy’, in which two ‘variations’ were sketched out: ‘a selection
of targets for destruction that will render the facilities unusable and un-repairable by an
enemy for a period of 6-12 months and a selection of priority targets for destruction
under "crash conditions".’
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In destroying or severally debilitating the oil fields’

functionality and the equipment for extraction and transport, two main objectives would
become theoretically feasible: rendering void, at least for the short term, Soviet
acquisition of key oil wells and reserves in a host producing country and in the event that
hostile domestic forces in a host producing country would obtain power, acquiring new
leverage over the new political order. Eventually, the US and UK divided responsibilities
for these contingent plans, with the former being responsible for the Arabian Peninsula
while the latter would be responsible for affairs across the Persian Gulf in Iran and Iraq.
With these in mind, it is important to note that while the UK and US ultimately
arrived at an agreed approach towards Iranian nationalization, particularly the
Mossadegh-led government, and their initial individual assessments of the situation when
nationalization became reality in February of 1951 was vastly different. As Anthony
Sampson has noted, the US, under the Truman administration, was unsympathetic to
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Anglo-Iranian’s refusal to even consider what the grievances of their host government, 89
which partly was a residue of FDR’s approach to Mexico and Venezuela. But with the
arrival of the Eisenhower administration, the escalation of the US-USSR Cold war
subsumed any empathy towards the Iranian position, as the home governments,
particularly the US and the UK, forcefully supported the position of the majors. The
British response to Iranian nationalization, particularly before a joint UK-US strategy
could be devised, was to apply a crippling boycott and denial of Iranian oil in the market.
During this time, Anglo-Iranian’s middle management team in the Abadan oil refinery in
Iran and in other oil fields in the country had either left the country or stopped working
altogether. Thus, with the boycott and the severe decline in oil revenues, the Iranian
government quickly became destabilized and vulnerable to external manipulation. During
the two-year boycott, particularly near the latter end, the British, in collusion with the US
as playing the lead role, utilized the growing frustration of the populace against
Mossadegh’s premiership, as the boycott of Iranian oil was having devastating effect
upon the Iranian economy. Under the leadership of Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., a CIA political
action officer, and in collaboration with Iranians loyal to the monarchy’s
accommodationist position on Iranian oil and its relations with Western powers in general,
the US and the UK orchestrated Operation Ajax in August of 1953, using largely paid
mobs to storm the Prime Minister’s office and demanding his resignation. 90
With public discontent bowling over because of the deteriorating economic
conditions within the country, and having now faced visible signs of opposition amongst
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the pro-monarchial elite within the country, with no great power in the international
system that was sympathetic to his nationalization policies, Mossadegh was forced to
resign, and spent the remainder of his days in house arrest, permanently exiled from
politics. Though the ramifications of the coup against Mossadegh would be fully seen
decades later in the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the American and British perceptions of
the events of August of 1953 viewed the “success” of the coup through solely the Cold
War prism. In his Presidential Diaries reflecting on Operation Ajax, US President
Eisenhower clearly manifested this perception, while also acknowledging the economic
reality that Iran faced after the coup, chiefly in the global oil market:
Another recent development that we helped bring about was the
restoration of the Shah to power in Iran and the elimination of Mossadegh.
The things we did were "covert." If knowledge of them became public, we
would not only be embarrassed in that region, but our chances to do
anything of like nature in the future would almost totally disappear.
Nevertheless our agent there, a member of the CIA, worked intelligently,
courageously and tirelessly… Now if the British will be conciliatory and
display some wisdom; if the Shah and his new premier, General Zahedi
will be only a little bit flexible, and the United States will stand by to help
both financially and with wise counsel, we may really give a serious defeat
to Russian intentions and plans in that area. Of course, it will not be so
easy for the Iranian economy to be restored, even if her refineries again
begin to operate. This is due to the fact that during the long period of shut
down of her oil fields, world buyers have gone to other sources of supply.
These have been expanded to meet the need and now, literally, Iran really
has no ready market for her vast oil production. However, this is a
problem that we should be able to help solve. 91
While it has conventionally been understood that the British government and
Anglo-Iranian (BP), came out as “winners” from the 1953 coup against Prime Minister
Mossadegh, in reality, there were no winners, but varying degrees of losers. The coup
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was a setback for Iranian democracy, indelibly maligned Britain’s image in Iran and the
region, began the cycle of mistrust of the US by the Iranian public and a large segment of
the Iranian elite, and from a material standpoint, dramatically lessened Anglo-Iranian’s
sway over Iranian exports.
After

Figure 1.3: Iranian concessions in 1954
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As the new government in Tehran formed, the Americans, being the instrumental party
behind the coup, negotiated a new consortium in order to prevent a repetition within its
own areas of interest. This witnessed Anglo-Iranian, now British Petroleum, lose 60% of
its stake in Iranian crude, forced to share the rest with Royal Dutch-Shell, five US majors,
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and CFP. 93 Another consequential ramification of Mossadegh’s downfall, and the new
consortium that was developed under American auspices was the legality of ownership of
Iranian reserves. As Daniel Yergin has noted, though in other host countries, the
concessionaries had the legal mandate over the host’s country’s reserves, in Iran,
dominion over the its underground crude reserves was transferred back to the Iranian
state.
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And though weak and highly dependent upon foreign powers, this gave the

Pahlavi monarchy breathing room to carve out, in modest terms, some modicum of
independence in its oil dealings with the West, of which would become an important
factor in both the creation and development of OPEC.
This newfound maneuverability, however modest, let to another significant
outcome from the coup against Mossadegh and the decline of British Petroleum in Iran.
The post-Mossadegh consortium arrangements in Iran, in dividing the concessions
amongst the major IOCs, allowed, for the first time, a small window for independent oil
companies to access the country. Though insignificant in amount, this new dynamic had
major long-term ramifications. The most important independent oil company at that time,
although initially seen as a nuisance to the majors, only to evolve into being a threat to
their cartelization of the global oil industry, was the Italian state-owned Ente Nazionale
Idrocarburi (ENI), headed by the ambitious Enrico Mattei. In his search to secure new
sources of supply for the Italian economy, Mattei’s ENI sought to undercut the majors by
offering far more favorable profit sharing conditions. After securing a small but
significant 75/25 profit sharing arrangement with Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, ENI
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capitalized upon the consortium flux in Iran, and in 1957 signed a contractual agreement
with the Shah that, as Leonardo Maugeri has stated, introduced a new oil formula that
officially broke the 50/50 profit sharing precedent, but more importantly created the next
template for the continuation of the domino cascade that would eventually affect the
relationships between other firms and producing countries. 95 Under the new terms, Iran
would be entitled to 50% of ENI’s gross profits in the form of a tax, and then divide the
company’s net profits by 50%, which in turn, would render that 75% of profits would go
to the Iranian government. 96 Maugeri also details that under the contractual stipulations,
the company would ‘cover the initial costs of exploration’ and ‘only after oil was
discovered would’ the newly formed Iranian National Oil Company (NIOC) and ENI
equally split the costs of exploration, and would dually manage SIRIP, the joint company
created by the agreement between NIOC and ENI.
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Thus, not only was the 50/50

precedent now officially broken, it for the first time, brought in the host country via the
newfangled concept of the national oil company, in joint administration of oil production.
ENI’s move would soon create another remaking of the nature of the oil industry, ending
one chapter, while beginning another.
The Birth of OPEC
Just as the development of the concessionary arrangements within the home-IOC-host
nexus was not just attributable to market forces, but had consequential geopolitical and
domestic political determinants behind them, OPEC’s formation and the early years of its
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institutionalization was also a product of the confluence of these factors. Within this
Embryonic phase of OPEC’s institutional life, the beginnings of the creation of the
determinants behind what ultimately OPEC behavior is predicated upon began to emerge.
It was at the market forces, intrastate, and then outside actor influence levels (in
that order) that, taken together, created the context, rationale, and space for OPEC’s
formation. The convergence of these three factors ultimately produced a unity of purpose
amongst member states, facilitating inter-member dialogue wherein bilateral or
multilateral issues at the interstate level (i.e. political differences, regional rivalries, etc.)
did not impede cooperation and collaboration in the Organization’s creation. This genesis
can be traced to the alignment of three major trends within the international system that
correspond to the three determinant levels at work in this Embryonic period: 1.) the
changing nature of the global oil industry, particularly the supply and demand dynamics
and oil pricing within the global economy at that particular time 2.) the unique economic
and security dynamics within OPEC member states in the immediate years before and
after the Organization’s founding; 3.) the beginnings of the breakdown of the home-IOChost nexus and the willingness or incapability of major powers to halt that trend. As will
be explained, the new dynamics at work at the macro level in the global oil market,
forced the major IOCs to continuously lessen prices and manipulate exports in order to
retain their market shares. However, in doing so, the major IOCs brought about
substantial economic hardships on host producing countries, which at that particular time
were facing both unprecedented economic and security challenges that could not tolerate
a diminution in their oil income.
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Compounding the new changes in the global oil market and internal dynamics of
proto-OPEC states was the American-Soviet Cold War, which led to the divergence of
US geopolitical interests with that of the major IOCs, ultimately sundering the homeIOC-host nexus. This created the groundwork and the opening for the collusion of
producing countries, which led to the formation of OPEC, culminating in the
Organization’s collective nationalization declaration in 1968, and ultimately the
disintegration of the concessionary system that defined the global oil industry since its
inception.
Market forces
The immediate pre-OPEC global oil dynamics
By the 1950’s, 85% of the global oil industry outside the US, Canada, the USSR, and
China – from dominion over the reserves, extraction and refining to the mid-stream
activities such as transportation, to marketing and selling at the consumer level – were
controlled by the major international oil companies that eventually became known as the
Seven Sisters,
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in addition to the French CFP.
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While the earlier discussed 50/50

arrangement between the host governments and IOCs, with often times the IOCs’ home
governments acting as backers of their firms’ interests, caused a sea change in the
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functionality of the oil industry, it eventually established a normative principal of
operation that lasted well into the early years of OPEC. The success of the 50/50
arrangement, measured by its longevity, had many factors, but a critical component of its
durability was the skill of the major IOCs (i.e. the Seven Sisters and CFP) to hold
together their integrated cartel over the global oil industry, primarily by controlling prices
and crude oil output into the global economy. However, it was this proclivity from the
major IOCs to continuously maintain their dominance over the market, that ultimately
engendered a new cycle in the prior mentioned “domino cascade”, which eventually
forced the disparate host producing countries into collusion, ultimately ending the 50/50
paradigm and engendering the collective nationalization declaration by the incipient
OPEC. The seeds of this new “domino cascade” can be found in the immediate postWWII economic environment.
The same cycle that appeared in the immediate years before WWI, which
produced the oil scramble in the inter-war years, only to witness new sources of supply
and increased output enter the market, was replayed in the aftermath of WWII.
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Aggravating the supply fears from WWII was the individual privatization of
transportation in developed countries, as middle class consumers at the individual level,
for the first time, in Western European countries, Japan, Canada, and more
consequentially, the United States, obtained the means to possess automobiles. In
response to the growing consumer demand at the individual level, not just the war-time
and immediate post-war concerns of the great powers, the major IOCs significantly
enhanced their profiles in the Middle East and Latin America, and began expanding oil
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output from their respective concessions. And just as had happened in the inter-war
period, with time, increased supplies relieved anxieties, ultimately leading to a market
surplus, which facilitated and even encouraged the rise of the personal ownership of the
individual’s means of transportation.
However, a side effect of this same cycle that transpired in both World Wars and
their aftermaths was a new constellation of forces that threatened the market-shares of the
major IOCs like never before. In the first instance during WWI and its immediate
aftermath, this was either not as apparent or definitely not as decisive. The new threat to
the major’s dominance came simultaneously from two sources: the rise of the
independent, small firms that for the first time had the tangible ability to access reserves
outside the major’s control; and the growing production from the Soviet Union, only to
be exacerbated by new discoveries in the Soviet bloc. A particular fear of the major IOCs
was the merging of these two disparate forces, meaning the potential collusion of
independent firms with accessible, cheap Soviet crude – a reality that was slowly
beginning to take shape. The major’s, however, recognized how this new constellation of
new players and new supplies (and even new host countries) could severally erode their
market dominance, if not decisive action was taken. Therefore, their reaction was to
manipulate the market in such a way as to drown out competition, by making it
economically unattractive and even unfeasible for the independent firms to enter or
sustain themselves in the market.
The majors were able to do this because of the peculiarities of how prices and
global supply were calculated at that. As Bassam Fattouh has catalogued, the majors’
control of the upstream, midstream, and downstream aspects of the global oil industry
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allowed them to manage the ‘rate of supply of crude oil going into the market through
joint ownership of companies’ that operated in the host countries, which meant that the
‘vertically and horizontally integrated industrial structure of the oil market’ rendered the
global crude trade ‘to a large extent a question of inter-company exchange with no free
market operating outside these companies’

control.’
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This dynamic obviated

significant amounts of “loose crude” to be sold by third parties, ultimately being
responsible for keeping, for so long, independents firms from breaking into the global
crude market in any meaningful way. 102 The ramifications of this meant that the ‘host
governments did not participate in production or pricing of crude oil and acted only as
competing sellers of licenses or oil concessions,’ which in return, they would acquire ‘a
stream of income through royalties and income taxes ’ of whatever the majors exported
from their territories, at whatever price the majors sold their crude for. Yet while the
majors were concerned with market share protection, they needed a formula to systemize
this process, in order for the host governments to know how the remuneration for crude
leaving their territories, based upon the majors’ profits, was being calculated.
This system of how the majors sold oil in the global economy became known as
the posted price – again having the binary purpose of cartel-esque protection policies
while also providing the host governments a structure of how they would be compensated
for their crude. As Robert Mabro has explained, the logic of the posted price was that it
publicly conveyed what any entity would accept or offer for ‘a barrel of crude oil or a
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tonne of petroleum products.’ 103 As the majors controlled most of the infrastructure of
the global oil industry, the prices they set became the standard on how oil was traded.
And as Mabro has pointed out, because the host governments did not control any
significant lever of the oil industry, but were mere bystanders to the IOCs operating in
their territory, they gradually understood that the posted price matrix, in which they
would receive a tax from the profit of what the IOCs made from the extraction, shipment,
and sell of their crude, left no other formulation, ‘such as spot prices or long-term
contract prices…suitable for the purpose of tax computations.’ 104 In other words, the oil
export revenues that the host governments, to varying degrees, so depended upon were at
the whim of whatever posted price the major IOCs set. Thus, when the majors witnessed
the formation of the independent firms, with the steady rise of cheap Soviet oil,
potentially threatening their market dominance, the market manipulation policies of
lowering the posted price in order to undercut new competition had, with time, severe and
lasting consequences for the host governments, as the latter witnessed the steady decline
of a major portion of their national revenues. Nevertheless, while the host governments
were certainly used to the vicissitudes of the majors’ export and pricing policies in order
to maintain the integrity of their global cartel, the period immediately before and after the
formation of OPEC proved to be quite unique, eliciting markedly different reactions from
the host governments and the major powers, most consequentially the US.
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Intrastate dynamics
The Internal Picture of the main proto-OPEC member states
Though each proto-OPEC economy differed from one another, possessing varying
strengths and vulnerabilities, all of them heavily depended upon the revenue that they
received from the taxes of their oil exports. In the immediate pre-OPEC environment,
however, the gradual decline in revenues, by reason of the majors’ market manipulation
policies, exacerbated a dangerous economic, political, social, and security reality within
the host countries. For reasons ranging from severe national security concerns from
foreign threats, in that additional spending on military hardware was warranted, to
economic difficulties due to demographic changes, to political upheavals from domestic
oppositional forces, many of the host governments, simultaneously, found themselves in
alarming to dire economic circumstances – all of which was happening in the beginning
stages of the US-Soviet Cold War.
In Iran, the massive political and economic instability resulting from the coAmerican/British embargo of the country, by reason of Prime Minister Mohammad
Mossadegh’s oil nationalization efforts, and the latter’s downfall in 1953, was still
reverberating throughout the country. Though the US-backed Pahlavi dynasty’s
dominance was renewed after the coup, as a result of the American and British
intervention in his favor, the economic deterioration in post-embargo Iran only added to
the simmering political crisis in the country that never faded by Mossadegh’s ouster. Due
to Iran’s long border with the Soviet Union and fearing Soviet influence over Iranian
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domestic affairs, 105 the US apprehension about Iranian internal dynamics forced it to
undergo a thorough review of its assessment of Iran’s economy and its political dynamics.
In a report by the US National Security Council, which was completed only a year after
OPEC’s founding, but was brought to the forefront in the wake of the demise of Prime
Minister Jafar Sharif-Emami’s first term (the fourth prime minister after Mossadegh), the
American diagnosis of Iran’s economic and political realities was quite grim:
The continuing trend toward revolution and chaos in Iran has reached the
point where the US must take vigorous action. At the present time our
position in Iran depends upon a regime that is pro-West but fragile and
increasingly vulnerable to opposition pressures, most of them neutralists
106
. There is a growing chance of domestic strike leading to chaos, or
coups by rightist or leftist cliques, or Soviet-managed subversion. Any of
these would probably lead, not to a hard neutralism with which the United
States could live, but to such weakness and division as to make Iran
incapable of withstanding Soviet pressures. It is this imminent possibility,
rather than possible Soviet or Soviet-supported aggression, which is the
greatest threat to US interest in Iran. 107
The task force went onto recommend that the US use financial and military aid, along
with political support at the domestic and international level to back the new Prime
Minister Ali Amini and promote efforts at economic liberalization, infrastructure
modernization, and the gradual political reform of the Shah’s system. 108 However, as the
uncertainty in Iran continued, only to be exacerbated by a scheduled end of US aid to Iran,
which had been planned months prior, Amini’s continuance as Prime Minister became
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politically untenable, and in similar fashion to his predecessors, abruptly resigned. As
Amini’s possible resignation was a principal fear of the earlier mentioned NSC study, his
abrogation of the prime ministership severally affected Washington’s calculus towards
Iran and the wider region.
In August of 1961, in an earlier version of second track diplomacy, Time
Magazine’s C.D. Jackson secured a secret interview with the Shah of Iran and reported
his findings back to the US government. In his report, Jackson makes several references
to the scheduled end of US aid to Iran, which after the 1953 coup against Mossadegh had
markedly increased in both military and economic terms, particularly in the late 1950s.
109

Within the interview, the Shah explained his country’s financial difficulties to Jackson

in rather candid form. According to Jackson, Iran’s economy, at the dawn of OPEC’s
founding, broke down into three sectors: “the military sector; the national improvement
or national plan sector, which [was] largely financed by the oil revenues; and the normal
running of the government, which is where [the Shah depended] heavily upon grants in
aid.” 110 Furthermore, the Shah conveyed to Jackson how Iran’s economic difficulties
were affecting its defensive military abilities in countering Soviet threats against the
country. 111 In other words, with the decline in the posted price in tandem with reduced
aid from the West, Iran’s domestic political and economic climate had severally
worsened, only to be aggravated by Soviet fears, which pushed the Iranian government to
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divert dwindling resources for development and government funding towards military
expenditures, which only perpetuated the internal crisis.
In neighboring Iraq, the domestic scene in the country resulting from the
downward pressure on oil prices and the effects on the government’s revenues was
severally intensified by the political upheaval and later fallout from the July Revolution
of 1958, which wiped out the entire infrastructure of the Iraqi monarchy from the
political scene, only to set up a fragile republic under the stewardship of General Abdul
Karim Qassim. With the demise of the US-friendly Hashemite dynasty in Iraq, the US
assessment of Qassim’s hold on power, seen through the Cold War prism, was mixed, yet
one of foreboding:
the Communists in Iraq with Soviet advice and assistance have reached a
serious position of strength. Qassim…has shown no inclination to move
against the Communists. His open reliance upon Communist support
strongly suggests either (1) that he is the dupe or willing tool of the
Communists or (2) that he is fearful that he will be forced to share or
ultimately relinquish power if he calls upon the army and/or other
nationalist elements for help in suppressing the Communists… even
assuming he is not a Communist or dupe of the Communists, we see little
prospect of Qassim’s moving effectively to stem the growth of Communist
strength. 112
As a result, the US and other Western power’s assessment of their influence in postmonarchial Iraq was that it was quite limited, as any overt intervention would possibly
invite a more robust Soviet presence, with unforeseen consequences. 113 Moreover, the
meteoric rise of Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, particularly the Egyptian union with Syria,
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in the form of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958, dramatically escalated fears in
Washington on the possibility of the UAR’s intervention in an unstable Iraq. 114 Thus,
unlike the rise of Mossadegh in Iran, because of what many feared was Soviet penetrative
contagion in addition to enticements of Pan-Arabism directed towards Arab states, the
US and Western powers took a very nuanced position towards Iraq, with what the US
termed as ‘maximum degree of flexibility’. 115
Across the Persian Gulf, the intersection between declining posted price and the
concerns of the Saudi state were far less apparent, but equally as consequential. Unlike
Iran, Saudi Arabia was not recovering from a systemic boycott of its oil exports and
dissimilar to Iraq, which was suffering from massive political instability as a result of
revolution. Yet, like Iran and Iraq, its regional security concerns had major economic
ramifications on its domestic budget – of which the declining posted price only brought
additional hardship on the coffers of the Saudi state. Not only had the revolution in Iraq
escalated Saudi concerns, but as was the case in the region and amongst Western powers,
the penchant for agitation by Nasser’s UAR, significantly worsened fears in the House of
Saud. For a conservative monarchy, the elevation of Nasser’s authoritarian republicanism,
rooted in the concept of Pan-Arabism which fundamentally rejected the concept of the
Arab client regime backed by Western powers for the latter’s strategic concerns, directly
threatened not only Saudi influence on Arab affairs, but also gradually challenged the
House of Saud’s domestic standing. Though this newfound fear of Nasser’s Pan-Arabism
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drove the Saudis to divert more money into defense spending, it was the Yemen crisis of
the late 1950s, and the eventual disintegration and civil war in North Yemen that caused
mass alarm in Kingdom. 116
Taken together with the new form of government in Iraq, the rhetorical challenge
from Cairo and Damascus, and the rapid deterioration of security on the Saudi-Yemeni
frontier, the House of Saud witnessed a revolutionary Pan-Arab, republican encirclement
of their strategic environment, partly backed by Soviet political and military might.
Though markedly different in nature and scope, the same mixture of internal
economic disarray, political instability, declining oil revenues, regional flux, and the fears
of Soviet penetration were also present within the Venezuelan milieu. Being
democratically elected to his second term as President, after his exile from the country
during the dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez, Rómulo Betancourt inherited similar
domestic dynamics of political and economic disorder resulting from the downfall of the
prior regime, while also witnessing the same pattern of Soviet-sympathetic regional flux
centered in the new Castro regime in Cuba. Because of the deterioration of US-Cuban
relations after the Cuban revolution, and fearing Soviet political and military infiltration
near American borders due to the creation of an avowedly pro-Soviet government in
Cuba, the US not only attempted to confront the rise and strength of the Castro regime,
but also to contain Cuban and Soviet influence within Central and Latin America. For
this, they initiated a similar reassessment of the region, in similar fashion to what had
simultaneously been transpiring in US policy in the Middle East. Only months after the
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unsuccessful Bay of Pigs operation, launched to unseat Castro, the US, in its National
Intelligence Estimate of November of 1961, painted a bleak picture of what the
Betancourt government and Venezuela faced in the near future:
The Betancourt administration…is opposed by extreme leftists, including
the Communists and other Castro sympathizers, and also by rightist
elements, but with the support of the armed forces, has survived repeated
coup attempts, including several attempts to assassinate Betancourt.
Despite the resources available to it, the Betancourt government is beset
by severe financial problems resulting from (a) the end of the Venezuelan
oil boom with a consequent decline in the growth of income from the
petroleum industry, and (b) greatly increased expenditures for politically
necessary social welfare programs. Its difficulties have been further
complicated by a serious economic recession and heavy flight of
capital…Popular dissatisfaction and impatience with the slow rate of
economic improvement is likely to grow, especially in the congested urban
areas. This dissatisfaction will provide the Communists and other
revolutionary leftists with further opportunities for agitation against the
regime. At the same time, distrust and dissatisfaction in business circles is
likely to continue, and some rightists will continue to conspire with
reactionary military elements to overthrow the regime. Thus Betancourt
will remain under continuing threat from both the left and the right. 117
Furthermore, Venezuela’s economic disorder had only recently worsened as a result of
American oil import quotas, placed during the end of the Eisenhower administration to
buttress support for US oil firms, also for the benefit of America’s immediate neighbors,
Canada and Mexico. In this environment, while Betancourt’s political rule was not
deemed to be existentially threatened, the myriad of difficulties he faced, most notably
capital flight, 118 was feared to cause paralysis and obstruction in effective governance,
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while also limiting his chance to construct any effective post-revolutionary stability for
his successor and the country writ large. 119
Yet, by far, the producing country that would become an OPEC member only two
years after the establishment of the Organization, which faced the most dire economic,
political, and security threats was Indonesia. Though not a founding member and not
instrumental in the creation of OPEC, Indonesia’s importance as a battleground state
within the wider Cold War went beyond its oil production. The country’s proximity to
vital shipping lanes for the global economy only added to the natural significance it had
as being an oil producer. But in the wake of the country’s hard fought independence
against the Netherlands in 1949, the country’s newfound sovereignty could not be
secured as parts of the country was ravaged from the independence war, while key
sectors of its economy was still reliant upon the Dutch, with little indigenous
manufacturing capability, mass societal poverty, ethnic tensions, and an uncertain
political future. From the US standpoint, these issues were well known, not only because
the US was instrumental in brokering the peace negotiations between the Netherlands and
Indonesia, but due to, as in the aforementioned producing states, the threat of communist
infiltration. This was clearly spelled out in the US National Security Council Report on
its policy towards Indonesia in 1955, explicitly stating that the ‘loss of Indonesia to
Communist control would have serious consequences for the US and the rest of the free
world.’ 120 As the country was reeling from economic calamity after its war with the
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Dutch, it reached out for aid to whomever would provide it, and thus, among the several
political, cultural, and security assistance that the US was contemplating providing
Indonesia, was assisting the country in ‘meeting its important economic problems and in
countering attempted Communist economic penetration’.121
Amongst the many policies that the US was to pursue, the infusion of direct
American aid became a staple of its policy towards Indonesia. Furthermore, during this
period, the US treated the country’s political elite with kid gloves, as the dire economic
situation in the country, was only made worse by growing ethnic tensions that America
feared would lead towards the disintegration of the newly formed state. 122 Thus, when
Indonesia, in the late 1950s, began expropriating critical infrastructure in the country
from the Dutch, including oil infrastructure, and thus partially nationalizing them, the US
reaction was very subdued due to the fear of Soviet exploitation of Indonesian anger
against what the latter would feel was an antagonistic US position. And even in the face
of an Indonesian administration that often was quite critical of the West, because of its
history with colonialism, and had political parties in government that were openly
sympathetic with the Soviet position, the US gradually began to provide Indonesia with
modest military aid as well. 123
From Iran, to Iraq, to Saudi Arabia, to Venezuela, to Indonesia, the summation of
acute economic, political, and security peril and uncertainty in these disparate countries,
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ultimately created the conditions where more budgetary liquidity was needed by the host
countries. This ultimately would become the catalyst for effective collusion amongst the
significant oil producing countries.
The Host Countries Act
From Collusion to Creating OPEC
The simultaneous economic and political dynamics within the major oil producing
countries of that would eventually become OPEC Members caused a systemic
reassessment to how great powers in the free market economies, most consequentially the
US, viewed the relationship amongst host governments, major IOCs, and themselves. In
1960, the four countries of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia accounted for
approximately 33% of global oil production 124 and synchronous instability within them,
and the economic and security ramifications for the international system would have
ranged from the severe to the catastrophic, especially if other important producers in the
Middle East, such as Kuwait, also became unstable. This reassessment, primarily
centered in the US, which had become the leader of the free market economies, due to the
decline of European power after WWII, gradually created the rift in the strategic interests
of the great powers with the major IOCs. While the latter were solely concerned about
market share protection and constantly on guard at attempts by nationalist governments to
appropriate the oil industry in producing host countries, the US, now the sole guarantor of
the home-IOC-host nexus, had gradually developed other concerns.
The economic deterioration in many proto-OPEC states was not only viewed as a
threat to free market economies, but also a grave security concern in the Cold War rivalry
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with the USSR. Thus, while the major IOCs could in the past count on some type of
general home government support, of which the US was the linchpin, to aid and assist
their foreign operations, mainly because of supply access and market stability, the
geopolitical contest between America and the Soviet Union and concurrent events in
several producer states had now changed the formula wherein US policy was devised and
implemented.
The US policy of ‘maximum flexibility’ towards the fallout of the 1958 Iraqi
Revolution gradually expanded to oil producing countries in general. The host countries,
though weak individually, understood the latent power of the “domino cascade” in the oil
industry, especially in light of the 50/50 precedent. Moreover, they implicitly understood
that regardless of the differences between them, and in the case of Venezuela and Middle
Eastern producers, the vast distance, their respective interests as it related to greater
control over their oil exports and remuneration was more readily achieved by collusion
and unity. Under Betancourt, and partly as a reaction to the US import quotas, Venezuela,
having never surrendered its ‘legislative prerogatives on taxation’ increased the
government revenue from all of the country’s oil industry to close to ‘70% of net profits’.
125

The Middle Eastern producers immediately took notice, and due to Venezuela’s

preeminent position in the global oil industry at that time, in that the country was the
world’s third largest crude producer, 126 the possibility of a renegotiation of the 50/50
arrangement now seemed possible.
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A year after Venezuela’s new agitation, in 1959, the important producing
countries of the Arab world, with the addition of Iran and Venezuela, met in Cairo and
held what was dubbed the First Arab Petroleum Congress, which essentially was a
meeting of the minds of host countries in hopes of finding a way to collectively revisit the
50/50 arrangement that was no longer able to satisfy their domestic budgetary needs. 127
On the sidelines of that meeting, under Venezuelan insistence and initiative,
representatives of the five major host producing countries of the world – Iran, Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, Venezuela, and Kuwait – came to an understanding to systemically collaborate
with each other in order to change the contours of the profit sharing between the IOCs
and the hosts. 128 Yet, though they signed what was to become the MAADI Pact to
facilitate collaboration amongst themselves, as the months dragged on, very little, if any
came of the meeting. There was a simple explanation for this. Alirio Parra, a close
assistant to Venezuelan Energy Minister, Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonso, one of the
signatories of the MAADI Pact (who was both instrumental in the early collaborations
between producing countries and is considered as one of the Founding Fathers of OPEC),
has stated that Pérez was the only official with his government’s backing and authority
when that document was signed. 129 According to Parra, it was only after the major IOCs
in August of 1960, further reduced the posted price, which only worsened the budgetary
constraints of producing countries that the spirit of the MAADI Pact started to come to
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fruition. 130 If anything, though the Pact was only a gentleman’s agreement in the months
after it was signed, it did provide clarity to producing countries on the need for collusion,
and the simultaneous willingness to do so. In Iraq, the economic pressures on Abdul
Karim Qassim’s new Republican regime had already forced it to individually challenge
the 50/50 arrangement with the concession holders of the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC).
131

Though Qassim was able to enlarge Iraq’s profit shares to 60%, the fundamental

problem for Iraq and the other hosts was not just the percentage of profits but also prices
and the volume of exports, which was totally in the domain of the IOCs control.
Immediately after the August 1960 posted price reduction by the IOCs, Qassim’s regime,
already in heated negotiations with the IPC concession holders, decided to capitalize on
the renewed sense of frustration amongst the host countries, and invited them to Baghdad,
in hopes of empowering the earlier MAADI Pact into something tangible. Qassim’s
invitation was particularly striking as the new Iraqi Republican regime was extremely
suspicious of Iran and had earlier made territorial claims on Iran’s Khuzestan province
and the whole of Kuwait. Yet, for the sake of expediency, Qassim’s Iraq understood that
no effective, lasting cooperation between the producing countries could be achieved
without active Iranian and Kuwaiti participation.
A month after the IOCs further reduced the posted price, in September of 1960,
the 5 top host producing countries – Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait –
met in Baghdad in hopes of formalizing a collaboration that would halt, and possibly
reverse the declining posted price. As the representatives initiated what was to become an
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intense dialogue, the formalization behind their collusion went further than simply an
outcry by a collection of weak developing host countries. In OPEC’s first two
Resolutions, I.1 and I.2, of which Fuad Rouhani, OPEC’s first Secretary General, has
labeled the ‘embodiment’ of the Organization’s ‘constitution or charter’, 132 the Members
laid out not only their principle complaints of the profit sharing arrangement that was
fundamentally rooted in the concession system, but more so, what their primary
intentions were in regards to the future of production. Resolutions I.1 and I.2 had four
basic principles that once again altered the nature of the relations between producing
countries and large, technologically advanced oil companies, but more so revolutionized
the nature of the oil industry as a whole.

133

Firstly, the resolutions drew the direct

linkage from IOC behavior to the internal economic and security conditions within OPEC
Member states, in that it specifically stated that Members were simultaneously
‘implementing much needed development programs’ ‘financed mainly from income
derived from their petroleum exports’ and thus ‘must rely on petroleum income to a
large degree in order to balance their annual national budgets’. 134 The Members further
stated that that ‘any fluctuation in the price of petroleum necessarily affects the
implementation of the Member's programs and results in dislocation detrimental not only
to their own economies, but also to those of all consuming nations.’
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resolutions, for the first time in the history of the petroleum industry, announced a formal
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declaration of Inter-state policy formulation and regulation of production by host
countries. For years, the IOCs dealt with individual host countries separately, dividing
them amongst themselves, playing one off against another, and severally impeding
collective host state cooperation. Third, the resolutions explicitly sketched out a policy of
economic protection for all Members in the face of possible IOC sanctioning a particular
Member. The Members unambiguously stated that if such an event occurred against one
Member state, the other Members would resist efforts to increase production at the
detriment of the Member being sanctioned. And finally, the 5 Members of OPEC
formally announced plans to increase membership with a clause that was tantamount to
an open invitation to other producing states. With these four aims, the ‘principle aim’ of
the nascent OPEC became clear: ‘the unification of petroleum policies for the Member
Countries and the determination of the best means for safeguarding the interests of
Member Countries, individually and collectively.’ 136
Outside Actors
The US policy of ‘Conscious Indifference’; the fall of the Home-IOC-Host Nexus
The news of formalized collusion amongst the 5 major host producers caused varying
reactions amongst the home governments of the IOCs and the IOCs themselves, the
former being dismissive while the latter being bewildered and apprehensive. The US
Embassy in Baghdad transmitted a perfunctory report of the events in mid-September of
1960,
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and a week afterwards, at a meeting of the US National Security Council,

President Eisenhower, in his last months in office, dismissed the importance of the
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formation in its entirety, claiming that ‘anyone could break up the Organization by
offering five cents more per barrel for the oil of one of the countries.’ 138 Because the
initial impetus behind the Baghdad meeting was the August reduction in the posted price
by the IOCs, the US drew the conclusion that formalized cooperation between the hosts
could be nipped in the bud by peeling off one by individualized pricing deals, in order to
isolate the others, ultimately to split the Organization, rendering its potential for
effectiveness null and void.
However, it was not until a few weeks after OPEC’s creation where the reaction
of the IOCs could be gauged. It was here where the signs of possible divergence of
perception were seen between the US government and the IOCs. In meetings between
the US State Department and certain IOCs on methods of dealing with Soviet oil export
policies and the meaning of host state collusion under the newfangled OPEC umbrella,
IOC executives were far more circumspect than the US government assessment. 139 Leo
Welch, chairman of the board at Standard Oil of New Jersey, stated that OPEC’s
formation and possible collusion on price and exports had far reaching negative
ramifications for the oil industry, particularly for the IOCs. Specifically, Welch feared
‘that the companies will be caught between producer country controls and the demands of
consuming countries…[and that they] will no longer be able to manage their business in a
normal way since the governments would take over the determination of oil prices, the
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amounts of oil to be produced, and the destination of oil shipments.’ 140 Victor De Metz,
chairman and director-general of Compagnie Française des Pétroles, expressed strong
opposition to the groups formation for this very reason, due to the possibility that OPEC
Member states would engage in the pro-rationing of output,

141

the same market

manipulation scheme that the major IOCs had depended upon to keep intact the integrity
of their cartel.
Yet, this apprehension on the possibility of full cooperation was also coupled with
the conventional IOC assessment of the then-current power of host countries. Prorationing was greatly feared, but according to the IOCs, simply not viable at that time.
Welch went onto to attest that while ‘OPEC has been set up in a preliminary form, … it
has basic weaknesses which will prevent the development and administration of a
restriction program.’ 142 These vulnerabilities had far more to do with not price, but more
so with an integrated and collective output policy, in that OPEC Members had
fundamentally differing assessments on how to integrate their oil output with the
collective Organization’s macro output. Welch speculated that ‘Iran and Iraq would not
be reliable members since they badly need increased output,’ while the other Members
were strictly concerned about an increase to their falling royalties.
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He went onto

subscribe to Eisenhower’s policy of Member division early on, stating that the IOCs
‘could work out arrangements with individual countries to meet their most pressing
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problems.’ 144 However, Standard Oil of New Jersey evinced increasing concern about
the future enlargement of the Organization, particularly as it related to Libya. During his
meeting with the State Department, Welch revealed that Jersey executives were now in
Libya ‘attempting to convince Libyan officials that they would have much to lose by
joining OPEC’, claiming that as a result of becoming a Member, Libya ‘will have low
cost oil favorably situated for the European market.’ 145
Thus, IOCs recommended that the US government use its vast political influence
to urge OPEC Members ‘to go slowly in completing the OPEC organization and
implementing its program’,

146

and as Harold Wilkinson, Managing Director of Shell

exhorted, ‘to convey to the appropriate governments concerned the thought that it would
not be in their interest to unilaterally force private companies to act against their will.’ 147
Yet, with this admonishment came also a threat. The IOC concession holders noted that
in the event that they were forced to act against their economic interests in the host
countries, not only could this affect ‘the whole climate of private investment’ 148 but also
could engender retaliatory measures from ‘a bloc of powerful consuming countries’ while
the IOCs would be forced to set free new supplies from untapped oil reserves, hence
further weakening OPEC Member states. 149
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However, as the US weighed its options, it quickly understood that its calculations,
particularly in light of the emerging Cold War dynamics, were far more complicated than
the IOCs assessment. Moreover, the lack of an effective Soviet response, for or against
the creation of OPEC, caused even more confusion. Had the Members collusion simply
played in the hand of the Soviets, there would have invariably been the same reaction
from both IOCs and their host governments, as the Soviet Union was considered a
detriment to the Western government’s strategic interests, while the increasing Soviet oil
in the global economy was accurately viewed as a threat to the market dominance of the
IOCs. Yet, OPEC’s creation have could have gone either way for the Soviet Union. The
USSR could have hypothetically become a member of the newfangled Organization, as
there would have been clear advantages for the Soviets to do so. Nevertheless, the latter
could have equally have looked at OPEC as a rival to new markets, as the Soviet Union
was looking to enhance its share of Europe’s consuming market – an intention they
announced at the Second Arab League Petroleum Congress in Beirut only a few weeks
prior, in October of 1960. 150 After all, it was the inclusion of new, Soviet oil in the
market that caused the IOCs to continuously decrease the posted price, which is what was
causing major damages to the economies of the host governments. Aggravating this was
the fear of how economic and political calamity in the host countries, due to the lowering
of the posted price, could lead to the downfall of various host governments, which, in the
mind of many officials in the West, could easily lead to communist takeovers, and
severally upgrade and enhance the strategic profile of the Soviet Union. As formalized
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collaboration was happening at the international level, at the bilateral level, the US
witnessed the governments of host countries, either directly or indirectly, ask for aid from
Washington – all of which derived from the same economically based maladies, with
subsequent security and political ramifications.
In late November of 1960, after weighing the viewpoints of some major IOCs, the
Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Armen Meyer, conveyed a thorough
review of OPEC’s formation and the subsequent policy options that the US could
reasonably pursue. Though Meyer conceded that the catalyst that triggered OPEC’s
creation was the major oil companies reducing Middle East posted prices for crude oil,
and to possibly ‘establish some form of joint pro-rationing,’ the weaknesses within the
Organization, in line with the IOC assessment, rendered this aim ‘almost impossible to
realize.’ 151 An underlying problem, according to the US perception, that plagued OPEC
was that it did not have strength in numbers, particularly the absence of Libya and
Algeria, not to mention other important producers. Meyer’s report essentially dismissed
the possibility of Libyan and Algerian integration into the Group, as both were
‘preoccupied in becoming major oil producers,’ meaning they needed private investment
and could not afford to risk antagonizing the same sources of technology in terms of
extraction and shipping, let alone the possessors of market access.
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though Meyer cautioned that it would be extremely difficult for the US to publicly
criticize OPEC's future pro-rationing of oil when the US engages in the same practice
domestically, the ability for OPEC Members to engage in such pro-rationing policies was
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not given, as there were ‘many obstacles in the way of parceling out each country’s share
of the world’s oil market unless all producer and consumer countries are members of the
same organization.’ 153 Nevertheless, Meyer cautioned that based upon the economic and
political uncertainty in OPEC Member states, along with the persistent mistrust
concerning Soviet intention concerning OPEC Member state dynamics and their own oil
export policies, US policy options were more limited and constrained than in past eras:
When the OPEC becomes a permanent functioning organization, the US
will have three choices: (1) Support the organization. In the event the US
should support OPEC, it would probably be necessary for us to revise
existing antitrust laws to enable American oil companies to consult jointly
when discussing prices with oil producing countries. It would also seem to
violate our present policy that international commodity arrangements
should allow for equal representation between consumer and producer
countries. (2) Oppose OPEC. Should the US oppose the OPEC by pointing
out its shortcomings (as suggested by several oil company representatives),
it would undoubtedly antagonize the oil producing countries that have
joined the organization. They would view this as unwarranted interference
and as evidence that the US is working hand in glove with oil monopolies.
It would probably strengthen OPEC and encourage member countries to
take further measures to control the operations of the oil companies
working in their respective countries. There is also the danger that the
Soviet Union could exploit this antagonism. (3) Remain neutral. By not
taking sides with regard to the OPEC, the US would be carrying out its
existing policy of remaining in the background in matters affecting
relations between oil companies and oil exporting nations and thus avoid
intervening on behalf of American oil companies except in extreme cases
involving questions of security of international law. This policy gives us
the greatest flexibility and allows us to deal with petroleum matters on a
case-by-case basis. 154
Eventually, Meyer’s third policy option became the leitmotif of how the US would react
to Organization’s formation, and later institutionalization. This policy of “conscious
indifference” was further buttressed by the analysis contained within the US National
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Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 1960, where this assessment evolved. Within the broad
evaluation of Middle East, the NIE forecasted three major trends. The first concerned the
inevitable collapse of the conventionalized profit sharing arrangement, in that the US
foresaw that the ‘Western oil companies will be further weakened by erosion of the 50/50
profit sharing formula and by the joint efforts of the producing countries to control prices.’
155

The second trend concerned the fundamental incapability of OPEC Members, in the

short term, to integrate a cooperative mechanism to fundamentally control prices and
output – thus threatening major IOCs investment in their countries. The US assessment
claimed that while ‘greater participation by local governments in the management of the
oil companies is likely’, ‘large-scale nationalization of industry facilities is [not]
probable’, hence ‘companies will [not] feel compelled to liquidate their interests in the
area during the period of this estimate’.
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US dismissiveness of OPEC was only

partially due to the collective weakness of the Organization and the individual countries
of the Group. The US also factored that, at least for the short-term, ‘any effective joint
action by the producing states’, chiefly as it related to pro-rationing, would not take place,
primarily ‘because of mutual jealousy and suspicion because of competing economic
interests’, with the sole exception of the possibility of influencing the IOCs pricing
arrangement. 157 Nevertheless, the longer term forecast brought much nuance to the US
position, chiefly concerning the future survivability of the concessionary system that the
Seven Sisters created:
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…as the government of the producing countries gain greater influence in
the management of the oil industry, there will probably be a growing
number of cases in which their policies and desires conflict with those of
the Western governments….Over the longer term, even broader problems
are likely to emerge. The ultimate aim of some Middle Eastern officials
and leaders is probably an arrangement whereby the present
concessionary interests of the international oil companies in the area are
eliminated and Western companies act at most only as agents of the
producing countries. Such an arrangement would not necessarily preclude
the supply of sufficient oil for Western Europe and of sufficient revenue for
the Middle East. It might even alleviate certain political problems, which
now confront the West in its relations with the producing countries—
especially those which stem from the close association in the Middle
Eastern mind of the companies with Western governments. 158
While the US understood that eventually the concessionary arrangements would be
abolished, it did not view this possibility any longer as a threat to the interests of the West,
let alone to US interests, so long as ‘a surrender or large-scale withdrawal of Western
company interests under pressure’ which would be ‘a setback for Western prestige’, did
not take place. 159 Hence, the host countries gradual exaction of control over the price
formulation in the short-term, and the measured appropriation of the entire oil industry in
their countries in the long term, as long as it was not abrupt or humiliating, and did not
create market instability, was a scenario that the US government, the principle power
within the free market economies, could live with. And with the arrival of this consensus,
the home-IOC-host state nexus began the gradual process of disintegration.
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CHAPTER II • THE INFANCY PHASE: THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF OPEC
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION, 1961-1969

The unique confluence of circumstances in the early 1960s created the space for OPEC to
be formed without the prior backlash that was visited upon certain individual producing
countries seeking concessional revisionism. Specifically these were the following: the
changing nature within the supply and demand dynamics in the global oil industry, the
distinct economic and security circumstances within OPEC Member States, and the
beginnings of the breakdown of the home-IOC-host nexus. In the Infancy phase of
OPEC’s institutional life, many of these same factors that contributed to the
Organization’s formation carried over, evolving and expanding in their complexity.
This rendered many openings for the institutionalization of OPEC, and its
development into a legitimate international organization that the international oil
companies (IOCs), major powers, and other important global institutions eventually had
to take seriously. Though during this period, as Bassam Fattouh has noted, “OPEC acted
as a trade union whose main objective was to prevent the income of its member countries
from declining,”
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it managed to integrate many of the contradictions between its

Members domestic priorities and inter-Member rivalries with that of the collective
Organization’s stated objective of price and export collaboration.
Within this phase, the determinants that created the conditions for OPEC’s
formation became fully distinguishable and interactive, affecting both the Organization’s
behavior and how other actors interacted with it. Pertaining to Market Forces, the same
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supply and demand dynamics that forced the IOCs to continue to devalue the posted price
of crude (to keep market share dominance), were creating major ripple effects within the
international system. As cheap Soviet oil began to expand into the market, complemented
by the rise of smaller, independent oil firms, which were successful in bringing online
new sources of crude, the IOCs found themselves devoid of other options than to keep the
posted prices low. The damage that this was causing to OPEC Member states, and other
significant producers in the third world, now become fully embedded in the macro
geopolitical environment of the time, namely the Cold War. Thus, the impact of Outside
Actors on OPEC, particularly of America as the guarantor of the home-IOC-host nexus,
underwent a major transformation during this period. The reigning Cold War dynamics
and the fear of Soviet exploitation of instability within the third world gradually
broadened the strategic concerns of the West towards political and economic issues. 161
And in light of the acute economic and security crises that were transpiring within OPEC
Member states, Washington gradually evolved from its policy of conscious indifference
to OPEC’s creation, to the inevitable conscious acceptance of the Organization, later to
be complemented by active engagement with the Group.
The gradual divergence that occurred between the major IOCs and the Western
powers, exacerbated by the internal economic instability within OPEC Member States,
had a direct impact on the relations with the Organization. The Interstate relations of
OPEC Members provided much of the rationale for delay and deadlock. However, they
also led to the expansion of the Group and its formalized institutionalization throughout
much of the 1960s, in order to collectively challenge what Members felt were the abuses
161
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of the reigning concessionary system. This ultimately led to action in the form of two
tracks of negotiations for more suitable profit sharing arrangements for producers. The
first track was individual negotiations between Members and the particular consortium
that operated in their territories – primarily because of the unique traits of each
concessionary agreement. Later, the negotiations evolved to collective talks with the
IOCs, as the Organization developed a formalized mechanism to present their demands to
the major oil firms. A main ramification of this process in the Intrastate dynamics of each
State was the rise of the national oil companies (NOCs) within individual Member States.
In the years ahead, they would gradually replace the technical aspects of exploration,
production, and transit of OPEC crude oil. It was the merging of these four key
determinants in this period that eventually ended one era in the history of the oil industry,
while heralding the beginning of another, leaving the IOCs in a much weaker and isolated
position. This process was visible in negotiations between OPEC Member states and the
IOCs throughout the 1960’s, culminating in the Organization’s collective declaratory
nationalization in June of 1968, to be implemented at the beginning of the next period of
OPEC’s institutional life. 162
Market Forces:
The IOCs fight to save their market dominance
From the beginning of the 1960s, the IOCs found themselves between two irreconcilable
trends that were threatening their short-term market share dominance, with the potential
to erode their power over the very global industry they helped create. As cheap Soviet oil,
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in addition to the new sources of supply from the independents, gradually crept into the
market, fostering a much less regulated, free market, the IOCs were forced to expand
output in hopes of drowning out competitors, while also keeping the posted price of crude
at low rates. Already, by 1960, the IOCs had witnessed their domination over global
crude oil production outside of Canada, the USSR, China, and the US noticeably decline
from 85% possession to 72%. 163 Though the increase in production outside the majors’
control and the subsequent lowering of the posted price became the impetus behind the
creation of OPEC, the Organization’s formation was not the only unintended
consequence of how the major IOCs addressed the problem of new competition. As
stated previously, while OPEC’s formation caused much alarm to the IOCs and caused
confusion to Western powers, from a macroeconomic perspective, as Fadhil Chalabi,
OPEC’s former General Secretary has argued, the creation of the Organization essentially
slowed the growing instability within the global oil industry. 164 Chalabi makes the case
that had the “fierce competition of price cuts in a free market not been curbed by some
form of restrictive regulation, the continued slashing of prices would have led to a level
of competition harmful to the industry and to the major oil companies themselves.” 165
Though the Organization would gradually challenge the IOCs in new ways, its initial
establishment helped stem the tide of continued mass price erosion, which would
invariably have major negative consequences for both companies and producing
countries.

163

F.J. Chalabi, Oil Policies, Oil Myths: Analysis and Memoir of an Opec 'Insider' (I. B. Tauris, 2011), 41.

164

Ibid., 42.

165

Ibid.

85

Yet, by the time of the Group’s founding, and well into the 1960s, certain trends
had already begun to take shape that the IOCs would not be able to control in the longterm. In the year of OPEC’s founding, the share of global oil production from what were
to become the five initial Members of the Organization was 37.58%, which was wholly
controlled by the Seven Sisters, plus the French Compagnie Française des Pétroles (CFP).
166

Total global oil production in 1960 amounted to roughly 21 billion barrels. The

market flooding policies of the IOCs, with the steady increase in Soviet output and that of
the independents caused the world to witness an unprecedented surplus, so that by the
end of the decade, in effect the end of the Infancy period, global production was almost
double that of 1960. 167
Despite the fact that the IOCs were successful at keeping their competitors at
bay, they were also in a race against time, for the short-term achievement of their output
policies in order to keep intact their cartel’s integrity was more of a pyrrhic victory than a
lasting solution. The 1960 reduction in the posted price, from roughly $1.90 to $1.80 per
barrel (which being adjusted for inflation in 2013 would be $14.84 to $14.06), 168 could
not be increased by reason of the new presence of the USSR and the independent oil
companies.
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The IOCs’ responses to new competition, which directly contributed to the
decrease of the revenues of producing countries at a critical juncture in their economic
and security development, not only began to build mass resentment within OPEC but also
led to further unintended ramifications. Though causing much economic pain to OPEC
Members, the IOCs’ oil war against the USSR and the independents had the converse
effect of gradually increasing the importance of the Organization’s Member states to the
global oil industry (See Figure 2.1). During this period, as the IOCs increased output
volume, much of which came from Member states, OPEC’s collective share of global oil
production substantially increased from its 1960 figure of 37.58%, – when it had only 5
Members – to approximately 49% in 1969 – when its membership increased to 9
Members (See Figure 2.2). 169
By the early 1970s, more than half of total global oil output came from OPEC.
The net result, as will be discussed in the subsequent sections, was to increase OPEC’s
collective bargaining position vis-à-vis the major IOCs in rearranging both the terms of
the concessions and the pricing systems. Thus, in challenging the new Soviet and
independent oil firms for continued market share dominance, primarily at the expense of
OPEC Member states, the IOCs not only created the impetus for the Organization’s
formation, but also its internal expansion, increasing the importance of OPEC to the
global
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benefit.

Figure 2.1: OPEC Crude Oil Production by country, as Members joined the Organization. 1960-1971 (1000 b/d)
Source: OPEC Statistical Data . http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm
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Figure 2.2: Shares of global oil production between OPEC & non OPEC producers: 1960-1971
Source: OPEC Statistical Data . http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm
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Outside Actors
Triangulating between the IOCs and OPEC
In light of OPEC’s increasing importance to the global economy, coupled with the
economic and security vulnerabilities within Member states, all in the background of
Cold War power politics, the US position regarding the newfangled Organization,
described earlier as conscious indifference, was no longer tenable. The American
perception of the altering dynamics within the global oil industry, in the wake of OPEC’s
formation and growing reliance of the West on Middle Eastern oil was summarized in a
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meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee of the US Under Secretaries on Foreign
Economic Policies in December of 1961. In what was alluded to as the “broad
international problem” concerning the global oil industry, the participants stated:
… that not only does the Free World get two-thirds of its oil from the
Middle East now but that 50 years from now it will probably be even more
dependent …. From the security standpoint of our longer-term interest in
the broadest sense, we must consider what kind of arrangements we can
work out to insure Free World access to Middle East oil. Already we have
an irrational situation in the Middle East producing and distributing
situation. It is irrational not only economically but politically. The
international oil companies within the borders of these countries are in a
position to dominate completely the political life of the countries because
the companies are the source of the bulk of the Governments' revenues.
The companies are earning enormous amounts of money and this is
resented. This makes them a likely target for the worst kind of attack on
political and economic grounds. On the other end of the spectrum, the
companies themselves are faced with all kinds of problems. They are faced
with the surpluses of stocks and capacity, with increasing competition of
substitutes, with new oil discoveries which jeopardize their traditional
markets, with competition from Soviet oil, with having to use their Middle
East profits to cover costs of explorations elsewhere that prove sterile,
with the constant demand of the Middle East Governments for a larger
share of oil revenue, and with no flexibility on prices. These all add up to
a serious state of tension. As a result our oil companies are handicapped
in other less developed countries where the Soviets use cheap oil and oil
exploration to penetrate the countries. Shall Western companies try to
compete with the Soviets in price?...The companies are in difficulty on
exploratory concessions. They come in and spend lots of money and if they
don't find oil, they are faced with the charge that they didn't really want to
as it would have cut down on their Middle East profits. Then the less
developed countries say they will ask the Soviets to come in. The
companies are scared of OPEC because they don't think the people
running it have a sufficient understanding of the economies of oil. They
are frightened that the OPEC Governments will put international
prorationing into effect. Then there is the problem of the European
countries in connection with the Soviet oil offensive. The average person
in Italy gets his oil cheaper because Italy is importing Soviet oil.
Industrialists in Europe can produce at less cost because of Soviet oil. It is
hard, under those circumstances, to work up resistance to imports of
Soviet oil. Our argument has to be the danger of dependence on Soviet oil.
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What Washington realized a year after OPEC’s founding was that cheap Soviet oil in
addition to alternative supplies from independent firms, were creating new market
conditions that the majors could no longer control in the long term. This was already
having consequential geostrategic effects in vital European and developing countries.
Though the IOCs’ increase in production was helping to keep the Soviets and
independents at bay, there were still what amounted to be losses in key theatres,
particularly the growing dependence of some critical markets on cheap Soviet oil and
other new suppliers.
The resulting surplus in the market in turn exacerbated the internal economic
conditions within OPEC Members that were beginning to take shape before the
Organization’s founding. The IOCs were simply not in the position to increase prices, as
to offset OPEC Member states’ growing, albeit differing, budgetary liquidity problems.
And because the US dramatically feared Soviet exploitation in countries that were
undergoing economic and political instability, evinced by US financial and political
intervention in post-WWII Europe in the form of the Marshall Plan,
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its policy of

neutrality between OPEC and the oil companies became increasingly strained.
US Aid
The beginning of Indirect American influence within OPEC
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Realizing that the major firms could not fundamentally reverse the price erosion of recent
years, and being equally aware of the mounting fiscal and security pressures upon OPEC
Member states, the US began to strategically shift to a more activist policy towards
OPEC Members and those that would eventually join the Organization. This
repositioning by the US, culminated in two trends during the 1960s: the beginning (or
significant enhancement) of US economic and military aid to some key OPEC Member
states and later, the gradual, albeit reluctant, role of the US as a silent broker to the
negotiations between OPEC Members and the IOCs on concessional revisionism.
Due to the varying budgetary problems affecting governance matters, and in the
case of Saudi Arabia and Iran, distinct security threats that required significant state
resources to address, key OPEC Members, starting from the late 1950s, individually
began asking the US for economic and security aid. Although it had received significant
US assistance since the ouster of Prime Minister Mossadegh to buttress its staggering
economy, the aid that Iran was receiving was set to expire. As the Kennedy
administration took office in January of 1961, one of the earliest communications that
President John F. Kennedy received was from the Iranian Shah, Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi, written on the 26th of January 1961, which was a plea for enhanced economic
and military aid. 172
In his communications in the subsequent months, the Iranian monarch
consistently reminded the US president that his regime was “trying very hard to put
[Iran’s] house in order,” having “adopted stern measures to achieve a healthy economic
172
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and financial situation.” 173 Yet, according to the Shah, “in order to remain under the
present difficult situation and against the pressure of international communism” Iran
needed, “both in the economic and military fields…continued American help, or rather,
in all earnestness, for increasing American help.” 174
Furthermore, in addition to the challenges within the Iranian economy and the
threats coming from the USSR, the Shah explicitly mentioned the threat from Sovietaligned regional Arab regimes, specifically how they were receiving funding and military
assistance from Moscow, and their attempted interventions in Iran’s domestic affairs. 175
To the Shah, both of these processes threatened to tilt the regional security architecture
against Iran.
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And though some within the US administration were skeptical about

continual, let alone enhanced aid to Iran insisting that “through a variety of unpleasant
measures the Iranian budget can be handled without the crutch of US budgetary
assistance,” 177 ultimately, the administration relented to the Iranian request.
The Shah’s repeated pleas was only buttressed by the recommendations of the US
National Security Council’s Task Force on Iran, sketched out in their report, "A Review
of Problems in Iran and Recommendations for the National Security Council", which
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recommended a robust economic and military assistance package to blunt the economic
problems and security threats facing the country. 178
As a result, the US decided to forgo the upcoming cancellation of aid to Iran, and
assured the Shah with a five-year aid plan. Though economic aid to Iran steadily
decreased from the post-coup period, it was only countered by a major increase in
military aid – which was where the brunt of the Shah’s concerns lay. Indeed, Iran, by far,
was the highest recipient of US aid to the Members of the Organization from 1960-1970,
totaling $7.2 billion (in 2011 figures) (See Figures 2.3 & 2.4). This same pattern was
applied to other Member states. Indonesia, which joined the Organization in 1962, had
for years been a recipient of US aid. Nevertheless, from the mid-1960s to the end of the
decade, it witnessed a dramatic increase, totaling $4.2 billion, mostly economic in nature,
making it the second largest recipient of US assistance in OPEC.
As in the cases of other Members, Washington’s fear of Soviet exploitation of the
dire economic and security conditions within Indonesia became the principle driving
force behind US aid.
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This was only exacerbated by a strong domestic presence of

communist political parties and the fact that Indonesia’s Sukarno government was openly
receiving aid from the Soviet Union, placing Washington in a position where it had to
compete with Soviets in Indonesia. 180 In addition to assistance, the US played an active
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role on behalf of Indonesia with its dealings in International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
with other important institutions, to facilitate the country’s development plans. 181
In Venezuela, under the Betancourt administration, and in reaction to declining oil
revenues, the government also had explicitly asked Washington for aid, 182 and was able
to secure $1.6 billion in economic and military aid over the decade. Saudi Arabia, with its
more pressing security concerns as a result of the instability within Yemen, the Iraqi
Revolution of 1958, and the continuous hostility from Gamal Abdel Nasser’s UAR
government eventually garnered the “full United States support for the maintenance of
Saudi Arabia’s integrity, ” 183 with the addition of $1.2 billion in military aid in the same
period. Even Iraq, whose political elite, after its revolution, had great suspicion towards
the US and its regional intentions, received, albeit a very small package, a little more than
$150 million in US aid in the 1960s. In total, US aid to OPEC Member states, from 19601970, was roughly $8.5 billion in the economic sphere and $7.6 billion in military
assistance.
Though the rationale behind American aid was initially a stopgap measure to
stabilize these critical producing countries, and also motivated by concerns regarding
Soviet intentions towards these states, the purpose of aid eventually evolved. In part, the
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US realized that as OPEC was beginning to create its internal decision-making organs
where the diversity of its Members’ policies could be streamlined into a macro
institutional policy, the possibility of more forceful demands from the Organization on
the IOCs could not be ruled out. And as negotiations between OPEC and the IOCs were
beginning to take shape shortly after the establishment of the Organization, albeit on an
individual basis between the concession holders in a particular country and that
respective government, collective negotiations through the Organization could possibly
become inevitable.
The US could not afford to remain indifferent to such an event, but as stated
previously, was unable to take an active position, either for or against the Organization.
Thus, with the aid that was being given to OPEC states, although on a case-by-case basis,
the US intended to generate some modicum of influence within the Organization. In
doing so, as was recommended by the Eisenhower administration and some IOCs in the
year of OPEC’s founding, the US sought to exploit the natural divisions concerning each
Members’ outlook on the concessionary system, and according to the unique
vulnerabilities that each state had. Naturally, the Members that would end up receiving
the most aid and security guarantees from Washington would become the vehicle wherein
US policy preferences and concerns would appear within the Organization.
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Millions

Figure 2.3: U.S. Economic Aid to OPEC Member States: 1950-1971 (adjusted to 2011 $ figures)
*Angola, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE did not obtain Aid during this period. Source: USAID
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Figure 2.4: U.S. Military Aid to OPEC Member States: 1950-1971 (adjusted to 2011 $ figures)
*Algeria, Angola, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE did not obtain Aid during this period. Source: USAID
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Intrastate Dynamics
The economic dilemmas facing OPEC Members were not the only internal factors that
impacted how outside forces would deal with the Organization in the beginning years of
its institutional life. Gradually, these concerns broadened to exclusively political matters
as well. During this period, two major developments within the internal domestic climate
of OPEC Member states proved to be consequential. The first centered on the political
typology of OPEC Member States, fundamentally impacting the relationship between
Member States and outside actors, and the larger international system. The second
concerned the rise of the National Oil Companies within Member states. The
governmental entrance in the producing countries production and export policies would
eventually affect how OPEC would function as a unitary entity vis-à-vis the major
international oil companies, and how the individual constituents of the Group ultimately
dealt with the nationalization of their hydrocarbon resources.
The Domestic Political Landscape
Up until this period, it was only Iran and Iraq that had consequential domestic
governance changes: for Iran, the rise and fall of Mohammad Mossadegh and the
reassertion of the Pahlavi monarchy; for Iraq, the 1958 military overthrow of the
Hashemite dynasty and the creation of Republican Iraq under military rule. Yet, during
the 1960s, with the exception of Venezuela that had a stable democratic transition from
the Betancourt administration (1959-1964) to the Leoni administration (1964-1969),
which continued the same economic structural reforms as its predecessor, 184 every other
184
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Member had far-reaching alterations within the socio-political dynamics of their
respective countries.
From 1960-1969, of the nine Member States of OPEC, five experienced change of
governments via coup d'états – some of which were bloodless (namely Saudi Arabia,
Libya, and Algeria), while others were bloody (namely Iraq and Indonesia). In time, the
arrival of new political orders or altered socio-political conditions within Member
countries had a far-reaching effect on how crude oil production was utilized for the
economic health of their countries by each respective government, and also their
respective roles within OPEC. For Kuwait, Qatar, Algeria, and what eventually became
the UAE, it was in this Infancy phase when their independence as sovereign states was
established. In many ways, what happened during this period on the socio-political level
not only laid the groundwork for the future internal and external political behaviors of
these countries, but also their impact upon OPEC unity, and when the time came, disunity.
While the domestic political developments in each country were important, both for the
particular Member state and eventually the Organization, in Iran, Iraq, and Libya they
proved to be the most consequential for the future of OPEC.
In Iran, a reinvigorated Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, having secured aid from the US
but also keen on diminishing any type of threat to his rule, began, in the early 1960s, the
process of implementing his ‘White Revolution’ in Iranian society. This dramatic plan
was advertised as an attempt to modernize Iranian society, both socially and
economically, in which the government would address such issues as woman’s rights,
economic growth predicated upon the Western capitalist model, and a restructuring of
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land ownership. 185 To embark on such modernization plans, the Shah heavily relied on
US aid, which Iran was receiving at that time – chiefly US military aid – which allowed
the Shah to spend more domestically. However, the practical results of the Shah’s efforts
was to erode the power of the traditional, land-owning aristocracy, thus lessening the
likelihood of political competition, creating the conditions where Iran’s urban middle
class would be politically disarmed by becoming invested in the Shah’s reforms. 186 And
this would transpire as the Pahlavi regime created a new middle class from Iran’s
peasantry that would invariably become dependent upon the government. Naturally,
many within Iranian society protested these dramatic measures. While this process was
underway, the Shah targeted the domestic forces within Iran that could be characterized
on the political left, and the small groups that were deemed sympathetic to the USSR. Yet,
with time, the ramification of these policies, although bringing some tangible material
benefit to the poor, were essentially to renew resistance to the Shah, and in the process
create a religious based opposition that would eventually fuse their grievances against the
gradually authoritarian bent of the Shah’s regime.
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As we will be discussed

subsequently, while the Shah would become the moderating influence within OPEC,
particularly during the negotiations between the Organization and the IOCs, it was this
very program, along with other modernization efforts, and his desire for a massive
overhaul of the Iranian armed forces that would eventually reorient his government’s
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thinking on the profit sharing arrangements with the IOCs, the very continuity of the
concessionary arrangements, and the overall price of crude oil.
In Iraq, the overthrow of the Hashemite dynasty, two years before the creation of
OPEC, had brought about both confusion and worry among the conservative monarchial
Middle Eastern governments allied with the West, and for the US itself. Initially, the
American perception concerning the 1958 Revolution was at best mixed, primarily
because of the contradictory moves that Iraq’s new post-monarchial leader, General Abd
al-Karim Qasim, made during the first few months. The US preliminary assessment was
not that he was fully aligned with the Soviet Union, although with his arrival, Iraq did
leave the Baghdad Pact and ostensibly warmed relations with the USSR. The American
discernment of Qasim’s move was viewed as either being domestically forced upon him
to adjust his foreign policies or an unwillingness or inability to stand against those
looking to balance relations vis-à-vis the US and the Soviet Union. 188 However, on a
regional level, the assessment of Republican Iraq quickly deteriorated, though Baghdad
had initially reached out to regional countries that would eventually become OPEC
Members and even hosted the first OPEC conference. Qasim’s continuing annexation
threats against Kuwait, which came to a head in the wake of the latter’s independence in
1961 (forcing Kuwait to ask for British military assistance), and his territorial claims
against Iran’s Khuzestan, gradually created enmity towards Iraq among differing, and at
times rival regional actors. Moreover, the domestic balancing act that he was forced to
undertake in order to pacify the coalition of disparate constituencies in Iraqi society
188
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ultimately proved paralyzing to his rule. And his inability to solve the country’s
economic crisis, by extracting more concessions from the major IOCs that held the
consortium in Iraq further undermined his rule. With time, the US not only became
gradually suspicious of his rule, but also eventually reached out to domestic forces within
Iraq that sought to remove Qasim, who at that time was the Prime Minister.
When the Ramadan Revolution of 1963 took place, initiated by the Baath Party
within Iraq, there is evidence that while the US may not have been overtly complicit in
the removal of Qasim (in the same manner that the US and UK engineered the coup
against Mossadegh), it certainly stood by and did not impede the Baathists as they took
control over the country. 189 Moreover, immediately afterwards, the US did provide Iraq
with a modest amount of economic assistance, which included access to US military
hardware, credits for agricultural surpluses for credit under Public Law 480, and ExportImport Bank loans.
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Though not known at the time, the Ramadan Revolution,

ultimately led to a 5-year interim of national, and often bloody, political turmoil where
pro-Nasserite and pro-Baathist forces fought for control over the country, culminating in
the consolidation of the Baathist Party in 1968, led Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and his
ambitious deputy, Saddam Hussein. Needless to say, the latter’s political rise would not
only change the face of the political and social direction of the country, but would have
profound ramifications for the future of OPEC’s unity and for the Middle East in the
years ahead.
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In Libya, when the coup against King Idris happened in September of 1969, the
country’s oil production, though modest, was not a major factor in the total OPEC output,
and certainly not global output. For this reason, at the outset, there were very little
political reverberations outside Libyan borders. The US’ initial assessment of the young
military officers behind the coup was that they showed “some moderation”, promising to
“protect foreign interests, including oil companies.”

191

However, the US understood that,

similar to the Iraqi Revolution of 1958 – where a monarch was overthrown by the
military – the political change in the country had “created a precedent which will not be
forgotten” and that “the moderate posture of the Libyan regime is probably temporary,”
with caveat being that there were no “good grounds” for forecasting if or when the new
government would settle into a policy. 192 The CIA specifically based their assessment on
past military-dominated revolutionary regimes in Arab World, citing that “without
exception”, the political order after the former regimes tended to be “more leftist and
extreme with the passage of time.” 193 With this cautious assessment, American leaders,
along with the British, chose to move towards recognition of the political change in Libya,
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194

even as some US regional allies were alarmed by the American passivity towards the

coup. 195
Yet, weeks after Idris’ downfall, the US perception of the political change in
Tripoli dramatically worsened. The new regime’s behavior quickly became hostile to
both Western enterprises and towards American and British military bases within their
country, changing Washington’s characterization of the “new Libyan government as
insecure, inexperienced, xenophobic,” and “perhaps divided but as yet without visible
opposition.”

196

Subsequently, Washington ordered a thorough revision of its policies

towards Libya, ranging from cutting off of relations to overt acts of economic and even
military hostility. 197 But even in the American NIE of December of 1969, the US still
had not developed a clear picture of the changed political order in Libya and particularly
of Libya’s new young military ruler, Muammar Qaddafi. For Washington, and by
extension its European allies, the primary issues of concern were the new government’s
interaction with Western oil firms, most of which were the smaller independents, and its
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ongoing negotiations with Tripoli concerning foreign military installations. 198 It would
take a few more months, well into the early 1970s, for the West, fellow OPEC Members,
and the wider global economy to gauge the real impact of the Libyan Revolution of 1969.
OPEC as an institution initially viewed what transpired in the disparate domestic
contexts of these three Member states, as well as others, as solely internal matters.
Throughout the Organization’s first decade, in its biannual and emergency meetings and
its resolutions, there was scant mention of domestic political developments. As will be
discussed in the next section, the negotiations that Member states were involved in with
the IOCs, later to become collective negotiations, was the main focus of OPEC’s
organizational concerns in this critical, Infancy period. However, the seeds that were
sown during this period, particularly within these three countries, would have a lasting
impact for both the way OPEC would operate in the 1970s and for the long-term unity of
the Organization.
The Beginnings of the National Oil Companies
The second critical internal development within the political and economic dynamics of
OPEC Member states was the genesis of the National Oil Companies (NOCs). The
mechanism where host countries would gradually exact ownership of the oil industries
within their territories, which mostly became institutionalized by reason of their domestic
laws and later collectively as OPEC policy, is inextricably linked to the development of
what became the Member states’ NOCs. While NOCs had very little impact on actual
198
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production during this institutionalization period, negotiations between Members and the
IOCs were laying the groundwork and rationale for creating a national entity that would
ultimately replace the vital role of the foreign firm in the producing countries. During the
first decade of OPEC’s institutional life the NOCs were either enhanced from their earlier,
rudimentary forms (such as the case with Iran and Saudi Arabia), begin the process of
creation by their respective governments, or established in full (See Figure 2.5).
The NOCs of each Member State, though differing in the particular contexts in
which they were born, all had one main driving force behind them: the desire by the
Member state government for more control over the crude oil that they exported, which
also affected subsidiary issues such as price and market access.

199

Nevertheless, one

fundamental distinction became important in both the effectiveness and strength of the
NOCs to be a viable alternative to the more technologically advanced IOCs and the
‘acceptance’ of the respective NOC in the global economy. And this had everything to do
with how the process of state control took place. As Valerie Marcel has noted, the NOCs
in “the developing world emerged either from nationalization, taking over the
expropriated assets of the foreign oil companies, or from ‘participation’ agreements in
which the national oil company gradually filled the shoes of the foreign oil company as
the state purchased the company’s assets." 200

This fundamental distinction is crucial,

for it concerns how the respective NOC came about from the larger process of give and
take with the IOCs during the negotiations of the 1960s for rearranging the profit sharing
agreements. In other words, what was the climate surrounding nationalization? Was it
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one in which there was a gradual recognition by both producing country and the majors
firms that the respective government, in the post-WWII era, for reasons relating to
prestige, sovereignty, legitimacy, and viability, needed to possess control over their own
oil resources, and thus a more modern business relationship needed to be established? Or
was the way in which nationalization implemented by the host government one which led
to animosity or even material loss for outside enterprises, without compensation.
While full nationalization came about in the 1970s – with varying specific dates
for each Member – the conditions for nationalization were set by how each Member’s
NOC was established. And this latter circumstance fundamentally affected the
negotiations of the 1960s. Near the end of the 1960s, as talks seemed unable to address
the main budgetary dilemmas that plagued the producers, thus laying the groundwork for
OPEC’s collective declaratory nationalization resolution of June of 1968, the Members’
NOC began the process of formal institutional collusion – both in relation to the
Organization and among themselves.
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Figure 2.5 OPEC National Oil Companies in their developmental stage
•Est. 1951. Unilateral
nationalization - 1953.
•1954-1979, in partnership
in holding company with
IOCs.

National Iranian
Oil Co. (NIOC)

•Est. 1966, productionsharing agreements with
foreign companies &
USSR
•Fully nationalization
complete in 1972

Iraq (INOC)

•Est. as Aramco in 1944
via merger by consortium
partners
•Production sharing with
IOCs until gradual
nationliazation process
of1973-80.

•Est. 1960, productionsharing agreements with
IOCs
•Became fully nationalized
in 1975
•Now under Kuwait
Petroleum Coporation

Saudi Aramco

Kuwait National
Petroleum Co.
(KNPC)

•Est. by unilateral
nationalization in 1976

Petróleos de
Venezuela, S.A.
(PDVSA)

•Est. by unilateral
nationalization in 1970

•Est. as Pertamin in 1961
by unilateral
nationalization, but
operations shortly
outsourced.
•1968 with merger with
Permina

Libya National Oil
Corp.

Pertamina Indonesia

•Est. 1974, productionsharing agreements with
IOCs
•Fully nationalized in 1976

Qatar Petroleum

•Est. 1971, productionsharing agreements with
IOCs

Abu Dhabi
National Oil Co.
(ADNOC) - UAE

•Est. 1963, productionsharing agreements with
IOCs
•Unitarly nationalized in
1971

Sonatrach - Algeria
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Interstate Dynamics
Organizational Enlargement and Negotiation
The combination of the reduction in the posted price of crude with the wider 1960s oil
glut was beginning to turn OPEC into a magnet for other producers to join, especially
from the Third World. While large, developed economies with hydrocarbon reserves
most likely either internally possessed or had access to the technology to recover,
produce, and export their crude oil, developing countries – specifically those that were
not major producers – had more limited options. A developing country seeking to exploit
its reserves, even in the 1960s, had essentially three choices: invite one or more of the
major IOCs to join a consortium agreement, look towards the USSR for assistance (but
risk engendering American antagonism), or attract the newly arrived independent oil
companies for assistance (which were far less technologically sophisticated than the
former two). These choices were particularly stark for newly independent countries with
little experience exercising sovereignty. However, whatever approach they chose to
pursue (and many times these approaches were not mutually exclusive), several
producing countries became attracted to the concept of a large international organization
run by countries from the developing world, that would, at least in name, become a forum
where their voices were heard, and more importantly, their economic interests could be
protected.
Because for some future Members, as the Organization was older than their
independence, the decision to join OPEC was one of the first acts of sovereignty that
some Member states undertook. Within a year after OPEC’s founding, the tiny Persian
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Gulf emirate of Qatar, with but modest exports, applied for membership and was
accepted without delay.201 This was particularly important because Qatar, like the other
Persian Gulf kingdoms, except for Saudi Arabia, was still in the process of obtaining, or
in this case, being given independence by the British as they gradually withdrew East of
Suez. The following year, 1962, newly independent Libya, still in the developmental
phase of its oil infrastructure, and Indonesia, a country with respectful production figures
still mired in territorial and concessional disputes with its former Dutch rulers, also
became Members. 202 In 1967, in the midst of the negotiations with the IOCs, Abu Dhabi
(to be superseded by the larger United Arab Emirates), in the process of gaining its
independence from Britain and having virtually no oil production, joined the
Organization. 203 And in 1969, only seven years after its war of independence against the
French, Algeria joined OPEC. Similar to Indonesian independence against the Dutch,
Algeria faced mass capital flight of the technocratic class, nationalizing what the colonial
power and its private enterprises left behind, the most notable being CFP’s upstream
facilities, with significant damage to country’s manufacturing base. 204 Yet, with very
little international support, the Algerian government viewed its Membership in the
Organization as both a strategic asset and a refuge.
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Though US economic and military aid, along with certain security guarantees,
significantly alleviated the internal concerns of the main OPEC producers, there was a
limit to what US aid could accomplish for other Members. Libya’s entrance into the
Organization signaled a fundamental change in the power of the IOCs to persuade
governments into accepting the majors’ preferences for their crude oil exports. Though a
country like Indonesia, the birthplace of modern Royal Dutch Shell, was still heavily
dependent on one of the Seven Sisters, the rupture in the home-IOC-host nexus, US
neutrality in the post-independence negotiations between Indonesia and the Dutch, and
continuous US economic and military support, allowed the Jakarta government to take
independent measures, like joining OPEC, for eventually more government revenue and
more control. Libya however was different. Unlike other producing countries, Libyan
production came online much later, and thus when OPEC was formed, output from Libya
was virtually nonexistent. And as the possibility of Libyan oil output was still
hypothetical at the creation of OPEC, this made the Tripoli government far more
vulnerable to pressures from IOCs and their imposed conditions for discovery and
extraction of Libyan crude than that of other producers – chiefly because of the glut in the
oil market.
After it gained independence in 1951, Libya’s pre-oil economy, with virtually no
manufacturing base and a largely decentralized government, was unable to steer the
country out of its impoverished conditions. Throughout the 1950s, the Libyans were able
to build only a modest agricultural sector, in addition to garnering crucial US aid –
keeping in line with established US policy of countering Soviet political and economic
penetration via economic and military assistance. However, once oil was discovered in
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Libya in 1958, several oil firms became interested in investing in Libyan oil. It was at this
moment, as previously stated, where Standard Oil of New Jersey attempted to convince
Tripoli of not joining OPEC, pushing a scenario where Libyan oil under OPEC would be
economically unattractive to European consumers. 205 What made matters more perilous
for the future of Libyan oil was that its assistance from the US was coming to an end.
Indeed, not unlike other Members, Libya’s economic health in the early 1960’s, in the
words of American officials, was in “sheer financial chaos”. 206 Under King Idris, Libya,
like other OPEC Members, had received US aid, albeit in moderate amounts. The aid was
specifically intended for domestic developmental projects. However, the Tripoli
government, possibly because of the excitement surrounding the discovery of oil,
corruption, or mismanagement started to increase development plans – predicated on a
continuous supply of US aid and the future oil revenue that was too come. However,
while aid from the US was arriving, it was decreasing with time (See Figure 2.1).
Additionally, though Libya’s oil had piqued the interest of many of the major IOCs to the
country, the oil glut of the 1960s provided little incentive for the rapid production of
Libya’s oil. And though Libya, like other Members, viewed OPEC membership as a
possible future asset, its reliance upon major IOCs would have allowed the latter to use
delays in production as leverage against Tripoli joining OPEC.
In a US State Department cable in 1962, American officials detailed both the
extent of Libya’s economic woes, but also their strong reluctance of providing aid to
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Libya. 207 US officials accused the Libyans of living beyond their means, by profligate
spending on oil pipelines, housing units, and other developmental projects, which left the
government with little savings and later a substantial budget deficit, while also making
commitments to other development projects that they could not afford. In their criticism
of Libya’s ‘lax financial and programming controls’, the US advised that the “first job of
the government of Libya was to put [its] own house in order and exercise fiscal restraint.”
208

Facing declining US aid and pressure from the major IOCs not to join OPEC, Libya

discovered that the only means to have both financial security and some modicum of
independence in its decision-making was to invite smaller, independent firms seeking
new supplies. Not only did this action eventually provide more maneuverability for the
Libyan government, but it also allowed Libya’s move towards OPEC membership to
become feasible. Indeed, it was this action by Tripoli that created one of the first
templates for producing countries, particularly OPEC Members, to view contracting with
independent companies as a viable means to obtain better revenue sharing terms. And the
early image of OPEC providing strength in numbers to the producers was all the more
reason for additional producing countries to join.
Building the Organs of OPEC while Individual Negotiations begin
Simultaneously, other Members were grappling with their own predicaments as it related
to the future of the oil industry in their territories, and the profit sharing arrangements
with the IOCs. Yet, though OPEC was viewed as potentially a major asset for
207
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hydrocarbon-endowed countries of the developing world, it still did not possess the
ability to functionally act for the benefit of its Members. Key feasibility issues were still
unresolved and would take a few to several years to fully address. Specifically, these
were the following: uniformity in purpose, the ability to streamline each Members core
national interests as it relates to their oil exports and revenues into a collective,
organizational strategy, institutional acceptance and recognition in the global economy,
and, the most important being efficacy for its Members. In the first two years of its
existence, OPEC managed to establish its internal decision-making bodies, its statutes,
policies and procedures, and at least in theory, a collective policy to formulate a
regulation of production and an approach towards negotiations with the IOCs (See Table
1). This was sketched out in its Resolutions I-II.16.
However, even as the institution was making headway to put in place the ability
to act for its members, as it is was slowly gaining some international recognition, the
issues that the producing countries had with the IOCs still remain unresolved. And as
previously mentioned, the economic and political circumstances in some Member states
were only getting worse because of continued and expanded budgetary constraints on the
respective governments. By far, the most acrimonious struggle between a host producing
country and the IOCs in the early OPEC years was in Iraq. After several months of
arduous negotiations to find a new mutually acceptable profit sharing arrangement
between the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC), the consortium umbrella involving the
major firms within the country, and the State of Iraq, the post-monarchial Qassim
government chose to dramatically escalate tensions with the passage of Public Law 80 in
1961. This legislation, with virtually no consultation with the IOCs, allowed the Iraqi
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government to recover 99.5% of the land granted to the IPC under former concession
agreements. This portion of the concessions was held by the IPC but the consortium
either was not actively pursuing upstream activities or had indefinitely delayed them.
Again, given the oil glut in the 1960s, there was little incentive for the consortium to
bring new supplies in an already saturated market. The Baghdad government, however,
saw things differently. It was not unusual for many producing countries in the developing
world, the overwhelming majority of which depended upon IOCs to export their crude, to
view market conditions as wholly manipulated by the IOCs, when in fact the new
conditions of the day (i.e. the entrance of Soviet and independent firm crude) limited the
consortium’s options.
The only areas left untouched by the Baghdad government was the .5% of Iraqi
land where the consortium was already extracting crude. With this legislation, the Iraqi
National Oil Company (INOC) also came into existence, as the Baghdad thought that
possibly new, more advantageous deals could be made with independents or even the
USSR – partnership with the newly minted INOC. Nevertheless, this move by the Qassim
government had serious ramifications, both for the future of Iraq but also for OPEC. As
Fadhil Chalabi has argued, Iraq’s actions (which were tantamount to nationalization) not
only severally curtailed activities in Iraq, but also greatly benefited Iran and Saudi Arabia.
209

And even after Qassim’s downfall, the continuing dispute between the central

Baghdad government and the IPC concession holders over the nature of the profit sharing
survived. So much so that the US government cautioned US firms in seeking concession
in areas taken over by the Baghdad government under Public Law 80. Washington feared
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that if a few US firms would simply accept the new arrangements, and thus cut separate
deals with Baghdad, the outcome would be perceived as a forced imposition upon
concession holders. This, they worried, would have wider implications for other
concession agreements. In a telegram from Washington to the American embassy in
Baghdad a year after the Ramadan Revolution, the US thinking was that “if other
companies should bid for concessions without a prior settlement, GOI [Government of
Iraq] will have good reason to suppose that concession agreements can be terminated
unilaterally and replaced with contracts with other oil companies under conditions
dictated by GOI wherever GOI considers that it is in its own interest to do so.” 210 Thus,
they concluded that other producers could utilize this event as a template, which not only
would affect OPEC Members but the wider industry of the day. What was a particular
concern to the US was what producing governments would make of this precedent, which
would lead them to believe that American firms “are not concerned for legal rights of
others and are motivated solely by advantages to be derived from access to additional oil
resources and new profits.” 211 Thus what the US did was to privately dissuade American
firms from reaching individual settlements with Baghdad (without a resolution to the
Public Law 80) while undertaking efforts with non-US firms of entering into Iraq while
the issue remained unresolved. 212 More so, this was done with the explicit knowledge
that American firms, for the time being, would suffer loss and access to foreign firms.
Yet for Washington, what they referred to as the “disadvantage of [a] completely passive
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attitude” by the US government would justify the “risk of possible lost opportunities to
American firms.” 213
Nevertheless, the Iraq experience, as Fadhil Chalabi has asserted, proved to be a
template for OPEC in the later years when collective negotiations with the companies
were to take place. 214 But at the time, it was a clear example that while the Organization
had overcome the skepticism of many more powerful global actors, and had made
headway on establishing itself, it still lacked the ability to fundamentally impact current
imbalance of power between producers and the IOCs and protect its Members’ interests.
As negotiations between Iraq and the consortium had reached an impasse, all the
Organization could do was “express concern” and issue Resolution III.18, which
explicitly supported Iraq’s position, but “urged foreign oil companies operating in the
territories of its Member Countries to realize that a spirit of true understanding between
them and the Member Countries is indispensable to securing…healthy conditions in the
world oil industry.” 215 Up until Qassim’s ouster by the Baathist-Nasserite coalition in
Iraq, production in Iraq stagnated, while those of other Members steadily rose. But even
after the Ramadan Revolution, the continuing dispute between the IPC and Baghdad
severally eroded Iraq’s production potential for the rest of the decade.
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4th Conference: Geneva
1962

3rd Conference: Tehran. 1961

2nd Conference: Caracas 1961

1st Conference:
Baghdad 1960

Table 1: Main OPEC Developmental Resolutions
I: Announced first collective action of Member states as a unitary Group. Pledge to formulate system to
ensure the stabilization of prices by the regulation of production. Collective protection of members, if as a
result of application of any unanimous decision of OPEC any sanctions are employed. No other Member
shall accept any offer of a beneficial treatment.
I.2: Countries represented in Conference are original Members of OPEC. Invitation for any country with
a substantial net export of crude petroleum can become a new Member if unanimously accepted by all
five original Members of the Organization. Pledge to establish regular meeting and organs of OPEC.
II.5: The Creation of the Board of Governors, of which each Member will nominate one Governor.
II.6: The Creation of the Statutes: OPEC having two organs, the Conference and the Board of Governors.
The development of the departments of these two organs, mechanism of decision-making and authority,
rules, and meeting intervals.
II.7: “President of Conference” Title created. “Chairman of the Conference” title abolished.
II.8: Financial Requirements for the Organizations and Membership dues established.
II.9: Conference appoints Fuad Rouhani as First Chairman of the Board of Governors.
II.10: Headquarters established at Geneva, Switzerland.
II.11: Board of Governors commissions study on the economics of investment in the oil industry by
concession holding companies, in comparison with investment in other enterprises in different countries.
II.12: Members shall compile and send to the Board of Governors, a statement concerning its position in
the matter of determination of prices at which exporting companies, and also concerning the appropriate
procedure in regard to the settlement of disputes arising on that matter pay for its petroleum.
II.13: Board of Governors commissions study on a ‘just pricing formula, supported by a study of
international proration’, of crude oil in the global economy.
II.14: Conference attempts to coordinate crude import measures with friendly countries that have placed
import quotas ‘in order to protect their domestic crude production… in order to arrive at satisfactory
solution and thus promote mutual understanding for the protection of the interests of both exporting and
importing countries.’
II.16: Statement of support for individual Members in current negotiations with the IOCs. OPEC
expressed hope that IOCs concerned will ‘meet such discussions in a spirit of understanding and will
ensure their prompt and satisfactory conclusion.’
III.18: Expression of concern regarding Iraq-IOC negotiations.
III.19: The Creation of an Information Center in the Secretariat for compilation and distribution of
industry news and research.
III.20: Review of the Venezuelan Delegation’s Coordinating Commission for the Conservation and
Commerce of Hydrocarbons, particularly in preventing the weakening of crude oil prices. Considers
similar measures of control may prove beneficial to other Members
IIII.26: Conference directs Board of Governors to conduct uniformity study to better functionality of
Organization
III.27: Reaffirmation of Resolution I.
III.28: Claims that ‘information submitted by Venezuela that crude oil produced in Member Countries
and elsewhere has been utilized by some oil companies and oil agencies to weaken the price structure,
resolves that Members conduct a thorough investigation of this matter and directs the Secretariat to study
the findings.
IV.32: First call by OPEC for Members to enter into negotiations with the IOCs to ensure payment on the
basis of posted prices not lower than those of 8/1960. That Members formulate a rational price structure
to guide future price policy. price structure to be devised will be the linking of crude-oil prices to an index
of prices of goods which the Member Countries need to import.
IV.33: That each Member Country should approach the company or companies within their countries
with a view to working out a formula where under royalty payments shall be fixed at a uniform rate which
Members consider equitable, and shall not be treated as a credit against income-tax liability.
IV.34: Member Countries should take measures to eliminate any contribution to the marketing expenses
of the IOCs within their territories
IV.35: Recommendation that Member Countries create of a body entrusted with fulfilling functions
similar to Venezuelan Coordinating Commission
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At OPEC’s 4th Conference in Geneva in 1962, the first session being in April
while the second session was in June, the Organization took a markedly different
approach to the negotiations than they had in the past. While previously OPEC had taken
a back seat to Member states talks with the IOCs, the Organization gradually chose to
become institutionally invested in the outcome of the negotiations. During the 4th
Conference, OPEC decided to formally enter into the negotiations by calling its Members
to fully engage the IOCs to restore the crude oil price prior to August 1960, (Resolution
IV.32). Furthermore, possibly knowing that the price reduction may have now become
fixed (at least for the time being), OPEC went further. In Resolution IV.33, OPEC laid
out its basis for a uniform royalty payment to all Members – apart from the taxes that the
IOCs were giving to the Members. OPEC’s rationale, again contained in the Resolution,
was that “under the arrangements at present in force between the Member Countries and
the oil companies…no compensation is paid for the intrinsic value of petroleum, royalty
or stated payment commitments being treated as credits against income-tax
liabilities…and that the right to receive compensation for the intrinsic value of petroleum”
to OPEC’s Members is “incontestable”. 216
Furthermore, in Resolution IV.34, the Organization demanded of its Members
that they should “take measures to eliminate any contribution to the marketing expenses
of the companies concerned.” 217 In other words, because producing countries did not
participate in the any of the marketing operations of the oil companies, and thus did not
benefit, they should not be held responsible for costs accrued with such activities.
216
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Needless to say, the response by the IOCs and especially the home governments
showed a new sense of anxiety about OPEC. In its previous statements and resolutions,
OPEC had come out in defense for its Members position, but this new activist approach
of collectively trying to change the terms of the profit sharing, uniformly – which would
set a major precedent for other producers, whether they be Members or not – was
alarming the companies. In the most detailed analysis of the negotiations between the
IOCs and OPEC Members to date, Ian Skeet laid out what was at stake for both sides. In
implementing a uniform royalty expense (a charge that Venezuela was already doing but
would now apply to all Members), OPEC would be essentially adding 11 cents to their
profit share, per barrel of oil. 218 As mentioned earlier, the posted price of crude at the
time was $1.80, which would amount to be a 6% charge for the IOCs. And had such a
precedent become the industry norm for dealing with other non-OPEC producers, the
financial impact to the major consortium participants would be substantial.
However, far from OPEC inter-Member discussions and the negotiations between
Member states and the IOCs was the important role of the US. It is here where the
importance of American influential capability on certain Members, exhibited through
economic and military assistance, clearly becomes evident. Only days after the 4th
Conference, the Iranian government privately confirmed to the US that though OPEC had
adopted these particular resolutions, the Iranian government’s support for them “in no
way implied [an] attack on [the] oil consortium or suggestion [that the] oil agreement
should be modified.” 219 The Iranians told the US Embassy in Tehran that the designation
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of Iran and Saudi Arabia to spearhead the negotiations with the IOCs was “ensuring [a]
moderate approach”, claiming that the “negotiations need not be completed within [a]
specified time and that they would be conducted in unhurried and friendly spirit.” 220
Though the American’s seemed encouraged by the Iranian position, they still remained
concerned about what they felt was the “fundamental and far-reaching character of
resolutions”, chiefly the “sharp impact on member companies of [the] oil consortium as
well as other segments of international oil industry.” 221
In a closed session meeting between officials from the US State Department and
Leroy Stinebower and George Pearcy from Standard Oil of New Jersey, the concerns
over the new OPEC Resolutions were clearly visible. Although Jersey’s executives were
confidant in the negotiating strength of the IOCs, they also feared mass governmental
expropriations that in their mind had “no rational counterforce” to them. 222 Recognizing
the seriousness of the new OPEC stipulations, the US government could not afford to sit
on the sidelines. However, in its discussions with its European partners, the US stated
that “it prefers to avoid adding to OPEC's international prestige or position” and thus
“contacts between OPEC and other organizations, including [the] EEC (European
Economic Community, the forerunner to the European Union), [should] be avoided or
minimized.” 223 Additionally, in consultations with the British, both the US and the UK
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agreed on this position as well. For both, there emerged a “complete unanimity” on the
“attitude which both governments should take towards OPEC….[agreeing] …that it
would not be to their mutual interests to undertake discussions with OPEC member
governments nor with the Organization itself on OPEC matters and that efforts to involve
the US and UK governments in OPEC negotiations with the oil companies should be
resisted.” 224 However, as with the US position towards OPEC during the creation of the
Organization, Washington and London agreed on avoiding any semblance of hostility
towards the Organization, 225 as that might create unforeseen consequences, particularly
in the Cold War context with the USSR.
Throughout 1963, OPEC, led by Secretary General Rouhani, engaged in both
direct and indirect talks with the Consortium, all in the background of the Organization’s
continuing development and with constant consultation with the Members. Yet, in
November of 1963, just prior to the 5th OPEC Conference in Riyadh in late December,
the representatives of the Consortiums within the Member states replied with a counter
offer to OPEC’s Resolution IV.33, concerning uniform royalty payments. The IOCs
offered 3.5 cents per barrel revenue increase, which OPEC under Rouhani immediately
dismissed. 226 Rouhani had confidence that this was the official position of all Member
states, and thus OPEC’s collective position. However, on December 6, 1963, in a State
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Department meeting with some of the heads of the major IOCs, it was revealed that there
was a surreptitious effort to break the OPEC consensus on royalty payments.
The participants were the following: G. L. Parkhurst (Vice President and Director
of Standard Oil Company of California and a Director of Arabian American Oil Co.)
William F. Bramstedt (Vice President of Standard Oil Company of California) John
Noble (Vice President of Texaco, Inc. and Director of Arabian American Oil Co.),
Howard Page (Director and Vice President of Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey and a
Director of Arabian American Oil Co.) Henry C. Moses (Executive Vice President of
Middle East Concessionary Interests, Socony Mobil Oil Co. and a Director of Arabian
American Oil Co.), Garry Owen (Director and Vice President of Arabian American Oil
Co.), Grady Davis (Vice President of Gulf Oil Co) and Kermit Roosevelt (Vice President,
Gulf Oil Co.). At the meeting, Howard Page of Jersey revealed that British Petroleum
executives had recently received a rejection by OPEC’s Rouhani and that in light of this,
the upcoming OPEC meeting in Riyadh could possibly witness the Organization using
sanctions against the IOCs. 227 However, Kermit Roosevelt from Gulf Oil differed with
his assessment. Roosevelt stated in this private meeting that he had recently spent time
with the Shah of Iran and that the Iranian Monarch understands why the offer that was
made to Rouhani “was the maximum which the companies can make”. 228 Roosevelt’s
history with both Iran and the Shah was quite unique, for a decade prior, it was this same
Roosevelt, at the time a CIA agent in Iran, who headed and implemented Operation
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AJAX which led to the coup against Mossadegh and the restoration of the Pahlavi family
to the Iranian throne. Both men had remained close since that consequential event. And
though some US officials, even as late as a week prior to OPEC’s Riyadh meeting in late
December of 1963, feared either sanctions or ‘arbitrary Member government action’
against the IOCs, when the time came, Roosevelt’s confidence proved prescient.
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As the 5th Conference commenced, it became clear to other Members that the
Shah had changed Iran’s rejection of the IOCs offer and had firmly refused to go along
with sanctioning the Consortiums . Though not identical, the Saudi position was also
similar, but it was clear that the Shah was leading the sudden opposition of what was
supposed to be collective punitive action against the IOCs. While senior industry experts,
such as Ian Skeet, surmised that the Shah’s sudden shift was due to suspicions regarding
other Members’ intentions or even pressure from the National Iranian Oil Company, 230
in the years since US archives have become declassified, the extent of US intervention,
albeit indirect, into the OPEC decision-making process of that time has become more
apparent. What came out of the Riyadh meeting was a fundamental shift in how OPEC
would continue to negotiate with the IOCs. Resolution V.40 pledged to continue
negotiations, by way of a Committee consisting of Fuad Rouhani, Iraq’s Abdul Rahman
Bazzaz, and Saudi Arabia’s Hisham Nazer. 231 Moreover, OPEC explicitly stated that this
group would negotiate on the Organization’s behalf with the oil companies – for the first
time, as a collective entity, as opposed to OPEC overseeing several different negotiations
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happening simultaneously. The IOCs feared this particular outcome, became some of
them thought that if OPEC negotiates as a unitary institution (with these three individuals
leading the effort) as opposed to “representatives of the individual producing
governments… the next step could be to exclude the companies as bargaining agents in
favor of governments.” 232
Notwithstanding, the IOCs’ fear did not materialize in the immediate aftermath of
the committee’s appointment. Much of this had to do with Iran’s moderation role in the
negotiation process with the IOC’s. In March of 1964, only four months before OPEC’s
6th Conference in Geneva, the assessment of Iran’s role was clear to the US: “Iran has
been successful so far in forestalling unilateral actions by the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries against the oil companies.”

233

However, this came at a major cost

to Iran’s reputation within the Organization. Immediately after the Iranian change of
position, on the eve of the 5th Conference, OPEC’s first Secretary General, the Iranian
Rouhani, was no longer able to carry on his role as opposition from Iraq and other
unilateralist Members grew. Moreover, in April of 1964, it was the US assessment that a
possible Arab backlash against the Shah could very well take place, leading to the
expulsion of Iran from OPEC.
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tolerated Iran was because OPEC’s foundational principle was based upon strength in
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numbers, and had a major producer left the Organization in its developmental phase, the
longevity of the OPEC enterprise would be in doubt. 235
During its 6th Conference in Geneva, OPEC passed Resolution VI.47, which
acknowledged that the IOCs did send a revised offer to the Organization (of which was
only marginally better than that which Rouhani, on behalf of the Group rejected). While
not accepting the offer, the Organization stated that it was a “suitable basis” to continue
to find a permanent agreement. And in the 7th Conference months later, OPEC’s
Resolution VII.49, claimed that five Members (Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Libya, and Saudi
Arabia) accepted the latest offer by the IOCs (again only a marginal increase of the prior
offers), while Iraq rejected the offer, and Venezuela and Indonesia remained critical of
the offer.

236

Moreover, the Organization stated in VII.49 that because five of its

Members did accept the offer, each Member should decide acceptance or rejection of the
Consortiums ’ new proposal individually. But as negotiations would proceed, this
dynamic, and the roles that each country within OPEC would play, would fundamentally
change.
Collective Negotiations with the IOCs
Whatever positive fiscal contribution the royalty payment fight gave to OPEC Members,
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it paled into comparison with the looming economic and security dilemmas that were

all the more exacerbated by stagnated crude prices and creeping non-OPEC competition.
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The posted price of crude remained $1.80 from 1960-1971. 238 After an uneventful 8th
Conference, OPEC met in Tripoli in July of 1965 with a plan to “adopt as a transitory
measure a production plan calling for rational increases in production from the OPEC
area” to meet the estimated increase in world demand. 239 There were, however, three
main problems with this approach. Firstly, the IOCs still possessed production control
over the OPEC area, despite the increasing technical efficiency of OPEC NOCs. The
second problem was discipline among Members. For this ‘soft' pro-rationing to work
(although OPEC did not view this plan in those terms), there needed to be strict
guidelines on how much each Member could produce (or under-produce), in order for
prices to gradually rise again. And finally, the production from the non-OPEC area was
simply too great to counter.
Besides OPEC’s support for the passage of a peculiar law by the Libyan
government implemented, via Royal Decree, that among other things made much more
headway on royalty payments than the actual Organization had done, OPEC’s 10th
Conference in December of 1965 did not address the fundamentals of the Member’s
dilemma with the IOCs. Yet roughly at the same time, there was progress in another area:
a marked shift in both the US, and by extension, the Western approach to OPEC. From
late 1965 to early 1966, the US was in discussion, both internally, and with its allies, on
the need to have more of an activist position regarding the Organization. Ever since
OPEC’s 5th Conference, there had been an impasse on how to move forward with
sustainable resolution on profit sharing. The market conditions not only had matters
238
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worse, but by this time, there had been criticism of the lack of movement by all Members
of the Organization. The American reasoning was summed up in a State Department
communiqué to the US Embassy in Vienna, OPEC’s Headquarters:
The US–UK policy of neutrality and non-commitment towards OPEC …
has not prevented the OPEC from obtaining recognition from
international organizations, specifically the ECOSOC and UNCTAD, and
Austria has granted diplomatic status to the organization and its
personnel. In light of these and other successes by the OPEC, the USG
intends to review the present policy towards the OPEC and consider if
some other policy towards the organization might more usefully serve U.S.
interests. 240
The US policy officially changed to active engagement in March of 1966, making it
possible, for the first time, for US officials to officially meet with the OPEC Secretariat
and to develop a working relationship with the Group. 241 The practical benefit of this
new approach was that the US no longer needed to rely on OPEC Member States or
Consortium partners for insights on how the Organization functioned. Moreover, in
stepping out of the shadows, the American perception was that with the US possibly
midwifing negotiations, there was a much higher chance that a mutually beneficial
resolution to the pricing and profit sharing dispute could be reached.
However, the American action came far too late, for by the time they entered, in
an official capacity, the moribund negotiations, other trends had already taken a life of
their own. The US knew that some Members of OPEC, namely Iraq, Venezuela, and
Libya, had serious misgiving about any foreign enterprise controlling the oil industries in
240
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their respective countries. This was brought to light many times by both Consortium
members and by officials from these respective countries, in various forums. Moreover,
even Indonesia, a major recipient of US aid, was also much more forceful in the
advancing of a wholesale revision of the profit sharing arrangement than what was
publicly known. However, the first sign that events had progressed into a new phase of
OPEC’s relations with the Consortium was the change of position in Iran.
The first instance where the US became aware of this changed position was in 1966. As
early as January of that year, the Iranian government started airing grievances to both the
IOCs and their home governments, particularly the US, on stagnating or decreasing
production. 242 These grievances quickly unearthed many of the Iranian government’s
frustrations with the concession holders on profit sharing and prices, as the Shah blamed
what amounted to a 200,000 barrel per day decline in production to the decreased
revenue Iran was witnessing in weeks and months prior. 243 It was indeed in January of
1966, where the US began to witness the Shah, for the first time, tie his frustration with
the IOCs with his strategic partnership with the West overall. At a meeting with the US
Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Armen Meyer, the Shah stated bluntly that
“if oil companies do not provide anticipated growth in revenues, Iran might have to
reorient [the] ‘philosophy’ which [the] Shah …had espoused ‘during twenty-five years of
[his] reign’.” 244
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In subsequent meetings with US officials from, the Shah, much more confident,
but more in need of capital for both social spending at home, and particularly on military
spending, expressed varying signs of disappointment and frustration regarding the
behavior of the Consortium in Iran. 245 By that time, Members had not focused anymore
on royalty payments bringing the extra revenue that they had hoped for, but major
producers like the Iranian government, were putting their hopes in expanded production.
And though while still high, the Shah’s government expressed frustration with American
officials that the Consortium was not increasing production, but relegating Iran’s status to
other smaller producers. The driving force behind the Shah’s changing approach to the
Consortium, as understood by the US was the following: “a mix of need for money,
desire to establish a position in marketing of oil, belief that Iran should be able utilize her
own oil assets, and Shah's views that Iran deserves more than its neighboring oil
countries, that East-West détente makes him less dependent on West and that Iran should
do more to assert independence.” 246 As stated previously, Iran during the 1960s was the
largest recipient of US aid, as it geographical positioning made it one of the West’s chief
allies during the Cold War. As the Shah’s Iran occupied such an important place in US
strategic thinking against the USSR, US aid, just like American political intervention in
Iran in the 1950s, had a geostrategic rationale behind it. But by this time, the aid that the
US was providing along with stagnant revenue from the oil output, proved to be
insufficient for the exceptional expenses that the Shah’s Iran had. Eventually, the Shah’s
245
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monetary concerns would collide with the IOCs strategy, backed by the US, of dealing
with the transitioning market conditions and negotiations with OPEC.
As the Shah’s grievances against the Consortium gradually came to light, the
direction of his anger often increasingly became directed towards US officials. In one of
the first acts of open defiance to the US, the Shah threatened to rearrange his arms
purchases away from American companies, diversify purchases from Europe. This took
back American officials because it presupposed, on the part of Iranian officials that the
Consortium in Iran “could have promised greater oil ‘offtake’ had the US applied
pressure on the American companies who are members.”

247

The US feared that by

reason of Iran’s frustration with the IOCs, the Shah would become more reactionary, both
with his relationship to the Consoritum and possibly with the US. 248 For the rest of the
year, the US and the UK, with collaboration the IOCs, made a serious attempt to address
the Shah’s concerns as it related to oil revenue. However, American policy was explicitly
not to become enmeshed in the negotiations so as to perceived in openly taking sides,
between Iran, which was main strategic ally, and the Consortium, which mostly were
American firms.
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The US attempted to reassure the Iranian government the

fundamental problem vis-à-vis production volume and prices were the market conditions,
and that the IOCS were “sympathetic to Iran’s problems”. 250 However, by the end of the
year, according to US officials that had consulted with both the IOCs and the Iranian
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government, both sides were on a “collision course” as their positions became
increasingly irreconcilable. 251 Thus, a tentative arrangement on production levels was
reached (a proposed 11% increase in 1967 and 1968), but to be gradually implemented.
252

Incidentally, Iran’s production in 1967, because of the Arab Oil Embargo of that year

(which will be touched subsequently), rose to 20% above 1966 levels.
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Yet, by mid-1967, although Iran’s production significantly rose, the fundamental
problem concerning revenue, primarily because of the saturated market, still remained.
During the continued negotiations between Members and the IOCs, the Iranians began
taking the position of other Members, even though the Shah felt that Iran’s importance,
both to the global economy and to the Middle East security architecture, was far more
important – and thus deserving of better privileges from the IOCs. Like other OPEC
Members, the Iranians also demanded the 6.5% OPEC discount be eliminated, which
would net Iran about 10 cents per barrel of oil, and if the “discount were completely
eliminated by January 1968, Iran would get about $200 million extra in the next five
years.” 254 Above these demands was the Shah’s constant insistence that the Consortium
increase Iranian production. Yet, the IOCs consistently said that they would be unable to
increase Iranian output without cutting back Arab production, which most surely would
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provoke additional Arab hostility towards the Consortium. 255 The new Iran question as it
relates to the OPEC negotiations came to a head in December of 1967 in another private
meeting with Armen Meyer and the Shah. Meyer reported:
My audience with Shah turned out to be one of most unpleasant of my tour
here. He was obviously smoldering over devaluation shortfall issue with
which he had been preoccupied earlier in day. Using terms such as
“robbery,” “thieves” and some unprintable epithets, [the] Shah professed
to be completely disgusted with consortium's behavior. At one point in
discussion, Shah said if companies wanted war they could have it. This
time it would not be with a Mossadegh but with a united Iran behind Shah
himself. When I noted consortium believes it has legal basis for its
position and perhaps arbitration might be one possibility for solving
devaluation problem, Shah said arbitration is totally unacceptable. As for
matter being legal issue, Shah said GOI would take care of that once and
for all by immediate passage of legislation, which would insure GOI undepreciable payments. …Shah went on to berate consortium for its
continual maltreatment of Iran, despite Iran's exemplary behavior in
comparison with other countries. My efforts to point out that Iran has in
fact been treated very well fell on deaf ears. Shah once again contended
that consortium is sitting astride Iran's vast reserves and he cannot permit
such restraining influences on Iran's welfare. I pointed out problem is one
of marketing. In this connection, I suggested Iran may be trying to carry
water on both shoulders…Shah argued such competition is infinitesimal
compared with bonanzas greedy oil companies are throwing to countries
like Libya. When I pointed out geographic factor which places Libya in
favorable situation with Suez closed, Shah said what really infuriates him
is companies' lifting large quantities from sheikhdoms like Kuwait and
Abu Dhabi when Iran with its 26,000,000 people needs funds to maintain
its progress and play its role in Mideast security. Shah also asserted that
Saudi Arabia's production will soon move up to 4,000,000 barrels per day.
Since geographic factor a la Libya cannot be applied vis-à-vis Saudi
Arabia, this further demonstrates he said, how companies
discriminate…Shah once again mentioned possibility of legislation which
would enable GOI to have oil at well-head for clients which GOI may
develop not in competition with consortium. He noted Iraq had long since
found companies submissive to such measures. My natural response was
to point to Iraq's sorry plight today and how much better off Iran is. I
urged Shah “with every bone in my body” not to go down Iraqi
road….Once again I reminded Shah that GOI's relationship with
consortium likely be much more productive if it continues as partnership
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than if it is coercive. Shah readily agreed but said companies seem only
interested in great profits and fail to take into account broader issues such
as encouraging a country like Iran which is moving in positive direction
and which has potential for influencing whole area in constructive way.
Before closing discussion, I told Shah I had obviously picked a bad day for
my audience. He managed to permit himself a brief smile, but added that
on any other day he would feel the same way about the oil companies'
behavior vis-à-vis Iran. 256
By 1968, the Shah had essentially adopted the revisionist position of other OPEC
Members, but with more sophistication and without the reactionary behavior of Iraq or
later Libya. Thus he was consistently able to obtain short-term concessions from the
IOCs while both would agree to work on a longer term solution. In a CIA assessment of
1968, entitled appropriately, The Shah's Increasing Assurance, the US perception of the
Iranian monarch and his regime was that it had overcome most, if not all, the postMossadegh threats to his rule.
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His main focus now, was buttressing his growing

military dominance of the Persian Gulf, securing any qualitative military advantage that
he had over his neighbors, balancing any Soviet threats to Iran, and maximizing oil
revenue. 258 And because there was no alternative seen to his rule, and more importantly,
his pro-Western disposition, the US approach to the newly confident Shah was to make
the best of the situation. In a personal conversation with former State Department official,
William R. Polk, the Shah was frank about asserting his independence, openly admitting
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that while he was once “a puppet”, the West now needs him in the Cold War struggle
against the Soviets.

259

Events in other areas in OPEC also seemed to progress more rapidly than both the
Consortiums and the US had previously thought. In OPEC’s 11th conference, the
Organization passed Resolution XI.72, which mandated that Members should enforce
“that no petroleum rights be granted or contracts entered into concerning the exploration
or exploitation of new areas by Member Countries unless royalty payments and income
tax liabilities are calculated on the basis of posted or reference prices.”
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What the

Organization was doing was ensuring that while they could not retroactively enforce a
royalty payment they found acceptable, they could stipulate a new royalty payment based
upon new contracts. IOCs took this with much concern, because while the market was
saturated at that time, there was no guarantee that the market conditions would remain the
same – and they did not.
Subsequent OPEC Conferences, particularly the 13th Conference in Vienna in
1967, further provided support for the Iraqi and Libyan positions vis-à-vis the
negotiations with the Consortiums, as the issue of production sharing with OPEC
Member NOCs had become a critical issue in securing more profit for producers. After
the 14th and 15th Conferences, another new factor developed in late 1967-early 1968, with
the creation of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC). 261
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The genesis of this Group was initially to gather an Arab voice, not only within OPEC,
but also amongst other producing countries on oil related matters. However, with the 6day war between Israel and her Arab neighbors, and the subsequent 1967 Arab Oil
embargo, initiated through OAPEC, the West became concerned on possibility of the
politicization of oil exports because of producer denial methods – even though the
embargo failed. As we will see later, the fruition of this concern in the 1970s dramatically
transformed the image of the Organization.
Yet, OPEC Members increasingly became convinced that the road they were on
as it related to incremental negotiations with the Consortiums was leading to nowhere.
With the principle Western ally having fundamentally altered its position vis-à-vis the
Consortiums’ role in its oil industry, with OPEC-IOC negotiations deadlocked, while
other Members were taking matters into their own hands – either by setting up parallel
organizations or attempting to work around Member consensus, the method that the
Organization was using for the protection of its Members was clearly failing. In a press
release in January of 1968, OPEC essentially blamed the “failure to reach a reasonable
conclusion” on Consortium Members. 262 Yet, without providing any more details, OPEC
retreated back to its ‘wait-and-see’ posture, which was what many in the West,
particularly the IOCs, had grown accustomed to. But something was different this time.
Between the 15th and 16th Conferences, there was a flurry of activity among Members. In
May of 1968, the Organization held its first Meeting of the Coordination Committee of
National Oil Companies of OPEC Member Countries. This meeting, in and of itself, was
very important because it shifted the conversation from equitable profit sharing, to inter262
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Member coordination on indigenous production efforts. Throughout the entire time
between the two Conferences, there was very little new discussion on differing
approaches to the impasse from the US, the West, or the IOCs.
When the time came for the 16th Conference, many observers figured that while
OPEC would most likely reaffirm a past Resolution for better profit sharing arrangements,
or introduce some other type of scheme to obtain additional charges from the IOCs,
nothing new would come of it. However, what transpired in that June 1968 meeting
would not only forever change the direction of OPEC, which would forge consensus for
the years ahead, but would fundamentally end the remaining vestiges of the pre-Cold War
oil industry. In a lengthy, technically oriented statement, Resolution XVI.90 introduced
the new OPEC policy as it related to its Members: The Declaratory Statement of
Petroleum Policy in Member Countries. At the beginning of the Resolution, leaving no
room for ambiguity, XVI.90 stated that “Member Governments shall endeavor, as far as
feasible, to explore for and develop their hydrocarbon resources directly”. Furthermore,
as it related to the current relationship that Member States had with the IOCs, XVI.90
acknowledged that the “capital, specialists and the promotion of marketing outlets
required for such direct development may be complemented when necessary from
alternate sources on a commercial basis.” 263
While the rest of the Resolution was more technical in nature, not unlike other
OPEC statements, the meaning was simple: OPEC’s Member States had officially, but
more importantly collectively, declared their intention to nationalize the entire oil
industries within their territories – at the same time. The IOCs initially had no response,
263
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and it would take a few months to glean reaction from the Western governments. The day
after XVI.90 was announced, the Consortiums behaved, at least on the surface, as if
nothing had happened. And while the announcement was clear, it would take at least two
years for the physical ramifications of this new era in the oil industry to come to fruition.
Nevertheless, all participants – the producers, the IOCs, the Western governments – knew
that something had fundamentally changed.
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CHAPTER III • THE ASCENDANCY PHASE: THE SHIFT OF POWER TO THE
PRODUCERS, ORGANIZATIONAL ACTION, AND THE POLITICIZATION OF
PETROLEUM, 1969-1979
As OPEC was approaching its second decade of existence, the conditions that led to its
formation were beginning to dramatically alter. On every level of analysis – geoeconomics, inter-member relations, the influence of outside powers, and the specific
dynamics within individual Member states – the unique circumstances that initially
brought the Group together were either no longer existent or beginning the process of
evolution. In this era, a new set of circumstances was driving the Organization into
unchartered territory vis-à-vis the negotiations with the international oil companies
(Companies) and finding its place in the international community.
On a macro level, the changes in the global economy regarding crude oil
production and consumption patterns only heightened the importance of the Organization
– a carryover from what was already happening after the OPEC’s establishment. Within
the wider global economy, but more so in the advanced economies of the West, the
transition and dependence to crude oil had now been largely completed. This was
facilitated by the mass acceptance of the idea that crude oil was and would remain
dependably cheap. Although the Companies were the gatekeepers of this concept, having
significantly contributed to the development of this paradigm within the advanced
economies, near the end of the 1960s they increasingly became aware that both producers
and consumers were in a transition period. This was highlighted by the ongoing
negotiations with OPEC, specifically OPEC’s Solemn Declaration of June 1968, which
carried enormous ramifications that eventually affected the entire global oil industry, and
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the wider global economy. But more importantly, leverage was added to OPEC’s
negotiation strategy with the Companies, while engendering a newfound deference by the
major powers towards the Group. Subsequently, this facilitated the marked shift of the
US from being overly sympathetic to the Companies to being pushed into the direction of
brokering negotiations between the former and OPEC.
From an inter-member perspective, Member states were undergoing a learning
curve of not only how to manage an increasingly important international organization,
but also how to work with each other vis-à-vis the negotiations and later to
institutionalize nationalization of their crude. What was markedly different from the prior
era was that the initial years following its creation and engaging in negotiations with the
Companies, while attempting to streamline the diversity of viewpoints and strategies that
each Member had, OPEC developed a sense of maturity and operational functionality.
Not only had they individually learned what was successful or ineffective in their
negotiations with the Companies, but also they had begun to understand what it means to
be a part of a larger collective effort within the Organization. During this period,
Members would defer to policies that benefited the larger Group as opposed to
individually based tactical moves that advantaged some states over others. The
Companies’ early success in halting any major gains by the Organization in the
negotiations was primarily a result of the inability of Members to find a collective voice,
but more importantly, implement an agreed strategy. Disunity among such a varied
Group was natural, but for so long, it debilitated any real movement, up until the end of
the Infancy period. It was only with the Solemn Declaration that signs of real, tangible
unity began to take shape, only to be operationally expanded in the Ascendancy Phase.
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Subsequently, this facilitated the marked shift of the US from being overly
sympathetic to the Companies to attempting to broker negotiations between the former
and OPEC. A complicating factor to what had transpired early in the negotiations was
how much of American sympathy and her allies lay with the Companies. But as they
realized that the increasingly untenable position of ignoring OPEC needed adjustment,
they gradually became invested in the negotiations and ultimately played a public
facilitating role in the OPEC-Companies negotiations, specifically in the immediate
aftermath of the Solemn Declaration. Yet, with the gradual shift that occurred in US
strategic thinking to a more measured and balanced approach between OPEC and the
Companies, space was created by the Organization for fundamental gains in negotiations.
The changing nature of the global economy, consumption trends, and gradual price
increase in the 1970s would ultimately create the circumstances where the Organization
could, and did, inflict pressure at the negotiating table. And much of this politicization
would be witnessed particularly by the Arab producing states (OAPEC) when oil export
policy would turn into a weapon against the West in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur
war of 1973. Nevertheless, as power shifted to the producers, the long-held suspicions
among certain Member states concerning each other would become entangled in how
outside actors dealt with both the rising power of OPEC in the international system and
the rising costs of crude. The natural rivalries within the Organization and the infusion of
great powers into inter-member dynamics would have profound ramifications on not just
those two levels of analysis, but also the domestic picture.
This would eventually lead to how the Ascendancy period in OPEC’s institutional
life would end, at least in part, by what would transpire in the domestic politics of its
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founding Members, particularly at the end of the 1970s. While during the Infancy phase
of its development, Members states were able to stabilize the massive economic and
security dilemmas they were simultaneously experiencing (in some cases with much help
from the infusion of US aid), many of the underlying problems reappeared under a
different form. It was in the domestic arena where inter-member suspicions would
gradually fuse with outside power involvement in OPEC in order to equalize the balance
of power in the Organization, only to have consequential, unforeseen, but lasting
consequences for the future of its core founding Member states, the wider Middle East
region, and the global economy.
Market Forces
The changing macro conditions
Near the end of the 1960s, the decade’s oil glut, the resulting cheap crude price, and the
continued proliferation of individualized means of transportation had already produced
significant behavioral changes regarding oil dependency to the average resident of an
advanced economy. And this gradual dependency was not just for transportation purposes,
but had spread to several aspects of daily life. As Figure 3.1 shows, as global oil
consumption dramatically increased from the mid-1960s to the beginning of the 1970s,
the major drivers of that consumption were the North American and European economies,
with Japan’s rapidly growing economy, the USSR, and the Eastern bloc playing
secondary roles.
However, as the decade closed, consumption patterns would eventually catch up
with global production. Most notably, this would eat away at the supply surplus that the
USSR, the independent firms, and the major Companies had created only a few years
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earlier. Such was the contradiction of the Companies ’ price war against the USSR and
the independent firms. Besides creating, albeit indirectly, the conditions where host
governments reacted angrily to the decrease in price, thus spurring collective action in
forming OPEC, the Companies efforts at regaining lost market share from the USSR and
the independents progressively created a dependency effect on cheap crude to consumers
in advanced economies. In other words, market share protection efforts not only created
anger in producers, but also helped create the expectancy of cheap supply from
consumers in the global economy.
Figure 3.1: Crude Oil Prices, 1950-1981 (US dollars per barrel) Source: BP Statistical Review
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Figure 3.2: Global Oil Consumption by Regions: 1965-1981 (Thousand barrels daily)
Source: BP Statistical Review
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Figure 3.3: OPEC Crude Oil Production by country, as Member States joined the Organization, 1970-1981 (1000 b/d)
Source: OPEC Statistical Data. http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm
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Figure 3.4: Shares of global oil production between OPEC and non OPEC producers: 1960-1981
Source: OPEC Statistical Data. http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm
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It was this very dynamic that created the conditions for the painful adjustment to
rising prices, most notably felt during the oil shocks of 1973 and 1980 (see Figure 3.1).
Even before OPEC and its Members (both collectively and individually) began exacting
control over their crude export policies and prices as the 1970s began, the enticement of
cheap prices leading to more consumption, created a tightening of the market. Thus,
when in 1970, Libya’s Muammar Ghaddafi’s began a forced a price rearrangement on
foreign firms operating in his country, 264 contributing to an export decrease of more than
500,000 b/d for that year, the market immediately reacted. The long established price of
crude oil per barrel, which since 1961 was $1.80 ($10.42 in 2011 figures) increased to
$2.24 ($12.43) in 1971 (See Figure 3.2). By 1973, as the Yom Kippur war approached,
and the fallout from that conflict, specifically the Arab oil embargo against the nations
that supported Israel, 265 global oil consumption had literally doubled from the prior ten
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years. Moreover, what exacerbated both the dependency that advanced economies had on
cheap crude oil and the growing consumption patterns, was that by the time the Arab oil
embargo arrived in late 1973, roughly 56% of global oil production originated from
OPEC countries. This in turn, meant that the Arab states of OPEC, by 1973, contributed
almost 37% of global oil production – of which was denied to the supporters of Israel
during the embargo. And so, the convergence of these seemingly disconnected factors is
what led to price of oil being almost quadrupled from 1973’s price of $3.29 ($16.66 in
2011 figures) to $11.58 ($52.58) in 1974, which became a constant fixture of the global
economy throughout the 1970s until the next oil shock of 1979.
Throughout the 1970s, as economics merged with the politicization of oil
production and export policies, the price of crude, long a domain of the Companies,
shifted to producing countries, of which OPEC was the main driving force. As
nationalization began to be institutionalized – both individually, according to the unique
circumstances of the particular Member state, and collectively through OPEC – the
Companies began to realize that the traditional mechanisms that allowed their control of
crude oil prices were now eroding. The fundamental incapacity of the majors oil firms to
halt or reverse collective appropriations by OPEC (although by no means was each
Member State’s case uniform) introduced a new sense of volatility to the global oil
market. OPEC’s previous motivation of price defense, of which was the central reason
why the Organization was formed, had now largely been achieved. No longer would
foreign firms control export volume and subsequently price. But as power shifted to the
producers, the policy of price reversal, only to be followed and later replaced by price
increases, gradually became the mantra and the central driving force of Organization.
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And as the reasons for this dynamic were not purely economic, later to be mostly political,
as a result, there came about significant short-term and long-term ramifications to
OPEC’s changed strategy.
Regarding the short-term ramifications, the major producing countries tactically
responded to the market conditions by utilizing oil export policies (i.e. reductions and
redirections of oil production and exports) for fast-tracking revenue accumulation. This
was done to not only alleviate any remaining domestic economic shortcomings that they
had in the 1960s, when many of them relied on US aid, but more so to modernize their
economies, and in the case of Iran and Saudi Arabia, to strengthen their respective
conventional military power. As the Arab states of OPEC, under the OAPEC umbrella,
politicized exports via embargoes, in retaliation for Western support for Israel in the 6day War and in the Yom Kippur War, the power of the oil weapon became infused with
this new revenue accumulation strategy. Hence, the result was that the OPEC, as a force
in the international economy, turned into a price maximizer; i.e. attempting to get as
much revenue for its Member’s oil exports as possible, which was an evolution from its
founding principle of price defense. This strategy was reinforced by the conventional, but
ultimately inaccurate, belief in the global economy of that time that crude oil reserves
globally were becoming exhaustible, thus justifying OPEC’s collective demand for
higher prices.
This tactical policy, by default, had significant long-term ramifications for the
global oil industry and the global economy. The first was that it eventually drove many of
the advanced economies, chiefly those that were extremely reliant on crude oil imports,
to alternatives sources of energy and non-OPEC sources of oil. This was only reinforced
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by the major Companies, witnessing the irreversible loss of their prior positions, to look
for newer, and often more expenses sources of supply – both in recovery costs (i.e. the
extraction and production overhead) and in transportation costs. What followed then was
a renewed global awareness of conservation and efficiency efforts, which first took hold
in Japan, and spread to other advanced and developing economies. However, by far the
most significant consequence was the gradual destruction of any cartel system that, in
many ways, was the legacy of the Companies’ control over the global oil industry. While
OPEC inherited the mechanisms and framework that would allow it to theoretically
become a cartel, its behavior, both as a single actor in the international economy and as
composite Organization created the conditions market share disintegration, not
accumulation. Indeed, the notion that OPEC was ever a cartel is fundamentally at odds
with how it has behaved in the global economy. As Fadhil Chalabi has argued, in this
period where the initial efforts of price defense evolved into an offensive goal of price
maximization, any lasting hope for the Organization to keep the market share
accumulation paradigm that the Companies built was lost – all for the short-term, tactical
goal of revenue accumulation. 266 Had OPEC discouraged (or possessed the ability to
discourage) the politicization of exports by its Arab faction in 1973-74 or even attempted
to stabilize prices by increasing volume post-embargo to the point that would discourage
consumers to look for alternatives and new supplies, its chance at a cartel would have
been much higher. But considering that the nature of any cartel is to dominate market
share, OPEC’s hawkishness on price only encouraged consumers to look for alternatives
and alter consumption patterns, thus undermining efforts at cartelization. OPEC’s
266
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offensive price maximization strategy, by default, eroded its potential at being a cartel.
As Figure 3.4 shows, the dramatic decline of OPEC’s market share is evident when
comparing its 1973 figures (56% of global crude production) to that of 1981 (40% of
global crude production). Therefore, while the Ascendancy era began with the
Organization finding a dominant, arguably the dominant voice in the global oil industry –
thus ushering in a new, changed period for the global economy – the end of this era
would also dramatically reshape the Organization’s functionality and its impact on the
global oil market. The decisions, Group consensus, and lack of consensus within the
Organization, often times complicated by inter-member rivalries and renewed domestic
crises in Member States, ultimately laid the ground work for the free-market based oil
market that has been an often times, volatile fixture of the global economy since the
beginning of the 1980s.
Outside Forces
US evolution to active engagement
Yet as the Ascendancy era of OPEC’s institutional life began, the US and many of the
home states of the major Companies, had by then begun to reach out to OPEC on its own
terms, meaning bestowing official recognition to the Organization, and eventually going
beyond that. While the intensification of the negotiations between the Companies and
OPEC had much to do with this strategic shift, the preeminence of the Middle East region
to US strategic thinking, due to the massive amount of hydrocarbon reserves in the region,
its growing importance to the global oil supply, only to be exacerbated Cold War
calculations vis-à-vis the USSR, played a crucial role in the US decision to actively
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engage OPEC as entity in and of itself – instead remaining in the position of background
neutrality . As the core of OPEC producing power resided in the Middle East region, an
active engagement policy with the Group became central to US grand strategy like never
before.
British Middle Eastern Withdrawal and US Twin Pillar Policy
In February of 1967, the US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), in highlighting
the unique importance of the region to the global economy, advocated that the US
“should for the foreseeable future, regard the Soviet presence and present Soviet policy in
the Middle East as the primary threat to vital US interests”.
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The NIE’s pressing

concern was a reaction to the coming perceived void that was to be left by the British
withdrawal East of the Suez. 268 Though London’s decision was driven by a prolonged
economic decline, coinciding with the gradual curtailing of its geopolitical power, 269 its
coming absence from the region – chiefly what that would project to the USSR and
market worries regarding oil supply – became a significant source of concern for the US.
270

The NIE summarized how the regional flux with the coming British departure would

affect both US strategic concerns and the perceptions of Soviet decision makers:
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British withdrawal following World War II was followed by a decade in
which new governments were taking their first steps, a combination of
British and American aid and assistance linked with mutual security
arrangements provided the essential support for early development and a
degree of stability; the Soviets, concentrating in Europe on consolidating
their position and at home on recovering from the war, did not pose an
immediate threat to the area. In the 1958-67 decade, the Soviets,
accepting for the present the status quo in Europe, have turned south to
concentrate their major efforts outside of the Bloc in establishing the
USSR as the dominant Great Power in the Middle East. In this decade"
British power in the area has all but collapsed; the U.S." never militarily
strong "East of Suez II, has moved into a period' of retrenchment and
disengagement based partly on lack of agreement within the United States
Government on the nature and seriousness of the threat to U.S. interests in
the Middle East" partly on limited resources and partly on a conscious
readjustment of policy toward a less militant resistance to the expansion
of Soviet Influence into the area…. If within the Middle East Region, the
military balance of power between the revolutionary and moderate forces
can be established and the Soviets denied and extension of influence
through Soviet “proxy military bases”, the Soviet threat can be reduced to
a tolerable level. Stated simply, most of the countries of the Middle East
region are capable of withstanding the Soviet policy of “peaceful
coexistence” as it is known in Western Europe; the Middle East cannot
withstand the combined pressures of “peaceful coexistence” and Soviet
support of “the liberation struggle” in the Middle East with massive
Soviet arms aid…. The period 1967-75 will be decisive for the political
forces contending for control, of the area between Asia and Western
Europe. Geopolitically, on the availability of resources and vis-à-vis the
apparent level of current commitment, the advantages rest with the Soviet
Union. In the absence of any early basic decision by the United States,
Western Europe and those free Asian countries with interests in the
Middle East to meet the Soviet challenge there, it appears inevitable that
the U.S. position as a Great Power in this region can be written off by the
end of this period. 271
The NIE’s explicit reference to the changing regional environment in light of the British
withdrawal rested on three realities. The first had to do with a lack of agreement on the
extent of US physical involvement in the Middle East, meaning what kind of long-term
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conventional military defense Washington would afford to the region writ large. The
second was a diagnosis of the region when comparing US influential capability, which
was undecided and possibly in relative retrenchment, as opposed to Soviet influential
capability, which at a minimum was constant because of its proximity to the region. The
American conclusion, as stated above, was that if trends continued, its position as a
“Great Power” could inevitably be “written off”. 272 But finally, it was presumed that
while the US could not massively build up conventional power in the region, there was a
way to balance out Soviet influence by providing support to friendly governments.
It was under these circumstances that the rationale of the American Twin Pillar
policy for the Middle East was developed. Accordingly, Washington would assist and
oversee the strengthening of Iranian and Saudi military power in the Persian Gulf and the
wider region.

273

However, the US had to tread carefully. Though this policy was

designed as a counterweight to the Soviet military threat and political influence in the
region, the Twin Pillar policy, by extension, was also intended to balance against Sovietaligned regional states. The problem though was that some of those very Soviet-aligned
states were fellow OPEC Members, chiefly Iraq, which by the beginning of the
Ascendancy era was fully under Baathist control with Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr as
President. Other states at the time, such as Libya and Algeria were wild cars, having
become recently independent with severe economic challenges and/or political instability.
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US pushed into role as de-facto intermediary in OPEC-Companies negotiations
For most of the 1960s, the US was consciously ignoring OPEC, until in 1966 where both
the US and UK decided to shift to open neutrality in the negotiations between OPEC and
the Companies. 274 The importance of the negotiations, the US fear of Soviet exploitation
of OPEC Member State’s discontent, and any instability resulting from tightening market
conditions eventually moved the US away from its position of conscious indifference, to
open neutrality, to a more active brokering role. From the late 1960s to the early 1970s,
the US took on an open intermediary position concerning the negotiations between both
sides, while also actively, albeit grudgingly, intervening in the dynamics of the oil
industry. Washington was no longer just concerned about an abstract peaceful resolution
to the OPEC-Companies dispute. The details of the negotiations, the ramifications of the
outcome, and the particular dynamics within the global oil industry were now deeply
affecting how the US approached the broader issue.
Washington’s intervention took place on three, interrelated fronts: playing a
broker role which often required nudging both sides in what turned out to be a tactical
compromise; investigating, formulating, and ultimately prescribing its own policies that
could potentially bring resolution to the broader OPEC-Companies conflict; and lastly, as
a major energy consumer itself, altering its own domestic policy, via import control
revisions, in order to increase the market share and revenue of some key OPEC states –
done to mollify their apprehensions about the negotiations. This pattern was first adopted
274
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in relation to disputes with America’s allies within OPEC and their respective concession
holders. At the beginning of this Ascendancy period, it was the dispute between Iran and
the Consortium that appeared to be the most worrisome for the US. In April of 1968, the
Iranian government and the Consortium came to a temporary agreement to enhance the
time needed to arrive at a more comprehensive resolution to Iran’s request for additional
control over price, volume, and, more importantly, production-sharing.275 Iran, as other
OPEC Members, was counting on a certain level of rising revenue to match their
previously described defense and development costs for the next few years. The US
government, by that time deeply involved in the negotiations, sketched out what the
Iranian strategy was vis-à-vis the Companies – of which was clearly a template that other
producers were either watching or soon to be mimicking:
The Iranians would prefer, as the simplest solution (and the only one
likely to succeed), that the members of the Consortium lift enough oil to
provide, through the usual royalties and taxes, the desired level of
governmental revenue…. If the Consortium is unable to do this, it must
provide the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) with a sufficient
quantity of oil from the Consortium area at a low enough price so that
NIOC could make up the shortfall in revenue through its own sales or
barter arrangements. The oil could be provided by modifying the terms of
the Consortium's 1966 agreement to make barter oil available to NIOC,
by turning over to NIOC an already producing field in the Consortium
area, or by conferring upon the Iranian Government membership in the
Consortium. The government has indicated that, in case of refusal, Iran
might take unilateral measures to obtain the oil. 276
Though the Consortium, under American insistence, considered as a possible solution
additional output, which would increase taxes and royalties to the Iranians, the market
275

United States Department of State: Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 19641968, ed. Susan K. Holly and David S. Patterson, vol. Volume XXXIV, Energy Diplomacy and Global
Issues (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1999), Document 223.

276

Ibid.

156

conditions in the late 1960s still had not tightened enough to justify such a move.
However, Iran and other producers increasingly saw the insistence of production sharing
if additional Companies output was not doable as the next best option – given the
constraints of the concessionary holders and the market conditions.
Major producers had come to believe, that in light of the very modest gains
regarding the prior fight over royalty payments with the concession holders, and
considering that the posted price system was still intact (and under control of the
Companies), that the logic of production-sharing was the most sensible path towards
more revenue. Though this process was not a novel idea, it was under the OPEC umbrella
where it gained traction. The simultaneous establishment of the National Oil Companies
(NOCs) in producing states, some of which were older while others came about in the
initial years after OPEC’s formation, was the vehicle that host states intended to use to
enhance revenue. 277
Nevertheless, what production sharing essentially amounted to for the Companies
was a de-facto, arbitrary reduction in the concession agreement within the host country,
by the respective host government. In other words, it was seen as an indirect first step
towards nationalization. In the past, Companies were only concerned about other firms;
some fellow national firms while others foreign, competing for concessions. Though the
threat of appropriation by varying host governments was a lingering concern, they never
had to worry about an internal large competitor in the host country controlled by the host
government, gradually splitting their concessions until nationalization was realized.
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Moreover, for the Companies, acquiescing to the terms of the producing states, would not
only lead to a market surplus, as NOCs would gradually saturate the market, but would
irreversibly collapse the Companies ’ market share.
Although each OPEC Member operated under different concessionary agreements,
their collective experience in gaining only modest revenue increases with the royalty
payments, and the many unresolved questions about new profit sharing arrangements,
gradually created a consensus to production sharing. However, though Member States
were beginning to coalesce around this new approach, it remained largely an aspiration,
with the sole exception of Iran. It was here where the US government in 1969, noticed the
beginning of this trend in Member States:
One of the latest of the numerous issues that have arisen between Middle
Eastern governments and the holders of petroleum concessions in their
territories concerns a demand by governments for participation in the
exploitation of previously granted exclusive concessions…. The principle
that governments of oil-producing countries have a right to participate in
the ownership of petroleum concessionaire Companies, even though the
concession agreement makes no provision for such participation, has been
publicly sponsored by OPEC…. Presumably, therefore, all the members of
OPEC endorse this principle and could be expected at some time or other
to present to the holders of exclusive petroleum concessions in their
territories a demand for an equity share in the producing company. For
various reasons, however, it is probable that the first and principal targets
for that demand, when and if it is made, will be the “Big Four”
concessionaire Companies—Aramco in Saudi Arabia, the Kuwait Oil
Company in Kuwait, the Iraq Petroleum Company and its affiliates in Iraq,
and the Consortium in Iran. So far, no specific demand has been made.
Iran has threatened unilateral enforcement of participation but only if its
revenue demands are not met by the Consortium. Public statements on
participation have been made in some other OPEC countries, but only in
Saudi Arabia has any government official had even an informal discussion
with the concessionaire company on the subject. Nowhere have the
manner, the timing, and the expected results of participation in existing
exclusive concessions been set forth in more than the vaguest of terms. It
would appear that none of the OPEC countries, except perhaps Iran, is
prepared to make a real issue of participation in the near future—possibly
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not at all as long as governmental oil revenues continue to grow at
somewhere near the rate governments expect. Iran’s threat to spur the
OPEC countries into concerted action to gain participation if Iranian
revenue demands are not met cannot be taken seriously. For more than
one reason, there is virtually no prospect of concerted action that would
serve to bolster Iran’s demands, primarily because those demands could
be met only at the expense of other oil-producing countries. The probable
results of the acquisition by governments of even a modest equity
participation in such prolific concessions as those of the Big Four would
be either (1) an increased per-barrel revenue for the government on oil
exports, thus putting a further direct squeeze on oil-company profits, or
(2) the provision to governments of sizable amounts of oil at production
cost, the sale of which, probably at cut rates, would be likely not only to
diminish the Companies’ own sales but further erode the crude-oil price
structure. Since crude oil prices are already gradually falling and
measures now in force will insure to governments a rising proportion of
oil export profits over the next five or six years even if no further steps in
this direction are taken, the concessionaire Companies may be expected to
dig in their heels on the participation issue. Governments would probably
have to resort to extremely drastic measures in any attempt to force
participation on their concessionaires—measures that would be likely to
leave both sides worse off. We doubt that, with the possible exception of
Iran, Middle Eastern governments are prepared or will be prepared in the
next few years to take that risk, barring unforeseen developments that
would seriously threaten the normal growth of their oil revenues. 278
Though the US was dismissive of collective action, sparked by Iranian attempts to force
production sharing on its concession holders, or even the Iranian ability to rally other
Members, its concerns regarding Iran’s own actions against the Consortium was quite
apparent. And by this period, Iran, by far was the closest ally that Washington had in
OPEC. The risks of instability that could be set off by Iran’s decision towards forced
production sharing on the Consortium, and the possibility of that becoming a template,
regardless of the US dismissal of this prospect, spurned the US, under the Nixon
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administration, towards a different approach in order to address the revenue of concerns
of producing states.
Due to Washington’s fear and the purported unfeasibility of production sharing
policies, the US, being the largest consumer of energy, decided to alter its domestic oil
consumption matrix as to break the paradigm of the conflict between OPEC and the
Companies. This was to be done by manipulating the American oil import quota system.
Now the import quota system (i.e. the Mandatory Oil Import Quota Program) initially
established in 1959 by the Eisenhower administration, 279 was one of the key contributing
factors in why the Bettencourt administration in Venezuela reached out to Middle East
producers in the pre-OPEC days. 280 As mentioned previously, this action, in restricting
Venezuelan sales to the largest economy, only worsened its economic challenges at home,
leading to collusion amongst the Member States. Amongst the main goals of the
imposition of the oil import quota system by Washington was straightforward: to help
buttress the eroding financial wellbeing of domestically based US oil firms that could not
compete with the major Companies.
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President Eisenhower justified the system by

saying that it was designed to “insure a stable, healthy [oil] industry in the United States
capable of exploring for and developing new hemisphere reserves to replace those being
depleted” and that its “basis…is the certified requirements of our national security which
make it necessary that we preserve to the greatest extent possible a vigorous, healthy
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petroleum industry in the United States.” 282 Moreover, on a security level, the system
sought to lessen the threat of mass dependence of the US on foreign oil, thus “given
restricted imports the domestic oil industry would thus be encouraged to locate and
develop domestic supplies.” 283
However, as the 1970s approached, the logic behind of this system no longer held
up. The tightening market environment not only created the conditions where American
based firms were no longer threatened by price erosion, but more importantly for the US,
keeping this system intact was now leading to artificial inflated oil prices at home. As
early as 1968, to deal with the problem between Iran the Consortium, Washington
suggested lifting some import controls on Iranian crude. 284 The added benefit would
mean more crude oil imported from an allied nation, cheaper prices at home, and a
lessening of the revenue concerns of Iran. Furthermore, this would also ameliorate some
of the constraints that Iran’s concession holders were placed under, primarily because of
the market conditions and the OPEC-Companies negotiations.
This formula added to the serious debate that was already taking place in the US
in terms of relaxing certain import quotas. 285 As this debate broadened in the Nixon
administration, the complications in the import quota system, the purported costs to
American consumers, and pressure from major foreign-based Companies on the US
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government pushed forward the possibility for instituting decontrol of oil imports. 286 In
August of 1969, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released a study concerning the
prospects of American access to global oil supplies for the next 15 years – in accordance
with the internal debate and in possible anticipation of decontrol. The primary US
concern was that if the walls were taken down, and the US market would become
accessible to foreign oil similar to pre-1959, would the American economy become
vulnerable to supply disruption – either intended or unintended? After surveying the
global energy matrix by Companies, regions, and allies, the CIA, in its summary, was
confident that it would be:
…highly unlikely that the US would encounter serious difficulties in
obtaining its foreign oil requirements over the next 10 to 20 years, given
the assumed termination of import restrictions. There are several major
reasons for this judgment. Even 10 years from now, US import
requirements would amount to only about 15 percent of the total amount
of oil, which, it is estimated, would then be moving in world trade. Given
the great and growing diversification of major sources of crude oil, supply
is becoming increasingly invulnerable to disruption—voluntary or
involuntary—by individual countries. Hence, although we would expect
political upheavals to occur sporadically in various producing countries
in the years to come, often with the chance of disrupting oil production for
a time, such instances are unlikely seriously to curtail American access to
world oil. Moreover, the oil producing states are heavily dependent on
petroleum revenues. Even another Arab-Israeli war would probably not
unite the Arab oil producers enough to let them long maintain an anti-US
embargo. All things considered, the US, with the cooperation of US oil
companies, would find it relatively easy to overcome the effects of any
selective embargos that might occur from time to time. 287
The CIA’s assurances notwithstanding, they also factored in that the “most likely source
of a serious disruption of world oil supplies” that could potentially “affect US access to
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oil is the Arab world.” 288 Though the market conditions were tightening, there was really
no way of knowing what the global consumption patterns would become in the 1970s, or
as will be discussed, how the Arab world’s reaction to the Yom Kippur war of 1973, of
which was severally discounted by the CIA, would ultimately be. Yet, with these
calculations in mind, the US began the phased adjustment to its import quota system in
the beginning of the 1970s. The alterations to the oil import quota greatly benefited
Canada and Mexico, which had earlier enjoyed what was dubbed ‘hemispheric
preferences’ but now extended to key OPEC Member Venezuela, which had been denied
this hemispheric advantage for most of the quota years. 289 Eventually the US would also
include other its allies in OPEC by offering “special treatment”, namely, Iran, Indonesia,
and Saudi Arabia. 290 And by 1973, after years of alterations to the import quotas that
essentially rendered the program hollow, the Nixon administration formally put an end to
the system.
Interstate Dynamics
Instituting Nationalization
At the same time that the US was adapting policies in reaction towards the OPECCompanies negotiations, significant changes were also underway within the internal
structure of OPEC. Though by the beginning of the 1970s, the Organization’s
achievements in the negotiations were quite modest, they were enough to pique the
interest of other minor producers that on their own felt quite vulnerable to their
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concession holders. To these smaller players, the OPEC umbrella had much to offer. In
this Ascendancy period, Algeria joined in 1969, Nigeria in 1972, Ecuador in 1973, and
Gabon 1975. In virtually all of these second generational states that would join the
Organization, the fundamental dilemma concerning host state’s profit sharing and
production sharing concerns (i.e. more revenue for the host government) vs. the
concession holders’ economic priorities (i.e. managing costs in a changing global oil
industry) were essentially the same. Moreover, as newly independent states crossed the
threshold from their initial, post-independence instability to finding government models
with some governance capability, OPEC came to represent an institution battling the
excesses of developed economies on behalf of the collective rights of the developing
world. Indeed, it was this phenomenon that pushed the Organization to eventually
become infused with the larger struggle of third world nations, particularly such
institutions as the Non-Aligned movement. Thus, it was not only in these very modest
producing states, as opposed to the major Member producers, that the stalemate in the
OPEC-Companies negotiations finally broke. But more so, it was with the addition of
these modest producing nations, particularly from the Arab world, that created the
conditions for the politicization of the Group in the 1970s.
The final phase of domino cascade
The implementation of Nationalization
As 1970 approached, while the negotiations between OPEC’s major producing countries
– namely Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela – had somewhat temporarily been alleviated
due to direct American involvement, the state of negotiations in other smaller producers
had reached a stalemate. In Algeria, Iraq, and Libya the lack of progress was leading to
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radical action from each respective state. Algeria’s entrance into the Organization in 1969,
brought with it the legacy of French occupation of the country, compounded by the rising
resentment from the Algerian government towards the concessions that French oil firms
had in that country. 291 In Iraq, the lack of mobility in Baghdad’s negotiations with the
Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) further emboldened the new Baathist elite that had
secured power over the country. And in Libya, Muammar Ghaddafi’s new Revolutionary
system was now looking to the country’s oil industry to pay for the post-revolutionary
economic programs his regime was attempting to implement in that country.
OPEC’s reaction, though accompanied by little capability to physically support its
Member States, was nevertheless strong in their rhetorical defense, as exemplified in their
June 1970 Resolutions XX.114 and XX.115, which supported Algeria and Iraq in the
their negotiations with their respective concession holders.

292

But as the impasse

continued well into the summer of 1970, the governments of these modest producers of
OPEC decided to take matters in their own hands. As Ian Skeet has noted, Algeria began
the trend at unilateral concessional revisionism by retroactively announcing a new posted
price, of which was almost 80 cents more per barrel than then current price. 293 The
Algerians did so by making the same arguments of other Members, that the price was
artificially low and therefore needed a retroactive price adjustment. This time, however,
they forced the issue on the concession holders. In Libya, since January of 1970,
Qaddafi’s revolutionary regime had been consistently applying pressure on the country’s
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concession holders for better profit sharing terms. As Daniel Yergin has chronicled, the
greatest source of pressure was applied to the American independent firm, Occidental. 294
So much so that as Libyan pressure forced Occidental to cut back production in Libya, by
far their largest concession, fears of supply disruption forced the US government to
intervene with other major Companies, advising them to make up the lost Occidental
production via Iran. 295 Though Libya’s second tier status, both within OPEC and in the
global industry, created a sense in Occidental that Libya’s intransigence would soon
subside, it was ultimately Qaddafi’s threat of full nationalization that forced major
concessions from Occidental.
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In the end, Occidental conceded a 20% increase in

royalties and taxes to Tripoli, a 30-cent increase in the posted price, and more
consequentially an increase of 5% of Libya’s profit sharing. 297 It was the latter, bringing
Libya’s profit sharing arrangement to 55% (with 45% for Occidental) that would erode,
in rapid order, the remaining 50/50 profit sharing paradigm. Soon afterwards, all foreign
firms in Libya reluctantly accepted this arrangement.
Unity Achieved
Events in Libya, and in other second generational countries of OPEC, created not only a
new precedent that other larger producers had for years attempted to implement, but also
a new unity of purpose within the wider Organization. The tacit acceptance of
‘incrementalism’ by the major producers Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, brought
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about by measured US attempts at mediation, swiftly broke down. The Iranian
government, the primary major Member that was once behind concessional revisionism,
only to be pacified by the US temporarily, utilized the Libyan example for its advantage.
The argument was quite simple; Tehran’s claims was that if a problematic, revolutionary
government in a modest producing country could secure better revenue sharing
arrangements with its concession holders, there was no reason why major producers
should be denied similar arrangements. Furthermore, the Shah’s unwavering argument,
both to the US government and the major Companies, was that Iran, being on the
frontline against the Soviet threat in the Middle East, and being the main pillar of the
Twin Pillar policy, needed to have special treatment vis-à-vis its oil revenue. Iran was
just not another oil producer. As Iran was shifting towards radical concessional
revisionism, Venezuela’s parliament, only weeks before OPEC’s 21st Conference, which
was scheduled to be in Caracas that year, raised the stakes with the Companies by
instituting a 60/40 profit sharing arrangement – up 8% from the prior 52/48 arrangement.
298

It was in the fall-winter of 1970-71 were events would come to a head. As OPEC
celebrated its 10th anniversary, the NOCs of the Member states had begun to prepare for
what was becoming inevitable: major concessional revision towards full nationalization.
With the December OPEC meeting approaching, Member States were no longer divided
between those who were waiting for incremental steps towards revenue reforms vs. those
who were considered radical. The Algerian and Libyan experiences galvanized the Group.
In OPEC’s momentous 21st Conference in December of 1970, for the first time, the
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Organization, as a whole, inherited the position of the so-called radical factions. The
Algerian and Libyan models were wholly adopted. In Resolution XXI.120, the
Organization “resolved that all Member Countries adopt…to establish 55 percent as the
minimum rate of taxation on the next income of the oil companies operating in the
Member Countries.” 299 In other words, OPEC had collectively taken the initiative behind
profit sharing. Moreover, the Organization implemented a blanket elimination to any
existing disparities in the posted price (tax-reference price), with the caveat of
consideration to any differences in “gravity and geographic location” of Member’s
specific crude quality. 300 For years, these disparities allowed the Companies to divide
and negotiate with the Members, usually with tacit cooperation from the US and UK, in
order to diminish the possibility of mass collective action. Now that had been resolved, at
least for the time being. OPEC had collectively instituted a direct committee to negotiate
with the Companies on behalf of the Member states. And lastly, in its 21st Conference,
OPEC decided to eradicate the allowances that the Companies were given by the host
states, effective January 1971.
After the Conference, the US understood that its efforts in bridging the gap
between the Companies and OPEC, though successful at delaying, were now shattered. In
a meeting between the Iranian government and US representatives on December 30, 1970
in Iran, US representatives were taken aback by the forcefulness of the Iranian
government’s attitude toward the inevitable price increase that was bound to happen in
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1971. 301 Moreover, the US increasingly saw the actions of Iran and OPEC as mutually
reinforcing, a marked change from the past where Iran counted on as holding OPEC to a
gradualist, moderating position and an ally within the Organization. Simultaneously,
other Members managed to put aside the particulars of their differences with one another,
in order to exact whatever coming concessions they could obtain from the Companies.
The renewed negotiations were slated to begin in the early days of 1971. Iranian,
Iraqi, and Saudi representatives headed OPEC’s new unitary negotiating team, while
Tehran was picked as the venue for what would become transformative negotiations for
the history of the oil industry and for OPEC. 302 The negotiations would last several
weeks and would comprise four rounds. Fadhil Chalabi, OPEC’s former General
Secretary and a significant figure at the negotiations, stated that both sides remained very
far apart from their positions, until in February of 1971, after the fourth and final round,
OPEC offered “a final position that the Companies either ‘take it or leave it’.” 303 Behind
the scenes, the US was still attempting to move the talks forward by playing the
intermediary role. Yet the Companies displayed to US officials a deeply entrenched sense
of mistrust towards the Shah and other Persian Gulf OPEC Members. They cited that no
“assurance” from them would be “worth very much and that even if agreement reached
on price, GOI (Government of Iran) will continue to put pressure on Consortium
members for increased off-lift”. 304
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Nevertheless, the sense of unity, determination, and persistence of OPEC
Members – with the US, and to a lesser extent Western powers, now playing
intermediaries – rendered the Companies unable to continue the status quo of domination
of the oil industries in the host countries – whether of price, exploration, or volume. In a
dispatch from the American embassy in Iran, after meeting with Companies
representatives, the US assessment was that the “Companies had ‘collapsed’ and met
virtually all OPEC demands.” 305 The Tehran Price Agreement was the minimum of the
collective demands that OPEC Members had stipulated from the Companies. Becoming
effective in mid-February of 1971, the agreement essentially concerned issues of
retroactive financial adjustments for past revenues for Member States, an increase of
Persian Gulf revenues in exchange for a pledge by those Members that they will not seek
to increase prices for 5 years, a new agreed freight premium, and better terms for Libya
(because of its proximity to Europe and high grade of crude quality). 306 Yet, with the
Tehran Price Agreement, a noticeable power shift had irreversibly gone to the producers.
The Agreement would become one of the most transformative events in the
history of the oil industry because it marked the official end of the Companies unmatched
domination of the industry. Though still having immense capital, political clout, and the
most advanced exploration, production, and transportation technology, the Companies
would never dominate in the way they had. Yet, though the Tehran Agreement began a
process where both sides were to take a step-by-step approach towards an agreed
resolution on price, and logically to be expanded out to a shared production agreement,
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that destination was never reached. The official collective negotiations between the
Group and the Companies became extremely problematic as individual negotiations
between particular Member States and their concession holders broke down. In Iraq’s
case, the returning Baathist government, spearheaded by Vice President Saddam Hussein,
was unable to cope with much of the delays and ultimately the irreconcilable price
differences that Iraq in particular demanded of the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC), the
main concession within the country. As a result, in 1972, Iraq simply nationalized the
entire industry. 307 In Iran, the Shah, though now clearly pushing for better conditions
from the Companies and increased with agitation against them, still would not push
towards full nationalization but adjusted his previous moderation stance within the
Organization for this new era. 308 Venezuela would successfully follow this piecemeal
strategy, while Libya and Algeria would continue to agitate for special conditions
because of their proximity to Europe.
Another complicating factor was the fallout from the collapse of Bretton Woods
Agreement in August of 1971. As the US exit from the increasingly archaic post-WWII
economic accords depreciated the dollar, Member States agreed among themselves that
the initial terms set in the Tehran Agreement needed to be revised as it did not account
for the major variations in dollar exchange rates. No one had anticipated that the US
would allow the dollar to float. Getting the Companies to agree to revisions to the Tehran
Agreement, while individual negotiations were happening, was extremely difficult for
Member States. Fadhil Chalabi even goes as far as to say that the Companies used
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“delaying tactics, obfuscation with IMF data and general prevarication” to avoid such a
revision – but ultimately relented to revisit the terms of the Tehran Agreement.

309

However, this proved to be a futile effort. Though interim arrangements were made
between both sides in the weeks and months after the collapse of Bretton Woods, by May
of 1973, negotiations between both sides had broken down by reason of the
irreconcilability of both sides’ positions. It was ultimately this collapse of negotiations
between the Companies and OPEC that would eventually become entangled into the
penchant of certain Arab producers, many of them OPEC Members, to politicize oil
exports.
OPEC as a template for the Third World
From this very long-sought but public battle, OPEC as an institution increasingly saw
itself (and in some quarters became to be seen) as an important representative voice of
many in the developing world. Up until that time, it was only the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM), created a year after OPEC’s founding, that was the singular
international organization specifically intended to protect the interests of developing
countries. 310 Member States and the Organization in general were seen solely through the
parochial lens of the oil industry and specifically for the protection of their revenue intake.
Nevertheless, the victory in the negotiations over the Companies, at least in the minds of
many Member State governments – by virtue that it created a template for other raw
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material exporting countries – had the potential to enlarge the mandate of the
Organization.
In theory, this dynamic was more under the surface. In subsequent conferences,
resolutions, and press releases after from the OPEC’s historic 21st Conference and the
Tehran Price Agreement, there was rarely any mention of any legitimate Third World
issue. And this was at a time that many African countries (themselves raw material
exporters), that had recently become independent of European domination, were still
locked in struggles with their former colonial masters over the production and selling of
their respective natural resources. To a far lesser extent, this same dynamic was also in
play in Latin America. OPEC’s succeeding efforts in the weeks and months after the
Tehran Agreement were directed towards its own issues. These were mainly continued
institutional development, procedural restructuring, implementing price reforms,
expanding market research, organizational concerns about the loss of value in the US
dollar, and monitoring the continued but ultimately futile negotiations with the
Companies. 311
It was at the national, governmental level of certain Member States that issues
outside of the export and selling of crude oil gradually seeped into OPEC’s
organizational behavior and made its way into the OPEC forum in general. This is not to
say that there was an intentional effort by the Organization to politicize exports or
manipulate prices. However, because for these States OPEC was their only basis of some
modicum of independence and power within the international system, eventually many of
their foreign policy priorities would gradually appear in the wider realm of oil production
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and exports. Moreover, for newly arrived Members, this institution had proven successful,
at least according to their perception, in slowly rolling back the power and influence of
the very same forces that had once dominated their economies. It was within this context
that, underneath the procedural, public face of the Organization (i.e. in resolutions,
official statements, and conferences), that certain Member States would utilize their
export policies for non-economic, political reasons. And invariably, the OPEC brand,
either directly or indirectly, would become attached to their decisions.
A forerunner of what was to come was seen in 1967, when the Arab Members of
OPEC attempted to utilize boycott measures against those states that supported Israel
during the 6-day War.

312

But due to the market conditions of the 1960s being too

saturated, the embargo had little effect. More so, oil producers at the time were simply
unable to muster independent leverage upon powerful consuming countries. The
concession holders were much too dominant within host countries. The previously
mentioned 1969 CIA assessment, though having sketched out the scenario of another
episode of export politicization, were confident that “even another Arab-Israeli war
would probably not unite the Arab oil producers enough to let them long maintain an
anti-US embargo.” 313 Yet, by 1973, new market dynamics had dramatically changed the
environment where that initial analysis was shaped. The 1969 CIA assessment, which
was essentially the de-facto position of the West, did not take into consideration the
abrupt end of Bretton Woods, the ramifications of a ‘floating dollar’, and the direction of
the negotiations between OPEC and the Companies, which ultimately ended in collapse.
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In May of 1973, OPEC, for the first time, officially declared that the talks with the
Companies were at reaching at an impasse, since in their words, “the oil companies'
representatives continue to adopt the same negative attitude vis-à-vis the main issue.” 314
In other words, the fundamental lacuna concerning price and production was still
unbridgeable, despite the many months that had transpired since the Tehran Agreement.
However, in the summer of 1973, there seemed to be a tentative breakthrough. Both sides
had hesitantly reached an understanding regarding further changes to the Tehran
Agreement because of what OPEC had described as the “world currency turmoil”.
Previously, they had reached the same level of understanding the year prior, in two
instances in Geneva. This was to be the final supplemental phase to that agreement which
would theoretically address the Organization’s concerns regarding the changing currency
conditions as a result of the end of Bretton Woods, while keeping the Companies bottom
from being significantly harmed. What it intended to do was amend the formula for
posted prices; expand the group of currencies (from 9 to 11) that would make it more
broadly representative of major currency movements against the US dollar; and introduce
modifications towards price setting, such as recalibration of price formula by month as
opposed to quarterly. 315 But this arrangement needed to be settled on the new parameters
of the Tehran Price Agreement, and specifically according to the new conditions on profit
sharing. Yet, this did not take place, as the production costs to the producers did not keep
up with the rising profits that the Companies were making on the market. Fadhil Chalabi,
who has at the negotiations and having commissioned a study to investigate the matter on
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behalf of the Iraqi government, concurred that
by mid-1973 the prices of oil products in the main consuming centers were
rising significantly. After netting back the crude oil price with costs for
handling, refining and transportation, we reached a free-on-board (EO.
B.) price in the Gulf that was well in excess of the official price of the $3
per barrel stated in the Tehran Agreement of February 1971. This meant
that the government's per-barrel share, according to that agreement, was
equivalent to considerably less than two-thirds of the netback value of
crude. In other words, the companies were reaping windfalls from the new
prices of products without sharing them with the host governments. This
fact signaled the need for the Tehran-agreed price to be increased at a
commensurate rate so as to realign the profit-sharing basis, prior to any
increase in the market price. 316
While there was initially no consensus about once again revisiting the formula for the
Tehran Price Agreement, as the Fall of 1973 came around, all Members, including still
cautious Iran, was on board to challenge the Companies on this matter once again.
The Companies , however, refused to renegotiate a formula that they had
previously assumed was resolved. In meetings from September of 1973, to mid-October,
OPEC and the Companies

attempted last minute attempts at resolving the issue.

However, the gap proved much too large. As Member States were to resume discussions
among themselves in Kuwait in early October of 1973, to discuss a response to the
Companies , hostilities broke out between Israel and her Arab neighbors in the Yom
Kippur War. Though the Arab Members of OPEC were still heavily involved in the
negotiations with the Companies , under the OAPEC umbrella, which was foundationally
set up as a politicized institution by Arab oil producing countries, some of these same
OPEC Member States were planning a boycott against all the sources of support for Israel.
Having the experience of the 6-day War of 1967 fresh in their minds, many in the West,
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most importantly the US government, expected that the Arab states would at least attempt
to utilize the oil weapon. In a meeting on the Arab-Israeli crisis of 1973 in October 15,
1973, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and his cabinet specifically went over the
possibility of this scenario coming to fruition:
Mr. DiBona: There are two possibilities. One, the Arabs cut off oil
supplies from the Arab sources to the US alone. We could handle this,
with some strain. Second, a total cut-off of Arab oil to all recipients. If we
should try to equalize the burden, this would mean the US would be
shipping oil out to Western Europe and Japan. This would require 5 or 6
million barrels per day from the US—one-third of the US consumption.
Mr. Rush: The economic impact in this country would be so striking that it
couldn’t be done.
Secretary Kissinger: What about the impact of a cut-off in Europe and
Japan? They would go crazy.
Mr. DiBona: It would affect their attitude toward the war.
Secretary Kissinger: To say the least!
Adm. Moorer: They have already made their attitude clear. They expect
the US to carry the entire burden.
Secretary Kissinger: And they have been … unhelpful in the diplomacy.
Mr. Sisco: The pressures would increase from Europe, but they haven’t
lifted a finger to help us with the Arabs as it is. It cuts both ways.
Gov. Love: You would see an almost automatic flow of French and
German technicians to the Arab countries if there were an oil cut-off. We
would lose out in the area.
Mr. Rush: It’s unrealistic to think they would be willing to suffer
economically for us.
Secretary Kissinger: How can they avoid it?
Mr. Rush: By staying with the Arabs and keeping the oil flowing.
Secretary Kissinger: If they do this, they would be doing us a favor. What
more could they do for the Arabs than they have already done? There is a
limit beyond which they can’t push us without losing their NATO
relationship. There are two alternatives: (1) the Arabs may cut off oil to
the US only; there would be some resolutions in the Security Council we
would have to veto, but we wouldn’t be that badly hurt; (2) the Arabs cut
off oil to Europe. The Europeans would gain nothing, and they couldn’t be
doing anything worse to us than they are already doing. And if the
Europeans try to do to us what we did to them at Suez, we could do more
to them in retaliation. They can’t afford to go into open opposition to us.
Is that a fair statement?
All agreed.
Gov. Love: Any approach to rational thinking on the part of the Saudis
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will show them that a complete cut-off is not in their self-interest.
Secretary Kissinger: We have had no indication up to now that they intend
a cut-off. They have been extremely circumspect. They have never
threatened an oil cut-off in any official channel. Officially, they have taken
exactly the opposite tack.
Mr. Colby: We have an indication that the Saudis are being very cautious
about this oil country meeting tomorrow.
Secretary Kissinger: I sent them a letter yesterday telling them about our
sending supplies to Israel. They replied that we should keep it in a low key
and blame it on the Soviets.
Mr. Sisco: This was not from the King, but we think it is official.
Secretary Kissinger: I’ve been dealing with the oil guy. We have no
indication that there will be a cut-off. But if there is, I think the President
will go for the whole program, minus rationing. That would be the best
way to bring maximum pressure on the Arabs…. 317
Even with the scenarios that were studied, the US, at the eleventh hour, was confident
that an oil embargo against them and the West was highly unlikely. Moreover, not only
were they confident that the European reaction would keep the Arab producers from such
an action, but in this particular conversation, US officials all but admitted that Arab
producers were aware of US help to Israel in the war. In other words, one of the main
reasons that the US, along with its partners, thought that they could handle the OAPEC
embargo was because of its outreach to Saudi Arabia during the Arab-Israeli crisis of
1973.
What they did not expect was how the collapse of negotiations between OPEC
and the Companies would amplify the planned OAPEC embargo against the high oil
consuming free market economies and the rest of the world. 318 And that is exactly what
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happened. The negotiations that OPEC was having with the Companies’ representatives
in the fall of 1973 were mainly intended to adjust the profit sharing and production
sharing provisions of the Tehran Agreement of 1971. From the standpoint of the Member
States, they were never intended to radically alter the global oil industry, as the existence
of the sheer existence of the Tehran Declaration was evidence enough that such an
occurrence had already transpired. However, as talks reached an acrimonious impasse on
October 8, 1973, Member States convened in both Vienna and Kuwait, ultimately
deciding to take their demands into unchartered waters. A day after Kissinger’s October
15th cabinet meeting, OPEC decided to unilaterally impose adjustments to the Tehran
Price Agreement by declaring sole proprietorship over the price of oil that their countries
were exporting. 319 For international cover, at least in the realms of international law, the
Organization decided to frame this decision as being in line with Resolution 90 of June of
1968, which could broadly be interpreted that OPEC had jurisdiction of not just over
production, but also over price. But in enacting this unilateral price measure, which
would put Arabian Light crude to $3.65 per barrel, raising total oil prices from $2.48 to
$3.29 per barrel (in 1973 prices), OPEC would redefine the architecture of how oil prices
would be set throughout the decade, only to change in the mid-1980s. In its press
communiqué on October 16th announcing the decision, the Organization affirmed that the
12th of October was the last official day that the Companies were involved in price
setting. Moreover, they stated that:
From this day on, actual market prices will determine the level of
corresponding posted prices, keeping the same relationship between the
two prices as existed in 1971 before the Tehran Agreement. The correction
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for changing posted prices upwards or downwards will take place when
the actual market prices of crude oil exceed or drop below the
corresponding level of the new announced prices by one per cent.
What this ultimately amounted to was a whole scale revolution in the economics of the
oil industry, as the Companies never thought that the Member States would so quickly
abandon the established posted price system. From the companies’ perspective, doing so
would risk too much backlash against OPEC. However, the coming together of global
demand, the shift of power to the producers (in that 54% of global oil output came from
OPEC), the US and her allies official shift to neutrality, and the cohesion of OPEC
created the conditions for the posted-price system to be abolished by Member States.
The OAPEC embargo against the supporters of Israel merely amplified a trend
that had been coalescing for weeks. The convergence of these two distinct trends, of
which OPEC Members’ price disputes with the Companies was well into their third
decade, both dramatically altered the economics of the oil industry. As Figure 3.1 shows,
it increased the price of crude oil astronomically in 1974, with debilitating effects in
North America, Europe, Japan, and even in some parts of the Third World. However, it
firmly placed the domain of price control – for better or for worse – in the hands of oil
producers for the next decade. The OAPEC embargo showcasing of the oil weapon had a
profound effect on how oil producers, the most important institution being OPEC, were
viewed by a host of global actors. The US gradually began to understand this fact. In the
end of November of 1973, US Secretary of State Kissinger, in a meeting with President
Richard Nixon highlighted this changing dynamic:
The Europeans and Japan have gone to the Arabs and said “What do you
want us to do?” This is intolerable. If we give in to this: (1) It encourages
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the radical elements. (2) It gives an opportunity to the Europeans to
escalate the proposal. (3) It gives an opportunity to the Soviet Union to
escalate the proposal. For example, the Africans are now proposing to
keep the embargo until the United States stops its racist policies. We could
be faced by blackmail from all raw material producers. We will talk with
the producers, but not under blackmail. There is some chance they will
back off the embargo and give negotiations a chance. 320
An emerging outcome from the oil shock of 1973-74 was that it was making oil
producers, OPEC and OAPEC, in the eyes of the US as independent actors within
geopolitics, and not just some arena of conflict with the USSR. In other words, the US
was now seeing that decisions made in these relatively weaker oil exporting states was
not necessarily compatible in the Cold War binaries of the day, but had a specific genesis
internally. It was the fallout from the 1973 OAPEC embargo that fundamentally changed
US strategy towards producers, not only abandoning its efforts of mediation between the
Companies and OPEC, but more importantly, planning to counter the direct and indirect
dependence of the advanced economies upon the Organization.
This price shock of 1973-1974 is what initiated a changing in relations between
the US and oil producers, in that traditional alliances and enmities would dramatically
shift. Initially, the US would hold Saudi Arabia, being the principal actor in OAPEC,
responsible for the embargo. In a meeting with the US National Security Council (NSC),
Secretary Kissinger was extremely worried about precedent, and specifically how if the
US would give into OAPEC’s demands, that a dangerous model would be created for
others to threaten US national security via the embargo route.
We think if we yield to the embargo in the sense of bargaining with the
Saudis on the specific terms for the conference, we will get ourselves on a
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hopeless wicket. It would take too long. It would make the Saudis
responsible for every point and their radicals would drive them. The
British and French would be given an incentive to leapfrog. Every
producing country would set up its own OPEC for the purpose of
blackmailing us. Our position with the Saudis is that they have
demonstrated their power. They have moved us off our position of letting
things take their natural course. We have assumed a major responsibility
for the negotiations, which they wanted. Now it is their turn to help. 321
Already, the outlying Members of OPEC, namely Algeria and Libya, were now openly
declaring how the use of the oil weapon against the US and the West was successful. In
doing so, they would cite that the oil denial action was not just a response to the Yom
Kippur War, but also colonial injustices that they had experienced that had emanated
from the West. This was a tremendous turn of events for countries that only a few years
ago had gained independence. In an interview in the midst of the embargo, Algeria’s
President Boumediene stated:
…that the Arabs have acted in a wise and positive manner, and have thus
imposed their existence on those who have always thought little of it and
have overlooked their interest in the Arab world. Those who overlook out
interest have no right to ask us to safeguard their interests; nor do they
have the right – when they are supporting the aggression we are subjected
to – to ask special privileges from us. 322
Moreover, Algeria, like other modest producers, was attempting to divide the positions of
the US from some of the other advanced economies like Japan. 323 With time, however,
the US was able to reach an understanding with Saudi Arabia and with most of the
OAPEC countries to end the embargo that was wreaking havoc on the advanced

321

Ibid., 1006-07.

322

"Boumediene Discusses Foreign, Arab Affairs in Interview," Algiers Domestic Service 1974, T4-T5.

323

Ibid.

182

economies. Though some holdouts, such as Qaddafi’s Libya or Baathist Syria, still
stressed for the continuation of the embargo, their minority voices could not turn the tide
of the shifting position of the end of the embargo’s utility. 324
However, ending the embargo, which again the US had expected to some degree,
was not the same enterprise as reigning in price hawks. One of the major geopolitical
‘side-effects’ of the embargo, besides the panic and damage caused to advanced
economies that supported Israel, was the creation of a constituency within oil producers –
price hawks – that now felt that the post-embargo prices was (and should be) the new
normal in the international economy. In other words, from their perceptions, the years of
disputes, setbacks, fallback positions, and forced compromises that they had accepted
from the Companies and their home governments could now be ‘corrected’. Though
OPEC as an institution did not participate in the embargo, many producing countries
within the Group obviously benefited from the elevated prices. Carrying over from its
gradual changing perception towards the negotiations with the Companies, and the
subsequent collapse of those talks, Iran quickly became known to be the leader of the
price hawks. Indeed, this new dynamic halted the return to pre-embargo prices, regardless
of the US understanding with Saudi Arabia. Well into the embargo, Iran’s very influential
Prime Minister, Amir Abbas Hoveyda, set out the parameters of their justification for
higher prices:
Everyone complains because crude oil costs more, but no one has shed a
tear over the fact that the price of grain has tripled and the prices of other
products we have to import have risen at a dizzy rate. It is said that oil
should not be trifled with because it is a basic product for guaranteeing
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the development of production and wealth. But grain is still more
important: It is the stomach’s oil…the time has come to talk to each other
frankly in the interests of clarifying relations between oil-producing and
oil-consuming countries. Iran is not in favor of a reduction in the present
price of crude oil. Saudi Arabia has displayed an initiative in this
direction but the price has been fixed by OPEC, and there is no reason to
change the decision. If anything, a new increase should be talked about. In
the West, the cost of the manufactured products, synthetic fibers, and
foodstuffs we import is continually rising, This year we will have an
inflation of 8-10 percent, and it is largely a question of imported inflation.
You say that your prices follow the laws of the market. Well then, why
should the same rule not be valid for oil? Because it is supplied by
underdeveloped countries perhaps? The two problems are interdependent.
We have friendly relations with Europe, but it’s now time to change the
bases for international trade. 325
Iran’s reasoning eventually became the leitmotif that other producers would adhere to,
both within the Organization and without. As Hoyveda explained, the rationale for
increased prices was not just a Third-world backlash. It had functional purposes, two of
which were the most important.
The first was the vast, albeit flawed belief of the day in the exhaustibility of
global crude oil, which was the forerunner to the later peak oil theory (i.e. the world is
running out of oil). In countless public interviews, the Shah of Iran would habitually cite
this reason behind the support for higher oil prices from the producers’ perspective. This
belief eventually led Iranian decision makers, and their counterparts in other producing
countries, to aspire to get the biggest ‘bang out of their buck’, primarily by tapering
production in order to see prices rise. Though smaller producers, because of sheer market
dynamics could not hope to influence global prices in that manner, larger producers such
as Iran and likeminded counterparts (i.e. Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, etc.) could manipulate
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market dynamics effectively. Incidentally, Fadhil Chalabi, being present during the
collapse of the OPEC-Companies negotiations, would specifically cite how Iranian
technicians would report that Iran’s 6 mbpd 326 production was damaging the country’s
oil wells, and thus a moderate decrease to 4 mbpd production would allow maintenance
measures to preserve the oil fields. 327
The second rationale of the price hawks had to do with how the increase of oil
prices was the necessary adjustment to the collapse of Bretton Woods, the flotation of the
dollar, and the subsequent rise of other global commodities because of inflation. Not only
Iran, but also other governments such as Venezuela had long adopted such a belief.
Because the OAPEC embargo and the abrupt OPEC price hike had put the governments
of many Member States on the PR defensive, this line of argument became a constant
fixture of how diverse governments would respond in public. Venezuela’s Carlos Andres
Perez made it a priority to point out that not only was the increase in prices a reaction to
an increase in commodities from the advanced economies, but because of the heavy trade
imbalance between developed and developing countries, that much of the money that the
latter would get would return to the former. 328 Even conservative Saudi Arabia, a skeptic
of the price hawk strategy, would eventually concede the argument on the linkage
between imported inflation into OPEC Members and the responsive price increase of
crude. In a wide-ranging interview with Al-Anwar in Beirut before he was crowned King
of Saudi Arabia, Fahd ibn Abd-al-Aziz directly tied inflation to purchasing power of
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developing countries: “Inflation reduces the purchasing power of the exports of
developing countries and is a means of swallowing up the revenues of developing
countries”. 329 Thus, even after the embargo’s end in the spring of 1974, the increase of
oil prices was now gradually seen as justifiable by Member States, for both corrective
purposes in relation to the past and for functional purposes for the present.
In the post-1973 environment, the Shah’s urgency for higher oil prices, previously
exhibited only to officials from the Companies and to the US, was now displayed openly,
surprisingly often in the Western press. Following his Prime Minister’s earlier stated
rationale behind the prices, the Shah would consistently cite the new increase in prices as
warranted because of his perception (which was shared by most producing countries) that
crude oil, for the prior 20 years, had been sold at artificially low prices. This was one of
the main driving factors as to why crude oil prices had not kept up with the rise of other
commodities. Moreover, in an interview with the British Broadcasting Channel (BBC) in
late 1974, the Shah emphatically affirmed this position: “We have been saying that you
have been taking that wealth away from us, for a ridiculous price.” 330 In the interview,
the Shah specifically compared the historical and rising costs of basic commodities –
most of which comes from the West or Western corporations – such as wheat, sugar,
vegetable oil, and other commodities to the price of oil. He stated that Iran and other
producers simply just “can’t refuse to buy your goods” because of the necessity of those
commodities. 331 In the same manner, the Shah was telling the advanced economies to get
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used to the price, just as developing countries adjust to price fluctuations of other
commodities.
Other Member States also shared this sentiment. In an interview in early 1975,
Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez essentially repeated Iran’s reasoning, but also
carried the same logic over to manufactured items, of which the West still the epicenter
of technology:
Our purpose is to make the great nations of the world understand that a
global agreement must be reached by means of which the prices of our
raw materials and our basic products will be in equilibrium with prices of
the manufactured items we import. There must also be an equilibrium in
the conditions under which we are given the technology we require for our
development. In other words, Venezuela wants to use oil – which was the
first basic product to become independent in the developing world – to
achieve the independence of our raw materials, of our basic products, and
thus the economic independence of Latin America.
Perez would further take this argument to what he advocated for, which was a “global
arrangement” that would result in the “balance between the prices of oil, the other raw
materials, basic foodstuffs, manufactured goods, capital and technology transfers”. 332 For
Perez, like most of the Heads of States of OPEC, “the industrialized countries [had]
imposed their conditions” for much too long, but now oil exports had become “a
convincing instrument of negotiation”. 333 The fight had broadened out from mere profit
sharing and production sharing to the larger question how the global economy had
functioned. For Member States, the desire was clear; in Perez’s words, “We want a
dialogue leading to a new international economic order”.
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And for the first time,

Member States economically acted on this desire for a changed, more equitable economic
order. In March of 1975, at the Conference of Sovereign and Heads of State of OPEC
Member Countries in Algiers, Algeria – by far the most important meeting that OPEC
had since the Tehran Price Agreement – Members officially pledged financial and other
types support for other, less developed nations.
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In doing so, they would end up

creating the OPEC Fund for International Development, which would facilitate
deliverance of aid, finance, and other means of support to the least developed countries.
336

Not only was this possible by the steep rise of oil prices in the post 1973 era, but more

importantly, OPEC had now set up to win the purported ‘hearts and minds’ of others in
the developing world. 337
Outside Forces
Recognition of Vulnerability leads to Behavioral changes
The inability of the governments of the advanced economies to prepare for such a new
reality caused severe strains for them domestically. Virtually, all sectors of both advanced
and non-oil exporting developing economies would feel the ramifications – from travel
(both international and domestic), to manufacturing, to defense spending, with most of
the burden coming hard down on the middle classes of these societies. And the economic,
political, and psychological effects upon the advanced economies, and by extension, their
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decision makers, reverberated throughout the 1970s. 338 The result was ultimately mass
behavioral changes towards conservation, energy efficiency, alternatives, and diversity of
crude supply – in both advanced and developing economies, chiefly those highly
dependent upon crude oil imports. For the US, as early as only a few weeks after the end
of the OAPEC oil embargo, major decisions were made to deal with America’s energy
vulnerability, of which the most significant was the creation of the EIA. 339
However, singularly focused initiatives in disparate advanced economies were
simply not enough. The dovetailing of OAPEC’s embargo and OPEC’s price hike, with
the price hawks led by Iran solidly influencing the Organization’s pricing policy, called
for a more integrated macro strategy among the advanced economies. Though as 1975
rolled around, the governments of the advanced economies were still sketching out their
own, individual responses to their particular energy vulnerabilities, with time, a collective
approach started to take shape.
The Advanced Economies React
It was at the Economic Summit at Rambouillet, France in the fall of 1975, that advanced
free market economies started to both collaborate with each other regarding the energy
crisis, but also set forth concrete proposals that they had recently begun. In a highly
significant meetings in mid-November of 1975 amongst the Heads of States of the US,
UK, France, Japan, Italy, and Germany, the leaders of these free economies essentially
decided to mainstream their collective policies to reduce the vulnerabilities of their
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economies to supply disruption. To do so, not only was conservation methods, new
supplies via exploration, and alternative sources of energy discussed, but also more
importantly, OPEC, for the first time, was now targeted by free economies. In an address
to the group of leaders, US President Gerald Ford, after outlining the new American
approach towards energy in general, introduced the specifics of what was the American
initiative towards diversification of energy requirements under an integrated, cooperative
approach of the free market economies:
In our opinion, the dialogue should be used primarily (1) to encourage the
oil producers to develop greater awareness of their own stake in a
growing and stable international economy, thereby reinforcing the
moderate OPEC countries on pricing decision, and (2) to set in motion
effective and cooperative programs by producers and the industrialized
nations to ease the [lease developed countries’] LDC's economic and
financial burdens caused by high oil prices. … We do not think the
dialogue will enable us to negotiate an agreement on oil prices at a cost
we are willing to pay. The producers are not likely to cede their unilateral
control over prices or to agree to reduce prices. The consuming nations
would reap little or no advantage from indexation or any similar
arrangement that would freeze prices at their current real level. This
would legitimize current high prices, neutralize LDC and market
pressures, ratify the gains of the cartel and make cartel management
easier, and expose political leaders to the charge that they are conspiring
with producers to drive prices up. Thus, we must continue to deal with
high and uncertain oil prices with our own energy programs. High oil
prices cannot be ignored; they have shaken our confidence, diminished
our ability to deal with our problems, and compromised our economic
development. There is no easy way to end our vulnerability and regain our
freedom of action. We each must take the hard decisions necessary to
implement and sustain strong and effective domestic energy programs,
whose combined effect over time will be to shift the balance on the world
oil market. To reinforce our individual efforts and to provide political
impetus for greater future sacrifices, I hope that at the Summit we will
pledge our nations to a maximum effort to reduce our dependency on
OPEC oil imports in order to enhance our own economic well-being and
to contribute to the long term energy needs of the world… Let me repeat
what I said. In return for other countries participating in large new
projects in the US which develop energy that would otherwise not have
been produced, we will wherever feasible guarantee that a portion of the
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incremental energy production can be exported. Projects will be
considered on their merits, in environmental, economic and regional
contexts. 340
Three new factors were now in play. The first was that the US had now officially, in the
presence of its free market partners, given up as a mediator between OPEC and the
Companies. Any hope of reverting back to the pre-1973 status quo in that the Companies
and OPEC, albeit grudgingly, shared price control responsibilities, had now completely
been abandoned. In admitting to their partners that the US no longer had the significant
leverage over certain OPEC Member States that it once had, the American sponsored
integration approach towards diversification became the de-facto policy. The second
factor was the initiative itself. For the first time, the US would now integrate its domestic
energy needs, at least in theory, with the domestic energy needs of its friends and allies.
To do so, Washington was proposing importing foreign expertise in the US market and
thus exporting that energy developed in the US back to other free market economies –
essentially, multinational technology transfer under America’s watch. The third factor, in
which would become more apparent in the years ahead, was a fundamental, and negative
shift of the US towards the OPEC enterprise as a whole. In other words, US animosity
towards OPEC is now clearly visible in full view.
At the same meeting, US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger sketched out, for the
first time that the weakening of OPEC had become the de facto position of the US
government, although it was never officially articulated in public:
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Our goal is to reach a point where OPEC loses its unilateral power to
control oil prices. This cannot occur before the 1980's, and in the next five
years conditions mentioned by the leaders here will obtain. At the same
time, we should not talk about OPEC as a monolith. OPEC sets prices
because it has the power to control production. The multinational
corporations, as was mentioned, do help it, because it is more difficult to
get individual countries to cut prices if the multinational corporations,
which are technically equipped and familiar with the market, manage
exports for them. OPEC cuts production to achieve set prices. On the
other hand, cuts in production are not uniform. This is an opportunity for
us. If the West has the strength to absorb the financial surpluses of OPEC,
they must export oil in order to import goods. Iran can no longer
significantly cut production to sustain oil prices. Iran is tempted to
increase oil to keep up exports. 341
Kissinger’s remarks were quite revealing because it exposed that the Companies had
effectively relented to OPEC’s control over prices. One of the main reasons for this
dramatic turn by the Companies is that what they lost in operation control, they were
gaining in tremendous windfall from the increase in prices – all the while OPEC was
taking the collective blame for the exorbitant prices. The other Heads of State were in
fact in full agreement with the diagnosis and the prescription, but had significant
concerns on the for the short term. UK Prime Minister Harold Wilson brought to the table
his country’s overwhelming concern on not just oil supply access or price, but on the
issue of precedent as it relates to other commodities. In his assessment, the Prime
Minister stated that they was no use denying, from the perception of the advanced
economies, the now inimical presence of OPEC:
…we have to face the fact that the OPEC syndrome is catching on. There
are already phosphates-pecs, bauxite-pecs, banana-pecs and others. But
we cannot rest on what we have achieved so far. The conditions of the
developing countries have worsened while the expectations have increased.
If any of us were importers of oil and other commodities, and faced
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droughts and the need to import food at existing prices, we would also feel
extremely bitter. Led by OPEC and other "pecs" they will be
pressing…There is also a political alliance between the more militant oil
producers and other developing countries... 342
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt carried this same logic to the possibility that OPEC
would somehow create an alliance with other developing countries that would go beyond
the commodities union precedent that Prime Minister Wilson feared. For Schmidt, the
advanced economies would need to make the OPEC as an institution wholly responsible
for the rise of oil prices, of which many of the developing world economies were
suffering from as well, if not more than the advanced economies:
The developing countries have suffered worse than us. We have flexibility
far greater than that of the LDC's. Many of them frequently have to
depend on one single crop. We must find a way to break up the unholy
alliance between the LDC's and OPEC. But we cannot say so in so many
words. We should do this in the CIEC by discussing the balance of
payments problems of the LDC's and showing how they are being
damaged by this situation. We can make the point that the newly rich
countries have to take part in new developmental aid in accordance with
their new riches. We will also have to convince the LDC's of our genuine
interest in their well-being, by helping them in the area of raw materials.
We must find some way to make OPEC more responsible.
Both leaders were not speculating. Indeed, while prior to OPEC’s unilateral price hike in
1973, solidarity with other raw material exporters were only alluded to, in the post-1973
era, OPEC as an institution really moved towards this direction. At OPEC’s 47th
conference in Bali, Indonesia in 1976, Mohammad Sadli, OPEC’s acting president for
that year, laid out that the Organization was well on its way to find commonality with
other raw material exporters:
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One of our principal objectives must be in common with owners of natural
resources and producers of raw materials in other developing countries to
maintain the purchasing power of our export revenues. This should be
regarded as a legitimate aim for developing countries, just as it is
accepted that organized labor in the West is entitled to defend the
purchasing power of wages. OPEC should be in the forefront of this
struggle, but we should be judicious in determining at what level we
should spring to the defense of our exports. We cannot simply ignore
market forces and the threat of competition posed by alternative sources
of energy. In exercising a policy of judicious appraisal, we are, at the
same time, taking account of the interests of the non-oil-producing
developing countries and of the rest of the world. The North-South
dialogue will assume growing significance in the years ahead. The
developing countries are increasing their efforts to bring about a new,
more equitable and more progressive world economic order. OPEC must
use its bargaining power vis-à-vis the industrialized countries to further
the cause of the Group of 77 nations… 343
Thus, from the European angle, the purported threat that was emanating from OPEC was
no longer its role as a price maximizer and potential supply disrupter in the free flow of
oil, but more so its potential to disrupt the traditional access that advanced economies had
to other raw materials. Accordingly, all of the parties signed onto the US-led initiative of
integrated diversification strategy to obviate any possibility of the recurrence of the 19731974 crisis. The British were the first to report that their North Sea exploration had begun
to pay off with modest, yet promising amount of oil that had recently started to flow in
their domestic energy basket. 344 Moreover, the Japanese unveiled their specific shift to
conversation, which would explode in not only new, efficient domestic infrastructure, but
also in auto manufacturing that focused on less waste and more efficiency for the
consumers of Japanese autos. As for the US, diverse initiatives such as a new energy bill,
price decontrols, voluntary automobile fuel economy program (which ensured that
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manufactures would increase efficiency by 40%), new supplies (Alaska), and alternatives
(nuclear) became the domestic to crisis. 345
Yet once this decision was made by all parties to move forward with the
integrated diversification strategy, not only was the US behavior towards OPEC bound to
change, but more so, its traditional and long lasting relationship with certain OPEC
Member States, namely Iran. In other words, the Shah’s consistent push for high prices
was bound to clash with what the free market advanced economies had agreed to in
Rambouillet. For Secretary Kissinger, one of the lead architects of this new strategy,
implementing it meant walking a very tight rope. To do so, what the US, through
Kissinger’s efforts, was directed towards was the soft disaggregation of OPEC –
essentially a neo-Eisenhower policy of reversing OPEC unity back to its semi-functional
or even dysfunctional form. However, it could not be seen as a full forced assault on the
Organization, because of the message that would portray to other raw material exporters.
It could backfire and thus instigate for raw material exporting unions, as opposed to
obviating them. What Kissinger suggested was breaking unity among OPEC Members
through implied threats and but open inducements, and thus creating the conditions where
the Organization would be separated from the least developed countries:
Iran provides the intellectual leadership, not the economic leadership. In
addition, the countries sustaining oil prices are politically the most
vulnerable; they cannot politically or psychologically sustain real
confrontation with the West. We should not give them assurances by
avoiding confrontation. The military threats from American officials
several months ago resulted from lack of planning and some bureaucratic
disputes. But after the initial outburst, and after all our friends had
disassociated themselves from us, the oil producing countries came to us
to ask what was needed to prevent this course of action from happening.
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We should attempt to convey the idea that Saudi Arabia cannot underwrite
the oil price increases for free without paying an economic and political
price. I am confident that if one country's attempt to exert pressure for
lower prices is successful with a particular oil producing country, other
consumers will jump in and take advantage. The oil prices are being
maintained by moderate countries in OPEC—those who are most
psychologically dependent on the US. We can do a lot if we are not
immediately disassociated by our colleagues. We expect a cry of outrage
from the producers. We can take that if we are not disavowed by our
friends. We agree on the need for cooperation with producers. With
cooperation we can separate the moderates from the radicals within
OPEC, the LDC's from the OPEC countries, and prevent a lot of other
"pecs." … Our strategy is to link these energy discussions with
commodities. We should try to break what the Chancellor correctly called
the unholy alliance between the LDC's and OPEC. This can happen, and
we can achieve our results, if they know that their disruptive actions could
stop discussions on commodities or that they will pay a price in terms of
cooperation, or military exports. In this way we can combat our
dependence with a coherent strategy. 346
Needless to say, in singling out Iran as providing the “intellectual leadership”, the
American task was now to roll back the desire of Iran and of other Member States on
reliance on post-1973 price increase. Indeed, without addressing the Iran issue, the other
elements to integrated diversification strategy would simply not work.
OPEC Unity Challenged, first from within and then from without
By the time of the Rambouillet Summit, Iranian influence within OPEC was by far the
most dominant force in decision-making and the future direction of the Organization.
This was the result of primarily three factors that advantaged Iran more than any other
Member State within the Organization. The first, which had been earlier alluded to, was
Iran’s preeminent position in American grand strategy against the containment of the
USSR. This single fact was what ultimately led to the years of economic and military aid
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that the US gave to Iran in the 1960s and what would ultimately create the conditions for
Nixon’s Twin Pillar policy. As the US was winding down its wars in Indochina during
the end of the Nixon administration and in the Ford administration, a war weary
American public would not accept the US having any additional large, oversea
contingencies. In the vital Middle East region, a strong pro-US regime in Iran capable of
pushing back against Soviet infiltration of the region, and keeping the region stable from
pro-Soviet proxies made sense to US decision makers. This was clearly exhibited during
Iran’s military intervention in Oman, where a communist insurgency, until being defeated,
was threatening the rule of Sultan Qaboos. 347
The second reason, which was a natural extension of the first, was that by the
1970s, Iran was by far the strongest conventional power in the region and in OPEC in
general. While, as Kissinger had stated in Rambouillet, Iran’s export capacity did not
make it the economic leader, its place in the wider Soviet containment strategy of the free
market economies and its conventional strength made it the intellectual leader. The third
reason was simply what Iran had done for the Organization. While the creation of OPEC
was essentially a Venezuelan initiative that was significantly helped by Saudi Arabia, it
was Iran’s signing onto a collective producers’ movement that gave the Organization life
and legitimacy in the eyes of the Companies and later the great powers. And it was Iran
that had become the main proponent of higher prices, which was creating huge windfalls
for other Member States. Iran’s rationale on prices was convincing enough to be adopted
by the majority of the Organization, and as explained by Venezuela’s leadership, even
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defended publicly in both international forums and with other foreign leaders. It was this
dominance within OPEC decision-making that the US and the rest of the free market
economies had to deal with when trying to weaken the Organization’s collective resolve
to continue on the price hikes that they were implementing in the 1970s.
However, the rise of Iranian clout within the Organization, the rise of Iranian
power in the Middle East region, and Iranian influence in other aspects of international
affairs caused suspicion in what had always been its principle future rival in the region:
Saudi Arabia. In other words, the rise and substantial strengthening of Iran’s strategic
profile causing a classic security dilemma for the region, and with time, would bring in
other regional actors over to the Saudi position. The Saudis understood that the
continuance of the rise of crude oil prices was not only bad for OPEC’s market share
domination – regardless of the actual viability of the oil exhaustibility theory – it also was
creating the conditions for the massive aggrandizement of Iranian power.
During this period of high oil prices, the Shah’s government failed to judicially
spend the country’s oil windfall in a strategic manner, but would fritter exorbitant
amounts on the latest military technologies, while engaging in ambitious urban renewal
and modernization efforts of Iran’s infrastructure. The problem, however, was that Iran’s
rate of spending continuously relied upon high prices, and in some instances continual
increases in the price of oil. In other words, this was money that Iran did not have in its
coffers yet, but as new monies came into Iran’s Central Bank, old expenditures would
clean out much of the reserves, at times resulting in budgetary deficits. In the post-1973
era, Iran, backed by Venezuela, Algeria, Libya, and at times Iraq, would continuously
push for higher prices at each OPEC gathering. Conferences of OPEC would basically
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become export comparisons among Members and price adjustments, with the latter
usually being an increase. The public rationale was always the same – the inflation
argument, while privately the Shah’s regime’s ambition became an aggravating force in
Iran’s behavior within the Organization and towards other countries, particularly the US.
In the mid-70s, the disagreements with the Saudis became so acrimonious that the Saudis,
at one time, almost left the Organization because of price disputes with the other
Members. 348 And because the US needed his regime, fearing what may replace him, the
Shah, by the mid-70s, had become virtually independent or resistant to US diplomatic
pleas or pressure. But this newfound confidence was built upon a tenuous set of
circumstances that was not sustainable. When those circumstances changed, the weakness
of the Shah’s enterprise became exposed.
These circumstances, the changing relationship between the US and Iran, Saudi
fears of Iranian power, would eventually converge the interests of the US and Saudi
Arabia together to reign in the Shah. Andrew Scott Cooper was the first scholar to find
proof of linkage between the Saudi Royal family’s fears of Iranian power with the desire
of certain aspects of the US government to constrain the Iranian monarch’s ability to
increase prices. 349 The US desire was very straightforward; lessen the price of oil, if so
dramatically and neuter OPEC by creating disunity. But to do so would mean to actively
weaken OPEC, which was now the US goal. Washington would have to fundamentally
confront the driving force behind OPEC’s unity and organizational decisions, namely
Iran. The only method that the US could use was to enlist the help of another major
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OPEC state that had the production capacity to drown out Iranian output; Saudi Arabia
was the only country that had that ability.
Yet, the US goal was never to wage economic warfare on Iran or even threaten
the Shah’ s hold on power. It is here where Cooper’s research proves so consequential.
Cooper found that as early as 1974, the year the OAPEC embargo ended, the Nixon
administration had already sent out feelers to the Saudis for collaboration on oil prices.
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However, because of Iran’s dominant position and its persuasive power with the other

OPEC Members, any voice advocating anything else except for higher prices would
simply be ignored. Moreover, there was an internal split within Washington, as Secretary
of State Kissinger explicitly warned against such a move because of the unpredictability
of what might occur and the Saudi resolve to actually go through with their part:
I doubt the Saudis would get out in front…I think they are trying to tell us
— they said they would have an auction — it will never come off. They
won’t let us live with lower prices but they won’t fight for them. The
radicals would jump them on if they got in front. The Shah is a tough,
mean guy. But he is our real friend. He is the only one who can stand up
to the Soviet Union. We need him for the balance against India. We can’t
tackle him without breaking him. We can get to him by cutting military
supplies, and the French would be delighted to replace them. 351
However, though powerful, Kissinger would eventually lose the battle. The advocates of
such a move in the Ford administration, most prominently Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld and Treasury Secretary Bill Simon, would now begin collusion with the Saudis.
The Saudis role was twofold: vocally protest, as best as possible, the increase of prices in
organizational conferences and deliberations, all the while increasing production so
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supply dynamics would eventually decrease the price. From 1976 to the end of the
decade, the Saudis openly advocated for a reduction in price. Being rebuffed by the
collective will of most Member States, they decided to overproduce. From 1975 to 1978,
Saudi Arabia went from producing just above 7 mbpd to 8.3 mbpd. This was at the same
time that other Members were either stagnating in their output, or even decreasing. Iran,
during the same period, went from 5.9 mbpd to 5.2 mbpd.
The US/Saudi desire for a sizeable drop in the price of oil did not materialize.
However, the significant increases that Iran was expecting – in that their budget and
future spending was tied to revenue that would never come in, proved have the most farreaching in its impact for Iran in the months ahead. The Saudi bucking of the OPEC trend
essentially duplicated what the Shah had done for the US within OPEC deliberations a
decade earlier. With time, as the Saudis, the Organization’s largest exporter no longer
was willing to go along with the collective will of Member States, OPEC’s ambition of
radically shifting the collective balance of power between the advanced economies to the
raw material exporting states of the developing world – or at least creating an equilibrium
– fell short by reason of the slow fraying of unity among Members.
Intrastate Dynamics
The Ascendancy phase began with the convergence of several macro elements in the
global economy, only to be greatly accelerated by the erosion of any hope of consensus
between the Companies and OPEC. Larger forces were at work within the global
economy for years prior this era, of which the most consequential was the supply
tightening due to soaring demand, the shift to OPEC oil dependence, the collapse of the
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posted price system, and the political empowerment of OPEC and some of its Member
States within the international system. Yet, surprisingly, this important era within
OPEC’s institutional life and that of the global economy would end at the local level of
intrastate dynamics. Naturally, every Member State experienced significant domestic
political and economic changes that not only impacted the trajectory of each respective
country, but also had important affects upon the Organization. Whether it was Qaddafi’s
consolidation of power within Libya throughout the 1970s (the creation of his oil-based
welfare state), the consolidation of power in Algeria of its post-independence elite, Saudi
royal transitions, or the first decade of independence for the UAE or Qatar, all were
noteworthy.
Nevertheless it was the domestic political and economic level of Iran and Iraq that
would prove to be the most consequential for both the future of these States, but also for
the long-term trajectory of OPEC as viable and functional international organization. The
collapse of the Shah’s regime in 1979 and rise of Saddam Hussein in the late 1970s
would be the most important and far-reaching intrastate event for OPEC during this
period, and arguably throughout its history, of which the ramifications have reverberated
well into the 21st century.
The collapse of the Pahlavi Monarchy in Iran
As 1976 drew to a close, the oil income that the Shah had counted on from continual
increases in prices simply never arrived. Revenue stagnated for the Shah, while
mandatory and discretionary projects remained unfinished. With time, Iran’s booming
economy, always feared to be overheated, started to dramatically cool down. The Shah
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was well aware that dependence on oil was his Achilles heel. And there is some evidence
that at least a sizeable portion of the oil profits were put back into the economy for
diversification efforts, more education, expanded occupational therapy, and high-tech
infrastructure. As Mohsen Milani has pointed out, oil revenues’ contribution to gross
domestic product (as percentage of GDP), though as high as 45% in 1975-1976 was
down to 31.8% in 1977-1978. 352 Other sectors such as agriculture, industry/mining, and
services were gradually, albeit painfully filling in the dominant position that oil had in the
wider Iranian economy. In other words, the Shah’s government was gaining ground on
diversification of the economy, regardless of the fact that certain organs of his regime
were corrupt. It was his spending habits with the oil money, and a dangerous reliance that
on future revenue based upon unrealistic price hikes that created his budgetary deficit in
the later 1970s – all exacerbated by the dual US-Saudi oil initiative.
With the slowdown, the thousands of workers that poured into major Iranian cities
from the countryside during the boom period gradually became either unemployed or
underemployed. As Iran’s economy went into crisis in 1977-1978, the contradictions to
the very rule of the Pahlavi dynasty, which massive US financial, diplomatic, and
military support was always aimed at masking, now started to unravel. This was a regime
that regardless of its authoritarian tendencies, which certainly was the norm in the region
and by many standards far from being the most onerous in terms of human rights and
political liberties, had one fatal flaw that was never able to overcome. And that flaw was
that it was re-installed by the US government in the aftermath of the coup against Iran’s
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democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadegh – a fact that most
Iranians were well aware of and never forgot. The Shah never had any genuine
legitimacy in the eyes of the overwhelming majority of Iranians, not because of his
authoritarian tendencies, which preceding dynasties such as the Qajars were seldom shy
about displaying, but because his rule was owed to outside powers.
The years of oil profits and the financial windfall that allowed the Pahlavi dynasty
to buy support, pacify middle class anger at the lack of political freedoms, and build a
major security and intelligence apparatus for the sake of protecting the regime was never
able to build a qualitative sense of legitimacy for the Shah. And the Shah was never
really able to combat this existential problem. By the time that Iran’s economic woes
became severe, another new aspect that the Shah’s regime had to face was the newfound,
and quite stern criticism of his human rights record from a newly elected, and idealistic
Carter administration. 353 The end of the Nixon-Ford era witnessed the political passing
of all the Shah’s supposed friends in the US government, chief of which was Secretary
Henry Kissinger, who both admired the Shah as a political leader but also considered him
a friend. Compounding the Shah’s domestic problems with what was a bourgeoning
opposition to his rule was a major miscalculation that his regime did in terms of targeting
those they felt endangered the Shah’s rule. The Pahlavi monarch and its security organs
had always targeted the left, whether they were social democrats or even communists.
The nationalist right was far too fragmented, and in some instances, wholly co-opted by
the Shah’s ideological affiliation for past Iranian dynasties. Yet, this made the religious
right in Iran, a segment of the population usually thought to be poor and rural, as the
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main source of opposition to the Shah. 354 While the Shah had certainly understood that
the religious right, most notably Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was becoming prominent
in opposition towards his rule, his assessment was that the Ayatollah could never muster
the support to challenge the Shah. Khomeini’s exile to Iraq, and then later to France, was
thought by the Shah as sufficient enough to get rid of what was thought of as a nuisance.
With confluence of the economic problems sparked by increased Saudi oil output,
the pressure for enhanced human rights in Iran by the Carter administration, the
coalescing of the religious right against the Shah (only to be expanded by the addition of
other opposition elements), and finally major episodes of workers’ strikes, the most
important being oil workers in Southern Iran, the Shah’s hold on power was became
increasingly untenable. Indeed, it was the latter, as spelled out by Iran’s Prime Minister
Gholam Reza Azhari in one of the last interviews he gave before the government fell, that
would present the Iran with unprecedented economic challenges, ultimately sending the
economy in a downward spiral, in which the Shah’s regime was not able to recover from.
355

The final sign for the Shah was the unwillingness of his armed forces, of which he had

dedicated so much time and economic support to building up, to support his regime
during the protests. Indeed many of the higher brass of the Iranian military was either
indifferent to the Shah’s continual rule or some even openly sympathetic to Khomeini’s
call for revolution. This was clearly exhibited in a memo, months after the revolution,
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to Dr. Gary Sick from the National Security
Council: “In the final analysis, the Shah did not command the loyalty of substantial
354
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numbers of the Iranian armed forces. The loyalties he did enjoy were confined largely to
the most senior officers of the several services.” 356 Moreover, by this time, the Shah had
terminally ill leukemia and thus was increasingly unable to lead in the way that he had
before. In January of 1979, the Shah and his family finally left Iran for good, leaving a
country in economic turmoil and political disarray.
The Rise of Saddam Hussein in Iraq
When the Baathist, after a series of political upheavals in Iraq, in 1968, returned to power,
again via coup, this time under the leadership of Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, their political
fortunes were much better than their first attempt. Al-Bakr’s tenure as President
coincided, like his OPEC counterparts, with the shift of power to the producers, the rise
of oil prices, and the massive increase of oil profits in Baghdad’s coffers. By all accounts,
under al-Bakr, though certainly not a democrat, the Iraqi state was able to govern under a
technocratic, albeit one-party elite . Like Qaddafi in Libya, this meant that the
development of an oil-funded welfare state. During this period, Iraq witnessed an
increase in education to the population, expanded socialized healthcare, affordable
housing, and major infrastructural development. One of al-Bakr deputies, a Baathist
apparatchik that played a marginal role in the first Baathist government, was Saddam
Hussein. 357
With time, Hussein would become the Vice President under al-Bakr. And using
this position, Hussein would surround himself with political actors and forces inside the
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country that throughout the 1970s would gradually render him the de facto ruler of Iraq.
In doing so, as Sandra Mackey has stated, the Baath Party and the State of Iraq would
become “virtually synonymous” under the al-Bakr-Hussein arrangement, as the Baathists
subsumed all the organs of the State. 358 Hussein’s aggrandizement of power was also
made possible, and largely facilitated by al-Bakr’s failing health. Nevertheless, as al-Bakr
stepped down, or as some have assumed, pushed aside, the Iraq that he left, now under
formal domination of Hussein, was qualitatively stronger and richer than he had found it.
With the exit of al-Bakr, and the formal beginning of Hussein’s presidency in July of
1979, just a few months after the Iranian Revolution that toppled the Shah, the domestic
undercurrents that had dramatically played out in both Iran and Iraq would soon clash, in
violent ways, shaping both the future of those countries, and the direction of OPEC and
its viability as an international organization for years to come.
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CHAPTER IV • THE FRAGMENTATION PHASE: OPEC IN CIVIL WAR, 1980-1993

As OPEC entered the 1980s, its confidence in its own strength and ability to set out an
independent course of decision-making in the global political economy, and not just
pertaining to the international oil market, was arguably at its height. In the prior decade,
OPEC, as an institution, had managed to collectively defeat the once unmatched power of
the Companies, nationalize (or proceed with the nationalization) of its Member States
resources, wrest almost total control over pricing, attract many admirers in the developing
world, and literally strike fear in the hearts of many governments of the advanced
economies. However, beneath this confidence laid an extremely weak and tenuous
foundation that in this new era, would precipitously and violently collapses. In the
Fragmentation Phase of OPEC’s institutional life, the majority of the gains that it
acquired in the prior years would be lost, much of which never to return. The most
consequential would be OPEC’s institutional unity, freedom of action and independence
from Outside Forces, and the ability to think strategically, as opposed to tactical moves
intended for price defense.
In the realm of Market Forces, the 1980s began with what was supposed to be
another boost to OPEC’s influential power in the global political economy – rising prices.
The fallout from the Iranian Revolution, particularly the crisis that engulfed Iran’s oil
exports as its oil workers went on strike (in order to remove the Shah), was initially a
boon for all producers, not just OPEC (with the exception of Iran of course). But what
would result from the second oil shock would not lead to any advantage for the
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Organization but would lead to a series of events that would dramatically weaken its
power in the global economy, and subsequently in the international system. In the
immediate aftermath of the second oil shock, the first fruits of the diversification and
conservation strategies that the advanced economies had embarked on years prior would
finally appear, minimizing the impact that the Organization would have on markets.
Though the political instability from the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War sent
jitters through the markets, resulting in massively inflated prices, these concerns proved
to be short-lived.
The advanced economies eventually would prove that because of their strategies
in the immediate years after 1973, they, and thus large sectors of the global economy,
were no longer dependent upon OPEC exports. The Organization made attempts to keep
their market share, but internal disarray within OPEC and the evolution of the global
economy to alternatives, conservation, and new production rendered those efforts
fruitless.
The fallout from the Iranian Revolution not only would dramatically transform
the intrastate dynamics of Iran for years to come, but would also reshape the domestic
political, social, and even economic undercurrents of other Member States as well,
specifically the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Though the Arabs of the Persian Gulf,
long distrustful and fearful of the Shah, initially were relieved by his regime’s downfall,
the rise of Political Islam in Iran would pose far more of a direct threat to their own
political stability. Monarchial Iran was seen as a threat via conventional military
dominance, but not to their respective regime’s hold on power. The overthrow of a
powerful, pro-Western monarchy, with one of the strongest militaries in the world, by a
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coalition of forces headed by religious figures, created a precedent which was easily
replicable in the domestic contexts of many conservative Arab monarchies, specifically
Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Iraq’s majority Shia population was seen, whether accurately or
inaccurately, as potentially vulnerable to influence because of Iran’s Islamic Revolution,
and how Iranian Shia clerical establishment lead the revolt that toppled the Shah.
This would have dramatic consequences in the interstate relations of OPEC
Members. The fallout of the Iranian Revolution initially paralyzed any effective decisionmaking towards consensus in the Organization. As mutual recriminations escalated
between Iran’s new Islamic Republic and the newly empowered third Baathist state in
Iraq (some spawned because of the Revolution while others were based on older
territorial disputes), conflict became inevitable. Fear of revolutionary exportation would
quickly lead the Persian Gulf Arabs to side with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. And as the
tensions between Tehran and Baghdad led to open hostility in the September of 1980,
OPEC as a unitary force irrevocably split, as two of its founding and influential Member
States became engulfed in the bloodiest War of the 20th century since WWII.
So consequential and transformative was the Iranian Revolution that the
prevailing Cold War binaries of alliances and spheres of influences concerning key issues
relating to oil production and the Middle East security architecture withered away as a
result. The US, having faced international humiliation by reason of the storming of the
American embassy in Tehran by revolutionary students, with the subsequent hostage
taking of its personnel, was now fundamentally antithetical to the new Iranian
government. And this antithesis was all encompassing in that the US would eventually
use all the levers of its power against its former ally: economic Warfare, diplomatic
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isolation, intelligence sharing and later alliance building with Iran’s enemies, culminating
even in several instances of the use of force against the new Iranian government in latter
stages of the Iran-Iraq War, albeit on a measured basis. Moreover, though in the
immediate aftermath of the Revolution, many thought that the purported Western ‘loss’
of Iran would become a gain for the USSR, in time, the Soviets understood that the
political transformation in Iran threatened their strategic profile as well – not just in the
Middle East but also in other key theatres. Like the Persian Gulf Arabs and others in the
region, the rise of Political Islam brought about untold threats to the Soviet Union, chiefly
among the millions of Muslims in Central Asia that were always seen as fifth column to
Soviet rule. Accordingly, the USSR also supported Iraq in its War with Iran.
However, what started from the Iranian Revolution did not culminate with the end
of the Iran-Iraq War. The eight-year War which concluded in 1989 would not only
consume any hopes of consensus for OPEC during this period, but would ultimately lead
to the de facto disintegration of the Organization. And while the War ended in stalemate,
its ramifications would yield more conflict.
Though the Persian Gulf Arab States supported Baathist Iraq with billions of
loans, Hussein’s regime was simply unable to pay back his debt to affluent Kuwait.
Eventually, as a result, and only months after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq would
embark on another costly military intervention against Kuwait - once again because of
territorial disputes, specifically shared oil fields. This time however, the ramifications of
such an action would be truly catastrophic for the future of Iraq as state, leading towards
the near complete destruction of Iraq’s military power, the eventual decimation of its
civilian population via War and later sanctions, all the while causing ruin to its oil
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production capacity and export capacity. And as these events were paralleled by the
continual increase of non-OPEC oil into the global economy enhanced by conservations
methods and the use or alternative sources of energy, OPEC would reveal the extent of its
dysfunction, causing many diverse speculations about its actual survivability in the
international system in the years to come.
Market Forces
Throughout the 1970s, OPEC had used the inflation argument to justify higher prices.
Yet, as mentioned previously, another potent argument, normatively accepted at the time,
was the environmentally based belief of the exhaustibility of crude oil – essentially the
forerunner to the peak oil argument popularized at the turn of the 20th century. At the
time, not only producers, but also environmental activists and even academics were
constantly Warning about a coming depletion hydrocarbon resources. The fusion of
these two intellectually separate premises – the inflation argument which called for
retroactive corrective measures to balance out crude prices with the rate of manufactured
goods and commodities with the second argument based on the non-renewable nature of
crude oil – proved to be a powerful driving force in keeping prices inflated.
Yet, the unexpected impact of the political upheaval in Iran changed the ability
for the Organization to implement measured increases or to keep prices elevated after an
increase. In the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, prices literally doubled, sending
shock waves to both developed and developing economies. Iran’s 1978 export figure of
more than 5.2 mbpd 359 dramatically decreased to a little more than 1.5 mbpd in 1980
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(See Figure 4.1). This resulted in OPEC fundamentally losing control over prices. As
panic and speculation led prices from their 1978 figure of $14.02 per barrel ($48.37 in
2011 figures) to $31.61 per barrel ($97.94 in 2011 figures) in 1979 (see Figure 4.3),
OPEC was now losing control over the argument over prices.
This unprecedented rise in crude oil prices – now referred to as the second OPEC
shock – for the first time, put the Organization on the defensive. 360 However, though the
price increase was a product of political upheaval in an important Member State, and
certainly not because of any decision that OPEC had done collectively, the Group’s
decision makers felt a need to respond via public diplomacy. All throughout 1979-1980,
OPEC as an institution, with its higher officials, and officials from its Member States
gave unprecedented interviews and speeches on this very topic. The Organization felt that
by explaining their perspective on the issue to diverse audiences, global public opinion
would not hold them fully responsible for the price hike.
Moreover, the way in which OPEC responded to the dramatic rise in prices would
unearth the deeply flawed premises that both the Organization and its officials had about
the global economy and the oil industry in the 1980s. It was these series of
miscalculations that would lead to OPEC’s dramatic weakening over the oil industry, as it
relates to prices, its export policy, and most importantly, control of market share.
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Figure 4.1: OPEC Crude Oil Production by country, as Member States joined the Organization, 1978-1993 (1000 b/d)
Source: OPEC Statistical Data. http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm
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Figure 4.2: Global Oil Consumption by Regions: 1965-1993 (Thousand barrels daily)
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2013
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Figure 4.3: Crude Oil Prices: 1978-1993 (US dollars per barrel) Source: BP Statistical Review
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In a series of speeches made to not only justify the high prices of crude, but also
to explain the fallout from the loss of Iranian exports, and on the future of production,
OPEC’s Ecuadorian Secretary General Rene G. Ortiz would continuously highlight the
binary inflation/depletion argument. In an address to the First Arab Energy Conference in
Abu Dhabi in early March of 1979, Secretary General Ortiz laid out the thinking of
OPEC’s production position concerning the next few years:
The fact that the primary fossil fuels available, and their ultimate
recoverable reserves, are finite and of a non-renewable nature, points to
the alarming situation that these exhaustible resources can only be
secured over a limited time period and hence attention is dramatically
drawn to the future availability and supply of energy required for the
anticipated economic development. This fact is particularly acute in the
case of hydrocarbons where at the 'present rate of exploitation the
hydrocarbon era is rather short and could, in fact, be measured in
decades. This situation, serious enough in itself, is aggravated by the slow
pace of development of alternative sources of energy and the low prospect
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of a real breakthrough in making these sources available at a reasonable
cost, and in the bulk required, to ensure a smooth transition from the oil
era to one hopefully based on renewable resources….This prominent
position of oil in the total energy demand was due mainly to the versatility
of its use on the one hand and the fact that crude oil prices were
artificially maintained at an unjustifiably low level on the other….Hence,
crude oil, which for some Member Countries is the only source of revenue,
was, for a considerable number of years, undervalued and over-consumed
as if its supply was unlimited. As a consequence, since the mid-Seventies,
an important structural change has occurred in the oil industry whereby
oil production and oil prices began to be administered by Governments to
whom revenue, compatible with their needs, economic development and
aspirations, made the production and export of crude a permanent
national objective to be handled through governmental policy. It is worth
mentioning here that an artificially low price for petroleum in the past
prompted over exploitation of this limited depletable resource and the
continuation of such policy would have proved to be disastrous from the
point of view of the world economy. Fortunately, OPEC Countries' actions,
particularly those of the 70s, came just in time, serving as a preventative
signal before having to face any major crises. Actually, as far as OPEC
Member Countries are concerned, the policy goes a step further, since it
covers a dual objective; firstly, that of obtaining an equitable value for
their resources and secondly, the inducement of the development of
alternative sources of energy, together with encouraging real
conservation measures and the prevention of wasteful utilization of oil.
Additionally, the Organization, while recognizing the vital role of oil and
gas supply to the world economy, and at the same time committing itself so
that the essential requirements of the consuming countries are met,
believes that conservation and the rational use of hydrocarbon resources
is a fundamental requirement for the well-being of, and national asset to,
future generations…the issue of the availability of supply of OPEC
hydrocarbons should account for all the economic, social and other
constraints compatible with Member Countries' needs and development.
Thus, these countries should not be expected to produce beyond what is
economically justifiable. 361
Ortiz’s remarks are very revealing because he openly states that OPEC’s objectives, at
least at that time, was ultimately to transition to a less oil dependent world. Coming from
the perspective of the exhaustibility theory, this reasoning, in fact, does make logical
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sense – even for an institution that depends so heavily on the revenue from its oil exports.
The Organization had figured that this resource would largely be done away with in a few
decades, so its finite nature justifies a higher price while the world economy adjusts to
other sources of energy, and with more conservation methods.
But because of the uncertainty surrounding Iranian exports, OPEC’s claim to
market stabilization was also coming under severe criticism. With the defeat of the
Companies and the wresting of control over prices, OPEC’s primary argument was that if
producers actually had a say (or control) over prices, there would be a better stabilizing
influence in the market, in the event of supply disruption. This argument largely went
unchallenged throughout the 1970s. However, when supply disruption actually came
about, this time quite a severe disruption, OPEC’s ability to act for the ‘global good’ was
found wanting. Fadhil Chalabi, OPEC’s future Secretary General after Ortiz, understood
this dilemma for the Organization:
The real significance of the Iranian oil crisis is that it has suddenly – and
dramatically changed – previous conclusions on OPEC oil and its role as
a stabilizing factor in world energy markets. In doing so, however, the
crisis has merely brought to the surface certain undercurrents which were
undoubtedly in movement before the crisis, and which, if no appropriate
measures had been taken, would nevertheless have confronted the world
with the same issues, if perhaps at a later date. Only six months ago,
people in the oil industry were still talking about the possibility of a
sustained OPEC excess capacity in production, excess that would continue
for years to come. The instability presently characterizing the world oil
markets would, however, indicate that such conclusions were erroneous. It
is now obvious that the disappearance of Iranian oil exports has not been
completely made up by the increase in production from those excess
capacities. What has happened, in fact, is that most OPEC Countries are
currently producing at near their full capacity; and those that have
increased production in order partially to make up for the loss of Iranian
production cannot continue doing so without jeopardizing their
production policies. This does not imply that the possibilities of expanding
capacities in many OPEC Countries do not exist. But the dilemma in
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which such countries now find themselves is clear: is there sufficient
incentive being offered to motivate them to undertake the large-scale and
capital-intensive investments necessary to cope with the increasing
demand, given the fact that the income derived from the depletion of their
existing resources is now more than ever needed to meet the pressing
requirements of economic and social development in their own countries?
362

Chalabi’s admission laid bare the major contradictions with OPEC’s policy of
uncontrolled elevated prices in the 1970s, which was dramatically worsened by the
politicization of the exports from OPEC’s Arab Member States. In focusing on the
“dilemma” of OPEC Members – namely the producers’ predicament of either investing in
excess capacity with additional windfall or saving those monies for the “pressing
requirements of economic and social” needs at home – Chalabi’s statement showed the
fundamental inability of OPEC to think in strategic terms vis-à-vis their consumers. More
importantly, it showed that OPEC’s thinking was based upon a reliance of the continual
increase in demand – of which its inaccuracy would only aggravate by the exhaustibility
theory. In addressing its possible concerns about Iran’s future production and market
share, Iran’s new Oil Minister in the provisional government, Ali Akbar Mo’infar,
exemplified this reasoning, which had been adopted by most of OPEC:
We are not at all worried about the sale or our oil. Even if this quantity of
oil were to remain under Iran’s soil, its price would increase day by day
and would become more expensive and we would not have been worried.
Therefore, we shall export the amount which we require in order to obtain
foreign currency. This is our goal, and at the moment our program is to
keep the present level of production and to sell the same amount as before.
We have a sufficient number of customers for what we wish to sell. 363
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Furthermore, this reasoning was not just adhered to by the Organization or other
producers. Many in the advanced economies also believed that the second oil shock was
proof of the continual and even rise of the power of OPEC in the decade. 364 It was clear,
that based upon Ortiz, Chalabi, and other OPEC and Member State officials, that the no
one really imagined the actual fruition of conservation methods and alternative sources of
energy. If they were viable, it was thought that they would be years away, for clearly
OPEC’s production, pricing, and planning policies made little room for them in their
strategic analysis on the dynamics of global supply and demand.
As a result, the Organization entered the 1980s with a major sense of confidence,
accomplishment, and determination. Only literally days before the start of the Iran-Iraq
War, which would fundamentally end OPEC unity and functionality for years, OPEC’s
September 1980 press release would celebrate its 20th anniversary by proclaiming that:
The controlling power in the hydrocarbons industry of the OPEC Member
Countries is now firmly in the hands of the rightful owners, namely the oil
producing nations. Their governments are now guardians of a substantial
proportion of the earth's last reserves of a precious commodity and are
attempting to administer this responsibility with wisdom and moderation,
taking due account of the national interests of their own countries.
Production and prices are being governed by consideration of the
depletability of the oil reserves: in the interests of both producers and
consumers OPEC is vigorously advocating measures aimed at enabling a
smooth transition from the oil era to that of alternative forms of energy.
Conservation, increased investment in existing and new fields, measures
requiring further exploration and/or enhanced recovery; and the
development of both conventional and non-conventional alternatives – all
these needs are constantly being placed in the foreground of discussions
by this Organization. There are signs that OPEC's policies are coming to
be recognized for what they are, namely, genuine pointers to the realities
and the challenge of the energy and economic development of the world.
Never before has there been such energy-consciousness as there is today.
And it cannot be denied that OPEC has been the prime mover behind this
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new awareness, the driving force which has led governments, the media
and the general public to concern themselves, not only with the
depletability of oil - although this resource is at present in the foreground
- but with the whole spectrum of the world's exhaustible natural resources.
For the industrialized countries this is a concept which they will not find
easy to adopt, but it is unavoidable if we are not to be confronted in the
foreseeable future with an energy gap, the economic, social and political
consequences of which hardly bear contemplation. OPEC has always been
ready to play its full part in creating a better world for all of us to live in –
not only through the bridging of the gap between the oil age and that of
alternatives but also and mainly, through the closing of that other gap
between developed and developing countries. 365

Blowback from OPEC’s price hikes and the collapse of its market share domination
Beneath the surface of anxiety and concern regarding the continual tightening and
sporadic disruption of supply in many advanced economies, all the while OPEC and its
producer counterparts rested on the inevitability of higher demand and higher prices,
were forces that would fundamentally alter the nature of the global oil industry. Out of
the all the countries that had suffered from the 1970s supply disruptions and price
increases, it was arguably Japan, an island nation with little to no crude oil, that had felt
the most vulnerable. The predicament surrounding Iranian exports was only the latest
crisis to highlight Japan’s oil vulnerability. 366 But Japan was not just reacting to events.
It had engaged in a multi-national effort of energy diplomacy, sending representatives to
several Latin American and African countries, with a specific emphasis on Mexican
crude. 367 By 1980, Japan’s energy policy rested on three principles: expand conservation
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efforts, diversify sources of energy from oil to alternatives such as coal, nuclear power
and natural gas, and divert dependence from the Middle East to more secure sources of
supply. 368 Though this was essentially the model that most of the advanced economies
followed – initially sketched out in 1975 – Japan had by the early 1980s advanced the
most, primarily because of necessity.
However, the second oil shock truly brought about a new phase in Japan’s quest,
started years prior, to lead in conservation efforts, of which automobiles were the most
consequential. As Koichi Shimokawa has catalogued, the US automobile market, from
1980 to 1983, witnessed a major shift in demand for the fuel-efficient and compact
automobiles, the very same kind that Japan was mastering for the home market.
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With

time, spawned by the first and second OPEC shocks, the very nature of personal transport
had shifted, from the large and heavy gas-consuming automobile, to the smaller, more
efficient vehicle. It was at this time that demand for Japanese autos skyrocketed,
penetrating other advanced, free market economies.
Compounding this trend was the conservation efforts making headway in North
America and Europe. As Figure 4.2 shows, North American consumption in 1979 was
roughly 21.3 mbpd, but for the next decade it would continuously drop. The lowest figure
came about in 1983 at 17.95 mbpd. By 1993, North American oil consumption was only
20.6 mbpd, lower than its 1979 figure. Europe’s conservation attempts were even more
dramatic. Though the continent’s 1979 figures were 24.7 mbpd, by 1993 those figures
had declined to 20.6 mbpd. And adding to the efficacy of the conservation efforts was the
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fact that alternative sources of crude was now coming online. Although US production
was in steady decline (from 10.1 mbpd in 1979 down to 8.9 mbpd), the North Sea,
Canada, and Mexico made substantial contributions in the West’s alternatives strategy.
370

Canada’s 1979 figures jumped from 1.8 mbpd to 2.2 mbpd in 1993. In the same time

frame, Mexico increased from 1.6 mbpd to 3.1 mbpd. The North Sea’s output, mostly
seen in the British and Norwegian production, was also significant. Britain’s 1979 figures
went from 1.6 mbpd to 2.0 mbpd while Norway’s 1979 output increased from a modest
407,000 bpd to 2.4 mbpd. And all of these smaller changes were happening as Iran and
Iraq were locked in an incredibly destructive conflict that, throughout the 1980s,
devastated the production capacities of both countries.
Figure 4.4: Shares of global oil production between OPEC and non OPEC producers: 1978-1993
Source: OPEC Statistical Data. http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm
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The results – amplified by OPEC’s internal strife (conflict between Iran and Iraq
while later Iraq and Kuwait) and the Organization’s broader inability to protect its longsought after preeminent position in the global economy – was the massive weakening of
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OPEC’s market share domination. As Figure 4.4 clearly shows, OPEC’s percentage of
global oil production dramatically fell from its 1979 figure of 49.71% to 40.44% in 1981.
And as will be discussed in subsequent sections, the inability of the Organization to
address the conflict between Iran and Iraq, its further paralysis as conflict led to open
War between the two founding Member States, and the ramifications of that conflict on
other Member States (and their relations amongst each other) only further weakened the
cohesion of the OPEC, and thus its ability to maintain market share control.
Intrastate Dynamics
The beginning of the Fragmentation phase began within and remained deeply affected by
the internal dynamics of three distinct places: Iran, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf Arab
Sheikhdoms of OPEC, specifically Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE. The collapse of
the Shah’s regime, the precedent that this event set for other States in the region and
beyond, and the rise of Political Islam in the shape of the Islamic Republic political
system both remade the political architecture of the Middle East and changed the internal
functionality of OPEC. This process of fragmentation within the Organization was not,
however, in the span of days, but took almost two years to fully become visible, began
gradually in the immediate aftermath of the Shah’s departure of January of 1979,
throughout that year and the next, and reaching its official beginning in September of
1980, as the Iran-Iraq War commenced.
Revolutionary Iran and the establishment of the Islamic Republic
While the most consequential impact of Iran’s political upheaval was ultimately political
and geostrategic in nature – in that it fundamentally reshaped the security architecture of
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the Middle East and challenged the Cold War binary of the time by introducing Political
Islam as a third, alternative political model – it’s initial impact on OPEC and the global
political economy was economic. This happened primarily in two theatres. The
Revolution caused a dramatic decline in Iranian oil production at a time when the market
supply was tight and the potential for market panic on supply disruption was particularly
vulnerable. The now established concern over exhaustibility was only supplemented by
new concerns over unintentional supply disruptions. The collapse of the Shah’s once
powerful regime, in a major producing country, only brought this concern further to
home.
Secondly, one of the first major acts of the provisional government and carried
through after the official establishment of the Islamic Republic was the full
nationalization of Iranian oil. This move was later codified under Article 3 of the new
Iranian Constitution drafted after during the provisional period before the official
establishment of the Islamic Republic and ratified in 1980.

371

This meant that the

Consortium – long a thorn in the side of the Shah and effectively sidelined in major
aspects of Iranian production and price controls during the negotiations – had now
officially been dismantled by the new Iranian government. Having such a full-scale
nationalization happen, even when events of state appropriation were no longer novel by
the early 1980s, still exacerbated the already shaky nerves that diverse markets had
regarding global supply disruption.
But events would gradually take on a far more political and later, security
significance. The hostage crisis surrounding the storming of the US embassy and taking
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of American personnel by Iranian students had dramatically and negatively changed the
image of both Iran’s Revolution and its new government in the eyes of many states,
particularly those in the West. Though this event greatly assisted in the creation of a
‘menacing’ and ‘rogue’ revolutionary leadership within Iran, the fundamentals behind the
major changes in the Iran-US relationship went much than the hostage crisis. Indeed, the
collapse of Iran-US relations had its roots in the trends that were forming in the decades
prior to 1979, which by this time were now clashing.
The patron-client relationship that had developed in the aftermath of the 1953
coup against Mossadegh, the contradictory situation of the Shah’s intense need for this
relationship all the while loathing the existence of it, and the severe and escalating
differences that the Iranian state, under the Shah, had with the US regarding oil prices,
created the conditions for the explosion of acrimony between both sides. With the Shah’s
departure, the weeks and months that passed witnessed the US moving from paralysis
caused by confusion concerning the Shah’s demise, to tactically recognizing the
provisional government all the while US policy was in disarray towards Iran, to
becoming vehemently opposed to the leadership that would eventually become the
Islamic Republic. And with this new opposition, came the first and continuous signs of
economic Warfare against Iran, in the form of trade, financial, and other economic
sanctions and embargoes against Iran. 372
The political disarray in Iran, exacerbated by the isolation that the country was
entering in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution, only further weakened Iran’s oil

372

H. Askari, Case Studies of Us Economic Sanctions (Praeger, 2003), 177-244.

226

production capacity, thus creating the conditions where other potential rivals would take
the dominant place in decision-making and leadership that Iran once had within OPEC.
Persian Gulf Arabs React: From Relief to Fear
For the monarchies of the Persian Gulf Arabs, Iran’s political upheaval was initially seen
not as a threat, but cautiously accepted. This was clearly demonstrated in an interview
that King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, then the Crown Prince, made to Al-Hawadith. 373 And as
King Fahd mentioned within that interview, Iran’s notion of pan-Islamic unity, a marked
change from the Shah’s rhetoric, was initially welcomed. But more importantly, the
Saudis and others in the region realized that, at least for the time being, the Revolution
had weakened Iran and put its economy and military in flux – to the point that they no
longer, at least in theory, could be seen as a threat to the Saudis and other Persian Gulf
states.
But as the months progressed from the Revolution, gradually, the perception of
these sheikhdoms dramatically changed towards Iran’s political change and new
government. Political Islam’s rise in Iran, in the Saudi perception, because it had
empowered the clerical establishment of the largest Shia Islamic country in the world, set
a dangerous precedent for countries with sizeable Shia communities in the region. 374 For
the Arab sheikhdoms, this proved to be a precedent that not only could and eventually did
cause varying degrees of political instability within their countries, but had the potential
to threaten the survivability of their regimes. With the perception of the Iranian
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Revolution now changing from an opportunity to capitalize on Iranian weakness via the
distractions of upheaval to a threat that no longer could be ignored, there arose an
integrated strategy that Persian Gulf Arabs embarked upon to keep revolutionary
instability at bay. The most consequential was the creation of Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC), in which security, strategic, and economic policy could be streamlined in a more
unified position, mainly because of the threat that Revolutionary Iran posed. 375
The Third Baathist State: Opportunity spurns War
Within Iraq however, the continuance of Iran’s revolutionary instability was
simultaneously seen as both an opportunity and a threat, as opposed to devolving from
one perception to another. On the latter, the newly empowered, and but significantly
leaner Baath party in Iraq, having been purged of any potential political rivals to Saddam
Hussein, saw Iran’s political instability as a chance to remake, in Iraq’s favor, the
territorial and political disputes that Baghdad long had with its powerful Eastern neighbor.
It’s important to remember that these disputes, particularly the territorial ones, were
issues that for decades had proven a spoiler in the larger Iranian-Iraqi relationship, some
of which going back to the immediate aftermath of Iraq’s 1958 Revolution that overthrow
the Iraqi monarchy. 376
Moreover, Hussein’s territorial disputes with Iran, particularly his intermittent
calls to annex the Iranian province of Khuzestan, had much to do with oil. Khuzestan’s
oil deposits were and still are extremely vast. Thus, the irredentists claims of the Iraqi
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Baath had just as much to do with their national perceptions of what constitutes their
territory, as it did with the significant economic benefits that they would accrue if some
of these claims actually came into fruition.
Yet, what exacerbated the cycle of animosity was the fear from Saddam’s regime
of the mass political empowerment of the Iraqi Shia, the majority of Iraq, by reason of the
rise and establishment of the Islamic Republic next door. 377 This was particularly acute
as the religious bonds between both countries, particularly between the Iranian city of
Qom and Iraq’s Karbala and Najaf, had traditionally been quite strong. With the arrival of
the Baath in political power in Iraq, these bonds were initially downplayed, only later to
be cut. Accordingly, the Iranian Revolution was seen by Saddam’s regime as a threat to
his rule as well, and eventually far more acute of a threat than the other neighboring
states of the Persian Gulf.
Interstate Relations
Once these assessments from both Iraq and the monarchies of the Persian Gulf fully
crystallized, the fear concerning Iran dramatically converged their interests and strategic
approaches to the political realities in Iran and what that would mean for the wider region.
As 1981 approached, the internal functionality of OPEC – paralyzed since the immediate
aftermath of the Iranian Revolution and its inability to respond to the ensuing pricing
crisis – would now begin the process of fragmentation, only to completely disintegrate in
its functionality near the end of the 1980s
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The beginnings of the Iran-Iraq War
The September 1980 Iraqi invasion of Iran was the first real instance where a Member
State went to War with another Member State. Though Iraq and Kuwait, in the early
weeks after OPEC’s founding, did escalate their territorial disputes, potentially leading
toward open hostilities, the Iran-Iraq War was qualitatively different. By the time the
Iraqi Baathist government decided to launch the invasion of Iran, the dividing lines, both
within OPEC, and beyond were already drawn.
Sensing the fear that the Persian Gulf Arab monarchies had of revolutionary
instability penetrating their borders, Saddam’s War plan against Iran, from the very onset
of hostilities until the end of the War, relied upon significant financial assistance from his
southern neighbors. In initially citing Revolutionary Iran’s interference in Iraqi affairs,
specifically as it relates to aid given to Iraqi Kurds, and its purported violations of the
Algiers Accord both countries signed in 1975, which was intended to resolve their border
issues, Saddam initiated the war while Iran’s political dynamics, economic position, and
military posture were chaotic and fluid.
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Iraq’s opening salvo against Iran was

successful due to the latter’s inability to foresee the scale of the Iraqi invasion, although
relations had dramatically worsened by then and throughout the year had seen localized
instances of border violence. Furthermore, the support garnered by the Baathist regime
from other significant players in the Arab world, outside of OPEC, added to the
confidence of Saddam’s regime in his war efforts. With some notable exceptions, such as
Libya and Syria (with Lebanon’s neutrality) the greater part of the Arab World, the Arab
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League in particular, openly supported and assisted Iraq during the War. In those initial
weeks of open hostilities, the Iraqi regime had assured itself of a quick victory over Iran.
If victory had arrived when Baghdad expected it, not only would Iran’s Khuzestan
province be occupied by Iraqi forces, but the future of Iran’s role in OPEC, and possibly
that of its political orientation would have been significantly influenced by the IraqiPersian Gulf Arab coalition that had come out so antagonistically against Revolutionary
Iran.
The failure of OPEC to broker peace
While the Iraqi Baath were able to garner the overt support of every Arab OPEC member
and the brunt of the Arab League, the rest of OPEC’s Member States had no real coherent
policy or approach to the Iran-Iraq War. The initiation of hostilities between two of
OPEC’s founding Members and the subsequent polarization within Group, created a
sense of paralysis amongst other Members. Though the conflict would eventually have
dramatically negative affects upon the Organization, as any open hostility among
Members would lead to the weakening of OPEC (which would be deleterious for
Member States), there was very little public effort made to first acknowledge the conflict
or even contain it. Finally, the Organization, in their 59th conference in December 1980,
did acknowledge what had greatly contributed to the massive crude oil price increase of
the past few weeks, namely the War between Iran and Iraq:
The Conference endorsed the sincere and honest appeal made by His
Excellency the President of the Republic of Indonesia in his inauguration
speech to the two Member Countries – Iran and Iraq - who are presently
in dispute, to quickly seek the best possible solution to their conflict
leading to a peaceful settlement of their differences. 379
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Yet, with the exception of this acknowledgement, OPEC, as an institution, either
volitionally or by force, ignored the War. For all of 1981, the Organization, in its
Resolutions, chose to focus on procedural and personnel matters. As prices began to
erode that year, only to plunge significantly, not only was OPEC still adhering to the
exhaustibility theory but also was unable to address the escalating conflict between Iran
and Iraq. As the War increased, it gradually weakened the influential power of both
Members within the Organization, as production capacity lessened both States’ influence
in decision-making. However, for OPEC, the War that would eventually cripple the
production capacities of these two significant exporters would also become deleterious to
the Organization’s future.
As the War would drag on, OPEC’s capacity to act on behalf of its Members and
respond to Market Forces would be significantly debilitated, as the loss of collective
OPEC output would affect the market share that took more than two decades to build.
The collective inability of OPEC to bring about a halt to the War – particularly in the first
few months – ultimately created the conditions for the War’s continuance, and significant
damage it levied on the Organization’s unity, functionality, and place in the global
economy.
Outside Powers
By the time the Iran-Iraq War commenced and well into the first year of hostilities,
Washington’s animosity towards Iran had largely hardened. The hostage crisis, the “loss
of Iran” in American grand strategy, and the birth of a new Iranian foreign policy that
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clashed in direct ways with established US policy preferences for the Middle East and the
wider oil industry, only worsened the relationship. By 1981, fear of Revolutionary Iran
and how that would affect the strategic interests of the US moved Washington to
gradually open up relations with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, a relationship that had largely
remained frozen since the mid-1970s. Baathist Iraq, both under Al-Bakr and then under
Hussein, remained firmly in the Soviet Camp, relying on Soviet patronage and assistance
for technical assistance with its oil industry, weapons purchases, and mega infrastructural
projects. 380
However, with the Iranian Revolution, the US found itself supporting the same
side that the Soviets had long cultivated and endorsed, which Moscow only expanded in
support in its conflict with Iran. 381 As Adam Tarock has aptly chronicled, the approach
of the great powers with their respective support to the combatants of this conflict can be
clearly seen and analyzed by their behavior at the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC). 382 Tarock points out that, in response to the Iraqi invasion of Iran, it took 4
days for the UNSC to meet, as opposed to what will later be discussed, the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait in August of 1990, in which the UNSC met on the same day.
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Khuzestan province, and yet made no demands to the Iraqi’s to withdraw. 384 The UNSC
inability to function, as R.P.H. King has argued, was formed by the confluence of its
Members’ deference to their individual national interests,

385

of which for the US in

particular was shaped by the Iranian hostage crisis, while for the Soviets it was the
fundamental aversion to Political Islam. After the Iranian’s rejected the UNSC resolution,
it would take another two years for the Council to revisit matter.
Indeed, the conflict between Iran-Iraq was the first and only major war since the
beginning of the Cold War that Washington and Moscow not only supported the same
side, but fundamentally for the same reasons: the containment and eventual extinguishing
of the revolutionary upheaval that flowed from Iran. The possible ramifications of the
spread of this political upheaval to other countries – regardless of a particular country
adopting a political model that took root in Iran – would rapidly erode the binary of
American and Soviet strategic power in the region. But as the Soviets merely expanded
the relationship they had with Baghdad to counter Iran’s War making abilities – primarily
by assisting with weaponry and training – the US position evolved from secret
communications, to logistical intelligence sharing, to weapons transfers, to official
recognition and normalization of relations, to full-throated open support for the Iraqi War
effort. And this process started in earnest only months after the beginning of hostilities.
Fearing Revolutionary Iran, the US starts recognition and cooperation with Iraq
In April of 1981, after completing his first overseas trip as Secretary of State
(which was to the Middle East), Alexander Haig conveyed a message to Iraq’s Foreign
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Minister Sa’dun Hammadi in order to test the grounds of any possible convergence of
interests between the US and Iraq. 386 In his correspondence to Hammadi, Secretary Haig
highlighted that he would be sending Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Morris Draper
to Baghdad for consultations with the Iraq government on a variety of issues. Haig’s
intention was to convey to the Foreign Minister that both the US and Iraq needed to be
“able to exchange views, freely and on a systematic basis”, as there were issues that
united and divided both sides, but ultimately geared to “come to understand more fully
the views of one another”. 387
Only a few days before Haig’s outreach, the US interests section in Baghdad sent
an analysis on the possibility for better US-Iraqi relations. In the dispatch, the analysts
remarked that Draper’s coming visit to Baghdad was the first visit by a senior American
official since 1977.
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The US analysts further stated that Washington’s decision to

embargo Iran, chiefly as it relates to the selling of arms, had been well received and had
positively shifted the mood of Iraq’s officials about the US. 389 More significantly, they
remarked that the US had now a “greater convergence of interests with Iraq than at any
time since the Revolution of 1958.”
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Baghdad, though it would take time, was Warranted, because of the altered regional
dynamics, of which Iran’s political transformation was the most important. As Iraq’s
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Foreign Minister returned a cordial yet brief communication to Secretary Haig, 391 the
stage was set for the gradual improving of relations, which was most importantly
manifested with senior officials meeting with each other. The most significant was
William Eagleton’s meeting with the then current head of Iraq’s Revolutionary
Command Council and future Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, which was highest-level
meeting with an official from Iraqi government since the collapse of relations in 1967. 392
As dialogue intensified between Washington and Baghdad, both sides gradually
began to talk about Iraq’s acquisition of the more sophisticated US weapons that would
assist it in the War with Iran. By mid-1981, any hope that Baathist Iraq had about a quick
victory against Revolutionary Iran had long dissipated. At this point, it was the Iranians
who were on the offensive, slowly repelling the Iraqis out of Iranian territory. Yet, for the
US to fundamentally offer and deliver tangible help for the Iraqi War effort, there needed
to be a normalization of Iraq, by the US, in the international community. In other words,
Iraq could not be seen any longer as a “rogue” nation but on that had good standing
among other countries. The reputation that Baghdad had long held was of a Soviet client
state, a leader of the reactionary Arab states against Israel, and an oil price hawk. Most
significantly, the US and the West in general, had concerns about Iraqi support for
terrorist groups, and as such, Baghdad was designated a state sponsor of terrorism.
What this meant was that the US government, could not transfer weaponry, aid,
training for the Iraqi military, or any meaningful interstate security cooperation and
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commerce with relative ease. More so, the US would be breaking its own laws. But as the
US would shift towards Iraq, Washington would take the steps to remove Iraq from this
list. And after a series of negotiations with Baghdad, in early 1982 the US decided to
ultimately delist Iraq from the list of countries deemed state sponsors of terrorism. 393
Although US officials still had deep suspicions about Iraq’s continued
sponsorship of certain regional militant groups, 394 once this delisting occurred, relations
broadened on significant political, security, and economic issues. This resulted in more
frequent communications with very senior personnel of both countries and Iraq’s broader
access to the American economy and military technology. Near the end of 1982, US-Iraqi
relations, though not able to be described as an alliance, were now well on its way to
becoming normalized. But unlike other instances of diplomatic normalization with the
US government, this process with Iraq was significantly fastracked because of the
converging concerns regarding Iran.
Iranian gains in the Iran-Iraq War
At the same time, the Iran-Iraq War, which in the opening weeks was going well for the
Iraqis, had by the end of 1982 witnessed several Iraqi setbacks and Iranian victories.
From the time of the invasion to the end of 1982, a series of Iraqi miscalculations
regarding Iran’s military strength and its response to the Iraqi invasion, Iraq’s military
planning as it pertains to offensive strategies, and the ability of the new Iranian
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government to garner significant military ability to resist the invasion, eventually
collapsed Iraq’s initial war plans. Hussein’s rational was that Iran would be so consumed
with political disarray, because of the arduous process of building a functional central
authority that it could not push back against a well-equipped and cash-laden Iraqi army.
Furthermore, the severing of Iran-US relations left Iran fully exposed to aggression from
Iraq and other states, as Iran no longer had a great power to rely upon for military
hardware, technology, and diplomatic protection.
But with time, Saddam’s calculations simply did not materialize. Though the Iraqi
military, in the opening weeks of the war, was able to push significantly in Iran’s
Khuzestan province, and threaten surrounding provinces, the Iraqi invasion became far
more a galvanizing factor to the various political currents in Iran jockeying for power. In
essence, the war assisted in the bureaucratic centralization of the new government, by
reason of the war effort being the most significant large-scale project that Tehran had to
contend with. As the core of the traditional Iranian military became functional again,
along with the newly created Revolutionary Guard, and the volunteer Basij forces, Iran
slowly began to restore balance to the dynamics of the conflict.
The most important and consequential Iranian victory in the early years of War
was the liberation of Khorramshahr, a vital Iranian port city on the Persian Gulf that the
Iraqis had captured in the immediate weeks after their invasion. Iraq’s army lay ruin to
city and the surrounding areas because the importance of the city to Iran’s overall trade
with the outside world, both regarding oil exports via shipping and other non-oil
commerce. The Iraqi Baath believed that with the destruction and occupation of Iran’s
major ports, the population would suffer extreme hardships because of the lack of trade,
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and would thus pressure their government to sue for peace under terms favoring Iraq. For
more than a year and half, Khorramshar was occupied by the Iraqi Baath army. In that
time, Saddam’s forces looted most if not all of the imported cargo that was destined to
reach other Iranian cities, and commodities that were meant for export to foreign markets.
Intermittent shelling of Khorramshahr by both sides destroyed large parts of the city.
However, in April of 1982, Iran began the initial phases of a counteroffensive that
would recapture this vital port city, and turn the tide of war in its favor. By May of 1982,
Khorramshar was retaken by Iran. Shortly afterwards, the Iraqi military was essentially
pushed out of Iran, and forced to defend Iraqi territory from an emboldened Iranian
military, with a determined, albeit inexperienced, Iranian leadership. With the recapturing
of Khorramshar, Iraq’s military began to make a series of mistakes that further
advantaged Iran in the War.
America’s policy shift towards over assistance to Iraq
From the US position, the prior two years had been dedicated to building it relations with
the Iraqi Baath. From offering a diplomatic makeover to Saddam Hussein’s regime, to
providing modest weaponry, to contributing in more robust intelligence sharing, and
economic normality between the two countries (even before there was political
normality), the US policy of outreach to Baghdad had largely succeeded. The US and
Iraq were not only on speaking terms, but now tactically in agreement as it related to Iran.
However, as Iran’s advanced in its war aims with Iraq – from strictly a defensive posture
to an offensive strategy – the US increasingly feared the possibility and the ramifications
of an Iranian victory in the war. After the tide had turned in the expulsion of the Iraqi
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military from Iranian territory, the US, under the Reagan administration, undertook a
series of policy revisions that would have consequential and lasting impact on the war,
OPEC’s functionality, and the political future of the broader Middle East.
In early 1983, the US began a series of internal policy reviews on several factors
as it related to the war, the most important of which was the following: the ramifications
of an Iranian victory, the ramifications of what a prolonged conflict would have on oil
prices (which were decreasing at the time), and the ramifications of the regionalization of
the conflict. Each scenario was seemed highly negative towards US interests and should
be avoided at all costs. In policy reviews that were conducted by varying American
agencies, it was agreed upon that the US position of de-facto ‘neutrality’ – as it was
described by US policy makers (even though the US was slightly assisting one side while
sanctioning another) – was no longer tenable.
In other words, the continuation of the Iran-Iraq war without overt American
involvement in the substantial aiding of Iraq (which would purportedly end on terms
favorable to Baghdad) would inevitably lead to either one, some, or all of the above
mentioned scenarios. The clearest indication of the this strategic shift to overt US
involvement in the aiding of the Iraqi Baath was a memo written by top diplomat and
future US Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger. In the memo, Eagleburger lays out
the fundamental US rationale for what ‘neutrality’:
When the war began three years ago, our poor relations with both
combatants and concern for our security interests in the Gulf led us to
reinforce air defenses by the deployment of AWACS to Saudi Arabia and
to block the use of air bases in the Arabian Peninsula by Iraqi aircraft to
reduce the threat of expansion of the war. Our neutrality policy evolved
out of this preventative reaction. Until now, this policy has served our
objectives and interests well. It has: avoided direct great power
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involvement; prevented spread of the war beyond the territory of the
combatants to threaten Gulf oil supplies; contributed to the current
military stalemate; preserved the possibility of developing a future
relationship with Iran while minimizing openings for expansion of Soviet
influence. 395
However, as Eagleburger sketches out, the strategic environment where that
policy was developed had now changed dramatically. Behind that change, two critical
developments lay at the foundation: the extensive improvement of bilateral relations with
Iraq as relations with Iran continued to “be virtually non-existent” and how Iran’s
strategy of “bringing about the Iraqi regime's political collapse through military attrition
coupled with financial strangulation” was “slowly having an effect”. 396 The conclusion
was broader than the possibility of Iraq being forced to look towards other weapons
suppliers, thus internationalizing the conflict by bringing in great power competition. The
real fear that Eagleburger and the State Department characterized as being “seriously
adverse to [American] interests” was the escalation of the then limited Iraqi campaign of
targeting Iran’s oil infrastructure, was targeting Iran’s revenue.
For the US, the loss of control of these tactics by Baghdad risked an escalation
that would elicit an Iranian backlash which “could cause Iran to try to prevent through
force all oil exports” from the Persian Gulf. 397 The US feared that Iraq’s attack on Iran’s
war making ability (i.e. its oil profits via the selling of crude) would inadvertently lead to
major supply disruptions, leading to a loss of Iranian, Iraqi, and other Persian Gulf oil.
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Earlier that year, the Department of Energy released a memo warning about the effects of
the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the pivotal water way that is the sole exit from the
Persian Gulf. The Department of Energy concluded that the closure of the Strait could
lead to a loss of 10 mbpd of the market and advocated for actively reaching out to other
regional producers, including major OPEC Members, to offset the possibility of this
supply disruption. 398 The concern over supply disruption from the region was coupled
with what Eagleburger and the State Department portrayed as the possibility of
“sustained Iranian pressure” bringing “about Iraq's political collapse.” 399 In other words,
the US had a heightened assessment of the destructive power of the Islamic Republic
while fearing the potential weakness of the Iraqi military.
With this assessment, the building blocks of the US response to the remainder of
the Iran-Iraq war were laid down. What the State Department proposed was to assist Iraq
in three interconnected ways: financial, diplomatic, and militarily, of which the former
two would become the most substantial. On the financial aspect, the most consequential
feature of this assistance was the conscious American decision to upgrade Iraq’s oil
exports, while it was in the process of cutting out Iranian oil from the global economy.
This overt decision by the US would become the most far-reaching intervention in the
internal functionality of OPEC since the Organization’s creation.
In times past, particularly the 1960s, the US intervention in OPEC’s affairs was
far more circumspect and behind the scenes. Now, with the proposed upgrading of Iraqi
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exports, while Washington waged economic warfare against Iran, thus targeting Iran’s
ability to produce and sell, these actions were difficult to deny or ignore. More so, to
fundamentally cause an upgrading to Iraqi output and excess capacity would be to
regionalize the conflict with Iran and Iraq, as the latter, as the State Department attests,
would need active assistance from the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf. This was the
most relevant as it relates to Iraq’s quest for more pipeline distribution across the Arabian
Peninsula and potentially involving Syria.
Diplomatically, the proposition was for the US to continue and possibly expand a
greater role at the UN in bringing hostilities to an end, while also issuing “more explicit
statements of support for the territorial integrity of Iraq and the survival of its present
government."

400

Albeit, this would come at a cost, as it would openly confirm US

support for Baathist Iraq, a reality not lost on US decision makers. Militarily, though the
economic warfare against Iran was to continue, it was to be broadened to disrupt the
foreign military hardware that Iran was managing to still obtain, regardless of the
sanctions placed on its economy.
As Figure 4.5 shows, Iran’s post-revolutionary ability to secure outside military
technology all but collapsed. With the exception of a few countries, Iran’s access to
foreign sources of military hardware, technology, and maintenance was solely dependent
upon the West, chiefly the US. But with the erosion of Iran-US relations in the wake of
the Revolution, the hostage crisis, only to be exacerbated by the war, Iran found itself
completely cut off from traditional partners. It was thus forced to purchase lower quality
hardware with older technology or pay exorbitant fees for what it used to have access too,
400
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oftentimes relying on third parties that went through the global black market.
At the same time, the US developed a more robust export policy vis-à-vis Iraq. In
lieu of the US actually committing American forces to fight on behalf of Iraq against Iran,
it helped facilitate much wider access to military technology. However, it is important to
note that while there was a modest increase in direct, state-to-state, arms transfers from
the US to Iraq, it was the financial and diplomatic changes to US policies (i.e. sanctions
removal, access to cross-border technology, diplomatic normalcy and protection to Iraq,
etc.) that helped facilitate other countries providing and selling the Iraqis weapons for
their war effort (see Figure 4.6). Thus, the military aspect of US assistance to Iraq, in and
of itself, was very minimal. This was because of the many hurdles it took in the early
months of the war to normalize the Iraqi Baath as a US partner, but more importantly,
normalize Iraqi-US relations. Only with the normalization of Iraq in the international
system via its newfound relationship with the US, did access to weaponry increase,
climaxing in 1984’s arms transfer figures.
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Figure 4.5: Total Number of Arms Transfers to Iran 1977-1992. Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
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Figure 4.6: Total Number of Arms Transfers to Iraq: 1977-1992. Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
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In subsequent months, these recommendations would be adopted as official policy.
In November of 1983, President Ronal Reagan issued a National Security Directive to
implement these policies – firstly to consult US allied regimes of the Persian Gulf, and
then other US partners in the wider Middle East:
I have reviewed and approved the Terms of Reference to govern our
political and military consultations with our key Allies and the Gulf Arab
states. Political consultations should begin immediately followed by
military consultations with those Allies and regional states which express
a willingness to cooperate with us in planning measures necessary to
deter or defend against attacks on or interference with non-belligerent
shipping or on critical oil productions and transshipment facilities in the
Persian Gulf. In our consultations we should assign the highest priority to
access arrangements which would facilitate the rapid deployment of those
forces necessary to defend the critical oil facilities and transshipment
points against air or sapper attacks. Specific recommendations bearing on
US plans and force deployments should be submitted for approval
following the consultations. It is present United States policy to undertake
whatever measures may be necessary to keep the Strait of Hormuz open to
international shipping. Accordingly, US military forces will attempt to
deter and, if that fails, to defeat any hostile efforts to close the Strait to
international shipping. Because of the real and psychological impact of a
curtailment in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf on the international
economic system, we must assure our readiness to deal promptly with
actions aimed at disrupting that traffic. 401
What the US would use to convince its regional allies, which spearheaded the increase of
American intervention in the war, was the specter of supply disruption. This
apprehension would not only motivate regional producers to come along with US policy,
but also persuade other global players, as the memories of 1973 and 1979-80 were still
fresh in the minds of many decision-makers.
401
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As this outreach was beginning, the Reagan administration began upgrading its
relations with the Iraqi Baath towards full normalization. To do so, it would send a
seasoned Washington insider from the Nixon and Ford administration, which at the time
was more in private business as opposed to public life: Donald Rumsfeld. President
Reagan designated Rumsfeld as a Special Middle East Envoy, primarily because of his
closeness to several figures in the administration. Rumsfeld’s mandate was not just to
meet with senior Iraqi officials, but more importantly, have a meeting with Iraq’s Saddam
Hussein. This meeting would be the highest encounter of a direct envoy of President
Reagan with the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. 402 Rumsfeld’s message to the Iraqis from
Washington was meant to unambiguously frame the objectives of Iraq in the war with
that of US strategic interests:
President Reagan and the US Government are committed to a sustained
effort to help end the war which we see as strategy for the combatants and
detrimental to our interests and those of our friends in the area. The US
Government recognizes Iraq’s current disadvantage in a war of attrition
since Iran has access to the Gulf while Iraq does not and would regard
any major reversal of Iraq’s fortunes as a strategic defeat for the West.
The US Government … will continue efforts to bring Iran to accept or
acquiesce in its terms. 403
When Rumsfeld arrived in Baghdad, the first person that he had a substantive meeting
with was Iraq’s Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz. The Foreign Minister consistently referred
to the “unnatural imbalance” that was purportedly a major cause for instability in the
region, a phenomenon he described as “giving a country more weight than it deserved”.
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This was a clear reference to Iran, and the economic and military might that the Shah

had accrued for the country, mostly in the 1970s. Rumsfeld, representing the
administration, agreed with this assessment, and conveyed to Aziz that the war should
end “in a way that would not feed Iran’s ambitions”. 405 With Rumsfeld’s meeting with a
deferential Saddam Hussein, and how the Iraqi leader showed “obvious pleasure” with
the US approach to Iraq, relations between both countries officially became normalized
only a short time afterwards, including the exchanging of ambassadors. 406 And within
days of Rumsfeld’s consequential visit, the American policy of financial assistance to
Baghdad, with the diplomatic factors that would entail, was now to begin in full effect. 407
The US broadens its Iraq initiative to its regional allies
With the structure of the US approach in place, Washington would now need to recruit its
regional allies in a concerted and integrated strategy to order to help Iraq in its war effort,
assist in the production and transport of its oil, and in contain Iran. Upon leaving
Baghdad, Rumsfeld would stop in London to coordinate with Jordan’s monarch, visiting
London at the time, the upgrading of relations with Iraq. More significantly, the two
discussed the building of the Aqaba pipeline, which would not only render more financial
assistance to Iraq, but would diversify Persian Gulf oil so that it would become less
dependent upon the Strait of Hormuz passageway, and thus less vulnerable to the ongoing
404

United States Embassy in Italy Cable from Maxwell M. Rabb to the Department of State. 19 December
1983 "Rumsfeld's Larger Meeting with Iraqi Deputy PM [Prime Minister] and FM [Foreign Minister]
Tariz [Tariq] Aziz, December 19".

405

Ibid.

406

United States Embassy in United Kingdom Cable from Charles H. Price II to the Department of State.
21 December 1983 "Rumsfeld Mission: December 20 Meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein”.
407

Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Action
Memorandum from Richard W. Murphy to Lawrence S. Eagleburger. 22 December 1983. "EXIM [ExportImport] Bank Financing for Iraq" [Includes Letter From Lawrence S. Eagleburger to William Draper,
Dated December 24, 1983].

249

war.

408

Indeed, it was this very subject matter that created the urgency for the Iraqi

regime to upgrade relations with the US. 409
For the US, however, the pipeline was part of an overall strategy in utilizing
global oil export dynamics as a weapon against Iran. In early January of 1984, as
relations with Iraq were being upgraded to official status, the US National Security
Council (NSC) released an early memo concerning US strategy to deal with energy issues
in light of the Iran-Iraq war, which by that time was pushing four years. In the memo, the
US strategy was to identify countries “likely to have spare capacity” in order to be
“approached diplomatically – to ensure increased output if possible”.

410

The plan,

already in place by targeting Iran with a web of sanctions, intended to make its economy
suffer, dry up its oil revenue, and thus and severally limit its war making ability, was to
be expanded with the help of other countries. The countries that were to be approached
were the following: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Nigeria, Venezuela, and other
OECD countries. This move was simply a natural extension of the policy advocated for
by Lawrence Eagleburger, which on the surface was meant to upgrade Iraqi capacity, but
ultimately meant the overt US intervention in OPEC. With the US now openly attempting
to change the export policies of OPEC Member States, the internal functionality of
Organization would invariably change dramatically.
The most willing participants of the US approach were those that were already
sympathetic or supporting Iraq’s war effort against Iran: the Persian Gulf Arab
408
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Monarchies. Being an outlying Member, Nigeria would ultimately stay neutral and not
become a significant factor in this proposed export policy. And Venezuela had long
looked askance on non-Member States, particularly those from highly industrialized
economies, interfering in the affairs of OPEC. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE, in
signing onto this strategy merely broadened what they had already been doing in
supporting the Iraqi Baath with direct financial assistance.
But as this policy was coming into effect, the nature of the Iran-Iraq war was now
dramatically changing. The localized attacks on oil tankers by both countries had now
turned into a full-blown strategy that each country was using. This meant that the threat
to the wider region was no longer an Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz, in possible
retaliation to an Iraqi action. It meant that the war was now regionalized to the point that
the oil production capacities of all producers, specifically those in the Persian Gulf, were
threatened. In March of 1984, the US Interagency Intelligence Assessment confirmed
this:
We believe that the warning about possible escalation of the Gulf war
contained in SNIE 34/35-2-83 dated October 1983 remain valid. The SNIE
predicted a series of intermediate escalatory steps by Iraq in to increase
military pressure on Iran, possibly culminating in Iraqi attacks on Iran’s
Khark Island oil terminal or associated tanker traffic an Iranian
retaliation against oil exports form Arab Gulf states. We believe Iraq
already has passed through many of the intermediate warning steps
outlined in the SNIE. The risk of a serous Iraqi effort against tankers or
Khark Island will increase if, as expected, Iran launches its next major
offensive, probably within a month. A serious Iraqi effort against Khark is
particularly likely if the battle goes badly for Baghdad. On paper Iraq has
the capability to shut down Khark Island though direct military attack or
attack on tankers calling at Khark. Iraqi willingness to risk heavy losses in
such efforts in the question….At a minimum, we believe that Iranians will
employ psychological warfare though the use of Iranian inspired and
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supported Shia terrorism directed at Iraq’s Gulf supporters as well as US
personnel and facilities in the region and beyond. 411
The Assessment went onto deduce that with the current trend the war was on, two “risk
options” would be most likely as it related to Iranian retaliation: a “lower risk” and “more
serious steps”.

412

On the former, the US concluded that the Iranians would utilize

harassment tactics against vessels, over flights of the offshore facilities of the Arab
Monarchies, and possibly attacking Iraqi pipeline exports. However, the higher risk
scenario is what concerned the US and its Western partners. This would involve direct
attacks by the Iranian armed forces on the neighboring Arab monarchies of the Persian,
the main financiers of Iraq’s war efforts against Iran, and the primary players in what
would turn out to be an oil war against Tehran’s oil export revenues. Furthermore, an
escalation would logically conclude in the Persian Gulf becoming a no-go zone, due to
reasons ranging from mining by the Iranian military to direct naval action.
The culmination of these concerns led to the establishment of a US doctrine
towards the Persian Gulf and the wider region for the remainder of the Iran-Iraq war. This
was introduced in a white paper that the US State Department put together for the White
House, entitled “Iran-Iraq War: Elements of U.S. Diplomatic Strategy and Plans”. In the
paper, the authors sketched out 9 principle goals that would ultimately become US policy
towards the conflict and the region:
1. Maintain active U.S. support for a negotiated settlement that will preserve
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Iraq and Iran.
2. Take steps to help Iraq avoid defeat by preserving a strategic balance,
while maintaining U.S. neutrality.
411
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3. Strengthen relations with Iraq, urge it to avoid escalation in the Gulf, stop
using chemical weapons.
4. Work through third parties to urge restrain by Iran and a negotiated
settlement.
5. Urge third countries to cease arms sales to Iran as a means of confronting
Iranian intransigence.
6. Emphasize U.S. intention to defend freedom of navigation in Strait of
Hormuz and international waters of the Gulf.
7. Obtain agreement from our allies for joint military operations in a Gulf
crisis.
8. Strengthen ties with friendly Gulf States and seek combined military
planning and US/Allied deterrent deployments/exercises.
9. Counter Iranian terrorism against U.S. and Gulf states. 413
This ultimately led the NSC to update their prior strategy and introduce, at the end of
May 1984, a memo entitled “Iran-Iraq War National Plan of Action”. The NSC memo
played out differing scenarios of supply disruption, but ultimately concluded that any
policy that would blunt the overwhelming negative effects of the stoppage of Persian
Gulf oil flow would need to be a multinational effort:
Bilateral and multi-lateral discussions with selected IEA/OECD partners
concerning coordinated stock policies, including special emphasis on:
need to increase strategic stocks; need to engage in such coordinated
drawdown as appears appropriate in light of circumstances at time of
emergency; need to avert overreaction to emergency by governments; and
need to coordinate public statements of governments to calm unnecessary
panic behavior of marketplace. 414
The convergence of these varying policy papers would ultimately lead to the US taking
on an active military posture to not only defend the free flow of oil, but more importantly,
being an active force against Iran in the wider war. As Iran and Iraq, by mid-1980s,
413
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were now in full-blown tanker war, it was only a matter of time where the US and Iran
would come to direct conflict. 415
Interstate Relations
By the mid-1980s, OPEC’s functionality had greatly eroded. The convergence of the
downward trend in oil prices, the start of the Iran-Iraq war, the inability of the
Organization to implement a ceasefire between two of its founding Members had all but
paralyzed OPEC. Moreover, OPEC’s move towards price defense – the tendency of
Member States to reduce output to tighten supply, in hopes of halting price erosion and
increasing prices – only made matters worse for the Organization. Yet, with time, these
two dangerous trends – the split within the Organization caused by the Iran-Iraq war and
OPEC’s fundamental inability to react to changing market conditions – would lead to the
virtual disintegration of the Group as the 1980s ended.
The collapse of OPEC functionality
OPEC’s adherence to the exhaustibility theory and its insistence on price defense, as
prices were significantly decreasing (See Figure 4.3), was one of the main reasons that in
1981-2, Member States began a series of production cap measures to halt price erosion.
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The Organization believed that placing a production ceiling on individual Members

would halt supply into the market, and thus halt the downward trajectory in price. It was
thought that with time, a sufficient tightening of the market would eventually raise prices.
This thinking was part of the legacy of the late 1960s, which consistently was reinforced
in the 1970s.
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Yet, the advanced economies’ efforts at conservation, while new supplies outside
of the OPEC area came into the market only further eroded the Organization’s market
share. By 1985, roughly the mid-way point of the Iran-Iraq War, OPEC global production
share had fallen to its lowest of 29.44% (See Figure 4.4). And though it would rise again,
primarily because of the twin economic and political decisions made by OPEC’s now
newly dubbed swing producer, Saudi Arabia, the culmination of what had transpired
within the global oil market by the mid-1980s was the loss of market share, and more
consequentially, the loss of price control by the Organization. For its part, OPEC’s
diagnosis of the price erosion was completely accurate. On its 25th anniversary press
release, the Organization put out one of its most far-reaching and systemic explanations
of how OPEC viewed itself in the global economy. In tracing back its history up to the
end of 1985, OPEC’s perception of the then political economy of the day was very telling
in how it would approach this period of falling prices:

the rapidity with which these structural changes in the world energy order
took place, as a result not only of market forces but also of the deliberate
policy actions of the governments of the consuming countries, created the
present over-supply and market weakness. The sharp decline in world
demand for oil through policies of accelerated conservation and fuel
substitution by consumers, coupled with the dramatic increase in nonOPEC supplies, led to a sharp and rapid decline in OPEC's share of the
world's total oil supplies and to the present situation of increasing
downward pressures on the oil price structure. Oil producers from outside
OPEC have been systematically undercutting OPEC's prices in order to
maximize their sales at the expense of OPEC Countries, but, here again, it
was OPEC's action of reducing production to defend the oil price
structure that had been behind the relative market stability of oil. Without
OPEC, the pressure on the market would by now have taken its toll. The
price structure would have collapsed and real chaos would have prevailed
in the oil market. OPEC has been able to successfully hold the price
structure from which other producers are benefiting, but at great sacrifice
to its Members and at enormous risks to their development projects.
255

Clearly, however, OPEC alone cannot and should not be expected to
perpetually provide the insurance policy on the stability of oil prices,
while non-OPEC countries sit back and enjoy the benefits of this
insurance without paying their share oil the premium. A collapse of the oil
price structure would be detrimental to all producers of oil, especially
those outside OPEC, whose cost of production is much higher than that of
OPEC Countries. Such a collapse would also be detrimental to the
consuming countries, insofar as the development of alternative forms of
energy is concerned. It could also adversely affect the economies of the
industrialized countries and their trade, banking and financial systems.
Those who adopt an uncooperative attitude to OPEC in favor of shortterm price cutting will discover, perhaps too late, that the economics of
the short term are also the economics of the short-sighted. Since OPEC
has proved to be a moderating influence on the international economic
scene, it is highly regrettable that some oil-consuming and producing
countries outside OPEC have stood doggedly in opposition, refusing to
learn from the lessons of history. The loud voices against dialogue with
OPEC in some major industrialized countries appear to be relying too
heavily on the present soft market conditions, which cannot continue
indefinitely. Non-OPEC countries, in maximizing production at the
expense of OPEC, are depleting their limited oil reserves so fast that they
will soon have to invest huge and exorbitant capital in order to prevent a
drastic fall in their production. Conversely, OPEC, which accounts for
two-thirds of the
world's oil reserves, is prolonging the life-span of those oil reserves which
will eventually bring it back to the fore as the future main supplier of oil in
the world. The reality of today's interdependent world must be appreciated
and its resources mobilized and utilized for the common good and for a
meaningful overall world economic development. We are convinced that
what is needed today, after OPEC's quarter-century of useful service to
mankind, is the full co-operation of all those involved in the energy
industry - OPEC, non-OPEC and consumers alike, in order to maintain
the essential oil price stability that would prevent an undue, sharp and
disruptive fluctuation in the future world energy situation. It is only to be
hoped that, as OPEC celebrates its 25th birthday, it can look forward with
confidence to a future of dialogue and co-operation with all partners of
the oil and energy trade. 417
The tone of OPEC’s official language had markedly changed from the confidence of the
1970s. But its reasoning had become quite contradictory. The Organization clearly
understood who the economic and political forces that have eroded the price structure of
417
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crude oil were – and how this process took place. But its premise and prescriptions were
not only inaccurate, but would continue to worsen its control over market share and thus
control over price, at least for the short term. Of the several misconceptions that the
Group had concerning the price erosion, the most harmful to the Organization’s interests
was the continual and unquestioned acceptance of the exhaustibility theory.
It was the continuance of this belief that would lead the Organization to adopt
production quotas for each Individual Member State, in order to collectively reduces
OPEC exports. However, the mere adoption of this quota system, was not the main
reason for OPEC’s inability to affect market conditions. Theoretically, according to
classic cartel dynamics, OPEC certainly the requisite power and capacity to tighten
global oil supply. Yet, as Raino Malnes, has noted, would require disciplined collection
action, which is the main characteristic of a cartel system.

418

But this type of

coordination amongst the differing Member States never in earnest existed within the
Group. Collective action was always tactical – whether it was during the early years of
negotiations with the Companies, nationalizations precedents, or agreements with OPEC
Member Stats National Oil Companies entered into with the International Oil Companies.
Collective action, which was synchronized was often agreed, but seldom actually
followed.
More so, the political conditions within the Organization – chiefly because the
Iran-Iraq war and its indirect consequences – made unanimity of purpose and collective
action all but impossible. For the quota system to work, Iran and Iraq, and the Persian
Gulf Arab monarchies would have needed to have amicable political ties. The raging
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conflict between Iran and Iraq, the polarization that the war created within the
Organization, OPEC’s inability to halt price erosion, and its subsequent loss over price
control gradually created an altered image of the Organization. What was once a feared
Organization by the advanced economies, yet simultaneously respected by many varying
developing countries, was now seen as a deteriorating relic of the 1970s. It was at this
time where first scholarly, and then mainstream commentary would notice this change.
Mohammed E. Ahrari’s OPEC: The Failing Giant was one of the most influential to this
shifting narrative of the Organization. Though Ahrari’s diagnosis of the maladies that
plagued OPEC was strictly in economic terms – too much greed at the end of the 1970s –
his work created the template to change the image of the Organization, from a once
successful initiative from the developing world to a collapsing institution whose time was
coming to an end. 419 With Ahrari’s template of a failing institution now constructed,
though derived in academia, it would, with time, go mainstream – even affecting the
perception of many influential OPEC officials.
De-facto Disintegration

By 1986, it was clear that the quota system then in place had not only failed to
bring about a reversal to OPEC’s fortunes, but also to halt the steady price erosion that so
dramatically was affecting the revenues of each OPEC Member State. The belief in the
efficacy of the quota system, rooted in the principle of exhaustibility, drove the
Organization’s main producers to ‘punish the market’. But when this policy failed to do
so, for major producers, like Saudi Arabia, the years that they had dedicated to price
419
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defense, by helping to institute the quota system, were wasted years due to its inefficacy
and how it had indirectly lead to the loss of market share. As OPEC held back its exports
from the market, in order to create new price dynamics, others just filled in the gap. For
the Saudis, the only way to counter their decline of influence in the market was to turn
market dynamics on its head.
In 1986, Saudi Arabia, one of the chief architects of the quota system, effectively
abandoned it, and broke away from OPEC’s established policy by overproducing. 420
They did this in consultation with some of their key Arab allies, and backed by the
previously explained American plan to contain the fallout from the Iran-Iraq war. This
overproduction greatly contributed to the collapse of crude oil prices (See Figure 4.3).
Riyadh went from producing in 1985 3.2 mbpd to expanding production to 4.8 mbpd in
1986, and by 1990, 6.4 mbpd. There was, however, an additional geopolitical reason
behind this move. Saudi Arabia’s flooding of the market was not only a keen opportunity
to punish its competitors outside the OPEC area, and those OPEC Members that were not
going along with quota stipulations, but also a way to further erode Iranian oil revenue, as
it relates to the Iran-Iraq war. Indeed, the Saudis’ decision to abandon their quota to
protect Saudi market share, coincided with the major economic problems that
Revolutionary Iran was experiencing in their sixth year of war with Iraq. It’s important to
remember where this rationale had come from, as that the Saudis had previously utilized
a similar method against the Shah, which contributed to the Revolution. 421
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By 1988, the economies of both Iran and Iraq were devastated. Iran, being the
sanctioned country, found it both increasingly difficult to acquire weapons (that it could
not indigenously make) from foreign sources, and more importantly, the revenue to
purchase those weapons. The price collapse in 1986, with the additional Saudi output into
the market, created unprecedented pressures for the Islamic Republic; so much so that the
continuance of the war effort was no longer seen as valuable nor viable. Those in Iran
advocating for the acceptance of the UN ceasefire agreement argued that Iran’s primary
objective had been met: the expulsion of Iraqi forces out of Iranian territory and the
return to the status quo ante, which Iran (both under the Shah and the Islamic Republic)
was content with. Those advocating for the continuance of the war argued that Iran’s
objectives were not going to be met until the fall of the Iraqi Baath. Eventually, the
former won the argument. For Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iran’s acceptance of the
ceasefire was tantamount to an Iraqi victory, although none of Iraq’s initial objectives
were met, both territorially and politically. In the end however, the Iran-Iraq war only
produced two losers. Not only was the war catastrophic for both countries’ civilian
infrastructure, 422 the impact to their oil production capacities, and dramatic decline in
their tangible exports severally downgraded the clout of both Iran and Iraq in OPEC. This
would be significant throughout the 1990s, as Saudi leadership would dominate a
weakened institution.
As the decade closed, OPEC officials were hopeful that with the end of the IranIraq war, the Organization’s future would return back to the what had transpired in the
1970s, when OPEC was a unified force in the global economy that actually benefited its
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Members. In a 1988 Press release, the damage that the market dynamics of the 1980s,
along with the hostilities between Iran-Iraq caused the Organization, was clearly felt and
now openly expressed:
Despite OPEC's many positive achievements, however, the current decade
has brought with it some very serious problems for the Organization,
making it perhaps the most difficult period in its history. These difficulties,
which center around the ways and means of stabilizing the volatile oil
market at prices that are fair to both producers, within and outside OPEC,
and consumers, are still very much present today. As so often in the past,
both depressing and heartening developments for the Organization have
been witnessed in 1988. The year began inauspiciously, with the impact of
an oil glut which had become apparent in the second half of 1987 being
carried over into the new year. Excessive supplies of oil, as well as
accelerated stock-building by consumers, combined to threaten the price
stability which OPEC had managed to restore to the market with its return
to a fixed price regime at the beginning of 1987. As a result, prices, which
had been climbing steadily towards - and on occasions even exceeding –
the Organization's reference price oU18 per barrel, began to falter and
fall back….An historic meeting between OPEC and seven non-OPEC oilproducing countries in April 1988 represented a milestone in OPEC/nonOPEC relations, and helped lay the foundation for future dialogue and cooperation between a large number of oil producers, in an atmosphere of
mutual trust. All the countries present at this gathering agreed on the
importance of the meeting, and that a stable oil market was the
responsibility of all parties engaged in the industry, with the burden consequently - to be shared by all. It was also agreed that such an initial
meeting should be followed by continued contact to review the agreements
that were arrived at and to plan future avenues of cooperation….Undoubtedly, one of the most important developments of the
year, not only for OPEC but also for the world as a whole, was the
cessation of hostilities in the Gulf. 423
OPEC’s Secretary General Subroto, on the eve of the 1990s, echoed this sentiment. By
describing the 1980s as the decade “characterized by confrontation”, the Secretary
expressed that the Organization looked “forward optimistically” to the 1990s as a
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“decade of cooperation”. 424 The hope for the Organization was that though Iran and Iraq,
and the latter’s supporters within the Organization, had deep mistrust and antagonism
towards each other, the incentives towards cooperation, at least for the time being, would
subsume the animosity generated in the 1980s. Indeed, it was sheer economic
enticements that brought together these disparate countries in the first place. And it was
thought that the same desire for economic gain, specifically in light of the decade of
economic loss that the Organization had gone through, would motivate Members to once
again collaborate.
As OPEC entered the 1990s, the most pressing issue for interstate relations was to
repair and overhaul the broken quota system. So ineffective was this system that the
Organization publicly declared it a failure, but more importantly, made it a benchmark in
how OPEC would move forward. As each Member was formulating their own policy
based on parochial national interest and an ad-hoc, tactical reading of short-term market
trends, unity of purpose within the Group and organizational consensus had long broken
down. So much so, that OPEC’s institutional leadership, in a press release, openly stated
that “only strict adherence to quotas, actually verified by the market, will demonstrate
each country's willingness to restore the price basket”.
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Thus, for the leadership,

getting Members to both agree, and more importantly, implement a new quota system
was the key priority for OPEC in the next decade.
But beneath this objective laid the unintended consequences of the Iran-Iraq war,
of which the Organization was largely ignorant about. For Iraq, the deep fiscal constraints
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caused by the damage to large swaths of its oil infrastructure, the debts accrued because
of the war, and with little non-hydrocarbon industries to generate revenue, eventually
caused desperation within the Baathist regime. The Saudi overproduction indirectly hurt
Baghdad (a key Saudi ally during the 1980s), just as much as it was directed to inflict
punishment on Tehran. Subsequently, the years that the Persian Gulf Arab monarchies
had lent Baghdad financial loans were now coming due. And with crude oil prices in the
doldrums, Iraq’s capacity to pay back the war debt was increasingly limited. For Baghdad,
the argument they made to their debtors, particularly the Persian Gulf Arabs, was that
Iraq had been the front line against Revolutionary Political Islam, which was rooted in
Iran, and which threatened the political viabilities of the varying governmental systems in
the Persian Gulf and beyond. 426 Saddam’s argument was that Iraq’s war against Iran was
on behalf of all Arabs. For its part, whether they bought this argument or not, the Saudis
wrote off virtually all of the war debt that Iraq had accrued. Kuwait, however, was not so
generous.
As OPEC was attempting to institute a new quota system, the old grievances that
Iraq and Kuwait had towards each other gradually resurfaced. These were as old as Iraq’s
claim to the entirety of Kuwait, territorial disputes about oil fields in the Persian Gulf and
on bordering areas, how shared oil fields would be exploited, and what had triggered the
renewal of these grievances, the massive debt that Iraq owed to Kuwait. Though
diplomatic means were tried, particularly by the Kuwaitis, in order to stave off conflict,
ultimately, war became unavoidable.
Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait came at a complete surprise to OPEC,
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much of the international community, the superpowers, and many of the regional players
in the Middle East. Since the invasion, several attempts have undertaken to explain the
rationality of why the war happened. 427 Greed, miscalculations, and fear on the part of
the Iraqi Baathist leadership and provocation and an inability to be flexible with Iraq’s
war debt by the Kuwaitis have all been offered as contributing factors. Yet, it was the
peculiar mix of miscalculations on the part of the Iraqi Baath that eventually made war
unstoppable. These miscalculations centered on Iraq’s past behavior with attacking a
neighboring country and also its perception of the reaction of the superpowers and the
larger international community. When Iraq invaded Iran, not only did the Baathist regime
get little to no international condemnation, but indirectly, it was rewarded with financial
and military assistance, and diplomatic normalization with the West – all the while it
expanded its relations with the USSR. Thus, when Saddam interpreted the comments of
US ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, as somehow Washington being indifferent to his
invasion of Kuwait, 428 his misreading was arguably rooted in past experience.
By the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam’s relationship with the US was heading
into troubled waters, by reasons of renewed mistrust and misperception. The Iran Contra
Affair, in which the Reagan administration used illegal arms transfers to Iran to pay for
paramilitary operations in Central America,
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changed the image of the Reagan

administration to the Iraqis. This mistrust even elicited a strong reaction from senior US
officials, most importantly President Reagan’s letter of reassurance to Saddam Hussein.
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In his 1986 letter, President Reagan sought to restore confidence in Hussein that US
policy was still to “restrain shipment of arms to Iran”.

430

However, the Iraqi Baath

figured that it could always balance its relations with the US by once again leaning
heavily on the USSR.
Yet these miscalculations were catastrophic for the Iraqi leadership. Though Iran
was viewed by the West, on the eve of the Iraqi invasion of Iran, as a globalized threat,
and hence easily securitized, Kuwait had no such threat factor associated to it. More
importantly, the Iraqi traditional reliance on the USSR, by 1990, was an obsolete
geopolitical paradigm, as the Soviet Union, unbeknownst to many, was in the process of
imploding. And thus, reliance on a failing superpower to keep it from international
condemnation, just as relations with the US were to fall apart, dramatically put the Iraqi
regime in an place of international isolation that they had not experienced before.
The invasion of Kuwait, the destruction of Kuwait’s oil infrastructure by the
Iraqis, and the subsequent destruction of key sectors of Iraq’s civilian oil infrastructure by
the US-led coalition intended to expel Iraq out of Kuwait, crystallized the perception of
OPEC as a failing, third world relic. Markets, governments, and other international actors
now questioned OPEC’s self-professed claim to being a stabilizing force in the global
economy – a mantra that the Organization had adopted years prior and long aspired to. If
the Organization could not stop its founding Members from going to war with each other,
how could it possibly diagnosis and prescribe macroeconomic energy solutions.
With Operation Desert Storm, the Iraqi-American relationship officially ended.
The US, no longer constrained by a powerful Soviet Union, which was at that time
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slowly disintegrating, took this opportunity to force its own preferences upon the
Organization. The initiation of this process was the implementation of the dual
containment policy on two of OPEC’s founding Members: Iran and Iraq. 431 What this
meant was that for the first time since the creation of the Organization, OPEC’s collective
output policy would now be openly dictated by non-Members. And though granted, the
US was in the unipolar moment of its geopolitical power, the behavior exhibited by
Washington towards the Organization had traditionally been measured, indirect, and
always behind the scenes. US intervention openly targeting the oil production capacities
of Iran and Iraq was new. And the resulting internal power dynamics within the
Organization as result of this targeting of Iran and Iraq’s exports created a new set of
circumstances within the Organization, giving greater influence within OPEC to Saudi
Arabia and its likeminded allies.
Furthermore, the beginnings of the draconian sanctions regime on Iraq would
commence within months after the US-led expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait. The economic
warfare that Iraq would undergo after Desert Storm would take the country back –
economically, socially, environmentally, and politically – at least a generation if not more.
And as this new process would unfold, OPEC as collective unit no longer had the ability
to respond or formulate policy in any effective way. And with the beginning of 1993,
OPEC once again underwent a significant price collapse, of which in its current
weakened state, was completely helpless to avoid or properly respond to. And so OPEC’s
civil wars, and the failure of the Organization to prevent the fracturing of unity had
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mortgaged its future, for the first time, to the outside powers that so long had tried to
control the direction of Organization.
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CHAPTER V • THE REBALANCING PHASE, THE GRADUAL
RECENTRALIZATION OF OPEC, 1993-2008
At the end of the Iran-Iraq war, OPEC’s leadership desperately hoped for reconciliation
among its Member States. But as the Organization’s hopes were dashed by the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing Desert Storm war to extricate the Baathists out of
Kuwait, OPEC, for the first time since its creation, lost control over its functionality and
future. Subsequently, the Organization entered a phase of its history where its very
existence became increasingly in doubt, both by its critics and its supporters – even its
former officials. 432
This era of OPEC’s institutional life, more than previous eras, was significantly
impacted by the evolution of US power and its dominance in the international system.
Regarding Market Forces, while many OPEC officials had hoped that the price erosion of
the 1980s would end with the beginning of the 1990s, the continued efficacy of advanced
economies post-1973 energy strategy (i.e. more efficient transportation, new sources of
oil supplies, and alternative sources energy.) continued to suppress and even further erode
the overall price of oil. This was compounded by the implosion of the USSR and its
disintegration into 15 republics, which would, in time, open up new energy-rich states,
such as Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan to Western investment.
Though OPEC would gradually regain a significant portion of its market share
that it lost in the 1980s, the aforementioned trends and the inability to collectively act on
tactical and strategic matters would keep price control out of the Organization’s grasp.
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This, by default, created a new free-market oriented pricing system, unlike the prior
systems that either the major oil companies, via cartel behavior, or OPEC, dominated.
In the Rebalancing era, the role of the United States vis-à-vis how OPEC behaved
in the international system would be the most consequential since the creation of the
Organization. Ever since OPEC’s inception, American policy and behavior towards the
Organization had always been reactive. Even at the end of the 1970s, when US and allied
nations successfully began the implementation of their alternative energy and
diversifications strategies, their motivation was one of defensiveness. Yet in this
Rebalancing era, specifically for the rest of the 1990s, the US would go on the offensive,
seeking to reshape the entire dynamics of oil towards its favor while directly weakening
any centralization of oil export planning. But the ability of the US to consequentially
weaken the Organization had its limits. At the turn of the century, macro consumption
changes would ultimately diminish the ability of OPEC’s critics to keep prices low and
prevent a new era of cooperation among Members – even though this cooperation was
limited, measured, and tactical.
Coincidentally, the US action within the Middle East, coupled with the major
changes in Venezuelan politics at the end of the 1990s, would set the stage for the
internal dynamics of OPEC’s Member States to have profound effects on OPEC’s
resurgence in the first decade of the 2000s. Indeed, the internal changes of leadership in
Caracas and Baghdad – the former by democratic populism while the latter was imposed
via invasion – would become the most profound for the Organization in this period. The
long drawn-out conflict between the US and Baathist Iraq, born out of the Desert Storm
conflict and resulting in the crushing sanctions regime placed on Iraq (with the overt help
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of US allied OPEC Members of the Persian Gulf), would finally come to a head in the
immediate post 9/11 geostrategic environment. With the invasion of Iraq and the toppling
of the Baathist system, the ramification of Saddam’s fall would affect every Middle
Eastern state, of which the most consequential would be the Persian Gulf Arab
Monarchies and Iran. More so, the ability of the Islamic Republic of Iran to rebuild from
the Iran-Iraq war and normalize its diplomatic relations during this period, with the
significant exception of its relations with the US, made it suited to take advantage, albeit
on a limited basis, of much of the macro changes in internal OPEC dynamics, the wider
Middle East, and the global oil industry. And this trend was also extended in its ability to
project unconventional power in US occupied Iraq, which helped it to foster, for the first
time, a friendly government in Baghdad that would eventually coordinate security and
economic policy, indirectly affecting oil related matters.
The changes at the domestic level of OPEC States would eventually affect the
interstate relations of the Organization. In the minds of the Persian Gulf monarchies, the
change of domestic political control in Baghdad, though they traditionally mistrusted the
Baathists, would fundamentally transform Iraq from a barrier against the Iranians to an
open collaborator with them. For Iran, an enemy became a potential partner. Furthermore,
the rise of Hugo Chavez under a populist-driven, socialist movement in Venezuela
significantly added a newfound relevance to the Organization in the beginning of the 21st
century. In Chavez and his Bolivarian government, the Organization’s interests would
once again compete and often times trump the narrow interests of certain Member States.
But as these internal and interstate alterations were happening, rising oil
consumption patterns in the global economy, particularly as it relates to Chinese and
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Indian energy demands, would eventually intersect with a brewing storm of mass
spending in the public and private sectors of many advanced economies. Chinese and
Indian growth, starting in the beginning of the 21st century, would gradually but
continuously, push oil prices far above what they had been in over a generation. As the
1990s ended, the US and other allies in the advanced economies witnessed the end of the
efficacy of their diversification strategies.
It was in this period where OPEC solidified the regaining of much of its lost
market share from the 1980s and 1990s. But as consumption would steadily increase,
greatly assisted by rising spending in the advanced economies, rising oil prices gradually
turned into a new threat – a replay of the 1970s. And as new worries about supply, and
the ‘peak oil’ narrative developed, prices would start to affect economic growth. This was
highlighted by the direct and indirect affects that rising oil prices had in the summer of
2008, only weeks before the triggering of the financial crisis of 2008-present. With the
beginning of this crisis, the Rebalancing phase of OPEC’s institutional life would end,
bringing the Organization to the present fragile and varying conditions of the global
economy.
Market Forces
As the 1990s began, the geopolitical and geo-economic trajectory of international
relations was almost impossible to forecast. While the 1990-1991 Gulf War had created
short-term consensus among rivaling countries in the Middle East region and beyond,
primarily because of the audacious nature of Iraq’s plan to annex Kuwait, the future of
international cooperation still was a mystery. US decision makers understood that while
the 1980s had been a devastating decade for OPEC, it was also trying time for the USSR.
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Being a major oil exporter, the Soviet Union had dramatically suffered because of
plummeting prices, some of which was actually expected by Western Sovietologists. 433
Moreover, by the mid-1980s, Soviet inspired and aligned Communist political systems
were dramatically lagging behind their free-market counterparts in such critical issues as
domestic governance efficacy, economic growth, and political stability.
But the Soviet Union’s invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, to support and
uphold a friendly Communist regime, 434 had drained the country of vital resources at a
time where its oil revenues had dwindled. For the Soviets, Afghanistan was akin to the
US experience in Vietnam several years prior. Yet, with the pullback from Afghanistan in
the Gorbachov era, the war effort, compounded by the mass decrease in oil revenue and
the structural problems in the Soviet economy, had created terminal issues for the Soviet
leadership.
The US understood that there were deep changes in the Soviet leadership and that
structural problems in Soviet governance were finally coming to the surface. This was
evident throughout the end of the 1980s as the USSR experienced serious governance
problems as smaller provinces on the periphery would agitate for independence, 435 and in
the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan, engage in open warfare with each other.
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However, the extent of the problems to the outside world, even though the Soviets were
attempting at controlled political liberalization and economic reforms, was not known.
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Thus, the actual, physical disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end to its viability in
the international system was not expected. And when it did end, under the leadership of
President George H.W. Bush, the disintegration process was neither celebrated nor
actively encouraged, but as Christopher Maynard has shown, was handled with deep
caution and prudence, primarily because of the fear surrounding the Soviet nuclear
arsenal. 437
While the Soviet implosion would have consequential impact on the international
system, primarily how the end of the Cold War would affect international cooperation
and security, because it was not widely expected, there was little planning for its
ramifications it in the wider global economy. Moreover, the fallout on global oil industry
itself was not well understood. In the early months of the 1990s, just before the Soviet
demise, OPEC officials were already planning their strategy to bounce back from the
disastrous 1980s. In a speech given in Tripoli in February of 1991, OPEC’s influential
Secretary General Subroto, predicted a somewhat return to normalcy for the
Organization:
In 1988, growth in world oil demand averaged 3.3 per cent. In 1989, it fell
to 2.2 per cent, and in 1990 it slowed further to around 1.1 per cent. This
year, as a result of the combined weight of a number of factors, some of
which have been gathering strength recently…it is likely to fall yet again.
However, we in OPEC believe that in the longer term, the downward trend
will be reversed. According to our OPEC energy in-house model and to
other predictions, average 1990 world oil demand - excluding the former
CPEs - stands at around 51.76 million barrels a day. By 1995, it will be
around 54.83 million barrels a day, and in the year 2000, about 57.67
million barrels a day. On the supply side, OPEC calculates that nonOPEC oil supplies, which averaged 27.34 million barrels a day in 1990,
will decline to 27.07 million barrels a day in 1995, and to 26.19 million
barrels a day in the year 2000. This would put the call on OPEC oil,
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including natural gas liquids, at 24.42 million barrels a day at the end of
1990, at 27.76 million barrels a day in 1995, and at 31.48 million barrels
a day in the year 2000. This would mean that by the end of the century,
OPEC would be supplying more than half the total world demand for oil.
438

Subroto’s message, on an elemental level, was not just to provide his audience with a
panoramic view of the global supply and demand dynamics, but to squarely address the
deep concerns with OPEC’s collapsing market share. Of the many losses and setbacks
that the Organization experienced in the decade of the 1980s, it was the erosion of its
influence in the global oil industry that was the most worrying to OPEC Member States.
And this loss of influence was directly related to OPEC supply diminishing in the global
oil market, to be replaced by new sources of supply and better upstream technologies. But
as Figure 5.1 shows, by the beginning of the 1990s, the Organization, primarily fueled by
the Saudi decision to break away from the quota system, had already regained much of its
market share.
By the early 1990s, the influx of non-OPEC oil in the global supply, as Figure 5.3
shows, was simply not enough to keep OPEC from recapturing substantial lost market
share. And though alternatives sources of energy were making strides for the advanced
economies’ diversification efforts, their impact was far more limited than was hoped for.
Thus, Secretary General Subroto’s optimism was not totally unwarranted. However, with
the Soviet implosion, disintegration, and the emergence of the newly independent Central
Asian countries, the global oil dynamics – chiefly as it relates to fears of supply
disruption – radically changed. With no Soviet threat that would menace Middle East
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supplies, the ‘fear premium’ on global supply would significantly decrease. As pricing of
crude oil was, by the 1990s, a far more free-market enterprise, lacking a cartel like
control by the oil companies or the incremental price hikes that OPEC was able to
implement (again because of its market share domination), investors and speculators were
able to apply a more predictable model for future supply. And, as Figure 5.4 shows, for
the rest of the 1990s, global consumption increased only incrementally. Hence with
predictable, but growing supply, and predictable but measured demand, without the fear
premium that the Soviet presence and the Cold War imposed on the global economy, as
Figure 5.2 details, crude oil prices continued to stagnate. Indeed, crude oil prices in 1993
relapsed to 1986 figures.
Prolonged ineffectiveness: OPEC in the dark ages, 1993-2000
As OPEC witnessed the slow regaining of its market share, the next phase of its recovery
plan, and the most important for the short-term economic wellbeing of its Member States
was the issue of price. Previously, the supply conditions in the market would
accommodate the Organization introducing measured price increases for their oil. But
because the Fragmentation phase had lasted so long, and complimented by the rise of
alternatives supplies and sources of energy, the notion of centralized price control eroded.
The hope was that a recentralization of the Organization would allow it to
exercise the innate influential capacity that it had with such large market share. But when
that did not happen, gradually Member States began to realize that even with the
regaining of large parts of their market share that had been previously lost, the dynamics
surrounding price control had radically changed. In essence, OPEC’s situation had turned
back to the 1960s, but this time, with no identifiable set of actors to blame.
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Figure 5.1: OPEC Crude Oil Production by country, as Member States joined the Organization. 1992-2010 (1000 b/d)
Source: OPEC Statistical Data. http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm
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Figure 5.3: OPEC Crude Oil Production by country, as Member States joined the Organization. 1990-2010 (1000 b/d)
Source: OPEC Statistical Data. http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm
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Figure 5.4: Global Oil Consumption by Regions: 1990-2010 (Thousand barrels daily)
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2013

90000

80000

70000

60000

50000

40000

18314 19161
13919 14543 15457 16213 17179
1989
3604

1991
3747

2038
3862

2069
3972

2132
4268

2206
4375

2246
4479

20176 19788

22086
20606 21263 21405

2325

2384

2467

2476

2520

4601

4780

4928

5100

5248

22880

2568

2646

5452

5686

19589 19363 19717 19563 19842
19624 19720
23140 22757 22135 20591 19911 19708 19417

27766 28754 29781
25124 25989 25881 26205
24124 24535

2767

2911

2920

3068

3218

6026

6335

6449

6696

7185

19998 20142 20311 20062 20017

30000

20000

10000

3714

3746

3922

4005

4235

4391

4496

4742

4923

5023

4942

5001

5004

4860

5059

5185

5332

5651

5892

3302

3463

3359

3523

7526

7861

7992

8354

19149 19057 18974 18543

5921

6222

6405

6533

25119 25002 25109 23860 22959 23464 23397 23040
22788 23467 23702 23681 23797 24170 25023
20316 20033 20405 20621 21266 21263 21919 22360

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

Total North America

1995

1996

1997

1998

Total S. & Cent. America

1999

2000

2001

2002

Total Europe & Eurasia

278

2003

2004

2005

Total Middle East

2006

2007

Total Africa

2008

2009

2010

Total Asia Pacific

2011

2012

In February 1994, in a speech to the Society of Petroleum Engineers in Vienna,
OPEC’s Secretary General Subroto squarely addressed the harsh reality of crude oil
prices and the inability of the Organization to fundamentally change or address this
problem:
…we cannot ignore the fact that oil prices are so low. In fact they have
recently been at their lowest for two decades, adjusted for inflation and
exchange rates. This is partly the result of recessionary economics
prevalent around the world and partly the result of over-supply due to the
increasing production coming from non-OPEC sources. OPEC Members
have been exercising self-restraint and have maintained their current level
of production for more than six months, but we have also been faced with
pessimists in the market who take the view that our constant level of
supplies represents a failure to make substantial reductions. I would
simply state that OPEC Members are not the only producers and before
worldwide oil production can be reduced in the short-term it must stop
expanding. The implications of low prices for the oil industry are clear:
many fields are becoming marginal, profit margins are being squeezed at
all levels and oil companies are renegotiating their terms and conditions,
reconsidering development activities and, in many cases, downsizing their
operations…These pressures are unlikely to diminish in future, even
though prices must eventually rise once more. Once strict controls have
been imposed they are not easily, if ever, eliminated. The oil industry is in
a new rational, economic phase and we must all pull our weight or be left
behind. 439
From the optimism of three years prior, Secretary Subroto and the Organization’s
leadership had now a dramatically different reading of the market conditions that OPEC
was operating under. They understood that without an active capability to affect and
influence pricing dynamics, Member States would only suffer from a decrease in revenue,
increase in budgetary deficits, and experience the political ramifications domestically.
More worrying for the Organization, was that OPEC had no real viable plan to recapture
price control or even introduce some temporary fixes. An updated quota system was still
439

———, Viewpoint 1992-1994: A Selection of Speeches

by Dr Subroto, Secretary General of Opec, ed. Eduardo Luraschi Graham Patterson, An Opec Series
(Vienna, Austria Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries., 1994), 307-09.

279

in place, which was basically a legacy of OPEC price defense policy of the 1980s – a
policy which was largely a failure.
Yet, even if OPEC had the institutional strength to coherently act collectively, had
the Organization attempted to significantly cut output, it would have faced significant
other hurdles. Firstly, just as Arab producing countries found out in the wake of their
failed oil embargo in 1967 against the supporters of Israel, when supply is increasing,
faced with steady or stagnant demand, production cuts will have negligible effects on the
market. Secondly, OPEC would surely have experienced significant backlash from many
actors within the international community, further staining its reputation, and possibly
facing a new round of blowback with the same intensity that followed after the 1970’s
price hikes. In the new post-bipolar world order, lower oil prices were part and parcel of
what many considered the ‘peace dividend’ that was purportedly one of the benefits to
the end of the Cold War. With these hurdles, OPEC’s default policy was to implement a
measured, limited output into the global supply.
However, by 1995, this policy was deemed to be failing, as it did not help with
price stagnation but also threatened the very same market share that OPEC had recently
regained. In its 99th Meeting, Venezuela’s Minister of Energy & Mines, Dr. Erwin Jose
Arrieta, who was acting President of the OPEC conference that year, laid out the
difficulties of OPEC’s impasse:
The continued efforts of OPEC intending to stabilize the oil market
through self-imposed restrictions on output, have been unduly abused.
Our agreements are permitting other oil-producing countries to steadily
erode our market share - to such an extent that even the absolute demand
for OPEC's oil is under threat. While OPEC is producing below capacity,
other producers are stretching their supply to the limit. As we all know,
this does not bode well for the general welfare of the market. There are
also dangers in the longer term. Since the beginning of this decade, we
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have repeatedly stated the need for an adequate level of investment in the
production capacity of OPEC. This is the only way to ensure sufficient
supply for the turn of the century and beyond, to meet future increases in
demand.… Unchecked increases in non-OPEC supply are depriving
OPEC countries of vital funds required for investment in new capacity.
This can only result in a future supply crisis, characterized by an
escalation in prices and widespread instability. This malaise could then
continue for a long time… It is in our best interests that the market
performs at all times in a stable, predictable manner, with equitable
returns for all its participants. A healthy oil market is essential to OPEC,
since oil revenue accounts for the bulk of our Member Countries' national
wealth. Furthermore, security of supply has a broader connotation than
just dealing with unexpected sharp crises, as and when they may arise. I
have in mind the situation that was created at the end of the 1980s, when
the dissolution of the Soviet Union brought about the withdrawal of a
substantial quantity of crude from the world's supply in a relatively short
time; net exports fell by one and a quarter million barrels a day in just two
years. Then OPEC had the capacity and the flexibility to make up the
shortfall and thus minimize the impact on oil prices. But next time, if we
are now deprived of the income needed to support it, this capacity and this
flexibility is not going to exist. 440
Simply put, Arrieta’s canvassing of OPEC’s predicament is an acknowledgment that the
Organization was not able to stop the price erosion, while also admitting that the price
collapse was weakening production capacity. And with production capacity stunted,
domestic revenue intake would also suffer, thus causing both economic and political
difficulties at home for Member States.
As the 1990s drew to a close, OPEC’s attention was mainly focused on continual
revisions to its quota system. This was particularly crucial for Iraq in light of the oil-forfood humanitarian plans that the United Nations had agreed with Saddam Hussein’s
sanctioned government. 441 But as OPEC’s inability to act collectively, even on tactical
related matters, was clearly visible to both its supporters and critics, it was increasingly
440
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becoming unable to justify to those very officials who had long championed the cause of
OPEC from within the Organization.
One of the most significant critiques came from Fadhil Chalabi, OPEC’s deputy
Secretary General from 1978-88 and acting Secretary General from 1983 to 1988.
Chalabi’s article, “OPEC: An Obituary” was a major turning point in how others saw the
Organization.
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Chalabi’s proclamation was no mere uninformed opinion by a media

columnist, but an assessment made from someone who was at the birth of the
Organization, instrumental in its negotiations with the international oil companies, and
most importantly, was at the height of decision-making. For him to declare OPEC ‘dead’
was no small matter. Since the late 1980s, specifically since the 1986 price collapse,
many had doubted OPEC’s efficacy, but not its survivability. But when former officials,
such as Chalabi, utilized this narrative, the continual survivability of the Organization
was now universally beginning to be questioned. The wider market conditions was
simply not conducive to the Organization’s recapturing effective influence over supply
and demand dynamics, as it had previously done in the past.
Outside Powers
The key, determining factor behind the changing market conditions was the dominance
that the US acquired and exercised within the international system in the aftermath of the
Soviet demise. It is important to remember that OPEC’s very formation was in many
respects grudgingly accepted by the US, primarily because of Cold War dynamics
leading Washington towards a policy of neutrality to oil producing countries in the
developing world. The fear of the Soviet Union exploiting the economic and security
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vulnerabilities in OPEC Member States created a major sense of caution in the US. But in
this period of American unipolarity, 443 there was no reason for the US to exhibit a sense
of caution towards producers. The Soviets had been defeated, and the Russian Federation
that took its place was a bankrupt entity incapable of running its own affairs, let alone
threatening American interests. This allowed American and Western firms to look
towards the newly independent Central Asian countries for possible future energy
investment.
For the international oil companies (IOCs) who a generation prior had lost their
concessions and effective control over pricing dynamics to OPEC, the collapse of the
USSR and the opening up of energy-endowed states on the Russian lower periphery
presented a major investment opportunity. The world of the old concession system was
long gone and could not be resurrected – at least in terms of providing the IOCs the
favorable investment conditions they once enjoyed. Yet, the years that had transpired
from the end of the concessionary systems and loss of control over pricing had
transformed the role of the major IOCs. Though at first, the end of the old system was
seen as a loss to the IOCs, they quickly adjusted to the new realities of the market, and
thus, with remarkable success, changed the very nature of their global corporate identities.
This evolution witnessed the IOCs transforming from the dominant concession holders
with total control over the entire oil industry in a particular country to being global
contractors to diverse National Oil Companies (NOCs) of hydrocarbon-endowed
countries. The main factor that allowed this transition was the significant technological
gap that existed between the IOCs, which in essence created the modern oil and natural
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gas industries, with that of the National Oil Companies, which were mostly a product of
the latter half of the 20th century. By the end of the Cold War, it was this very
relationship, which the IOCs were forced into, that made up the entire structure of the
global oil industry.
Because of the technological gap, even staunchly nationalist NOCs that were
highly suspicious of foreign firm involvement in their oil sectors, ultimately had to
consider an invitation to the IOCs in hopes of not only enhanced output from traditional
wells and future discoveries, but also for more efficient output and environmentally
sound exploration. This new dynamic gradually created a ‘neo-concessionary system’
that was based not on physical domination of the producing country or its political
apparatus, but one of enticement through enhanced production and export prospects.
Eventually, in hopes of recovering from the disastrous 1980s, OPEC Members would
either enhance their cooperation with the IOCs, such as the case with Saudi Arabia and its
Persian Gulf monarchial allies, but also nationalist price hawks such as Algeria, Iran, and
Libya.
With the confluence of the massive technological gap between NOCs and IOCs
and the new sources of supply because of the Cold War’s end, for the first time in a
generation, oil firms gained tangible leverage in the wider global oil industry.
The opening of the Post-Soviet Space: New Sources of Energy
The years immediately after the Soviet collapse, once dominant actors,
particularly Russia, and to a lesser extent China, were quite helpless in obviating newly
independent Central Asian Republics from inviting both foreign capital and polices into
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the region. 444 The Russian Federation’s attempt to jettison its former affiliations with
fundamentally weak, and unstable regimes in oil-rich Central Asia, exemplified in its
reoriented “common European home” policy, 445 laid the groundwork for the cooption of
Central Asia by the West via energy firms. Moreover, Russia’s catastrophic transition
from a command to a market economy mired the state in domestic unrest and fiscal
inertia for almost a decade,

446

essentially causing a paralysis in its geostrategic

considerations. It was during this very time that advocates of Western economic and
political intervention in the post-Soviet space were at its zenith,

447

buttressed by

prospects of both lucrative enhancement as well geopolitical gains. 448
Whether motivated by apprehension concerning their newly found independence
or a sincere desire to seize a moment when the traditional dominant actor was weak, most
Central Asian countries, particularly Georgia, the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan,
overtly courted Western capital, technology, and diplomatic relations. This was chiefly
due to their own internal inability to access the vast amount of hydrocarbons within their
respective territories and also not possessing the technology to export the hydrocarbons to
the global market. With these events, by the turn of the century, the West’s relationship
with dependent new states of Central Asia firmly granted it a foothold in Eurasia that it
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never possessed prior to the Soviet demise. 449 And as new supplies from Central Asia
and the Caucuses came online, it was this very strategic foothold that helped perpetuate
the very market conditions that OPEC and other oil producers, like Russia, were suffering
from throughout the 1990s.
The New Consumer Base: South and East Asia
But as the 1990s drew to a close, the role of outside powers, even in this age of
unipolar American domination, was not just relegated to the US. The exponential
increase in consumption patterns in the developing world, particularly due to massive
development in China and India, played a decisive impact on the gradual rise in oil prices
(see Figure 5.4).
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For all the complexities surrounding Chinese and Indian

industrialization, past and present, the concept of energy security as it relates to their
post-Cold War development was far more elemental. Distinctively for China, as internal
development endeavors, coupled with the international pressures for continuing
modernization, transformed it into an oil importer in 1993,
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Beijing, since 2000,

witnessed imports triple, with rising consumption every year.
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By 2030, the

International Energy Agency predicts Chinese consumption far exceeding that of the
European Continent, and taken together with East Asian economies and that of India’s,
consumption from the East will most likely surpass both North America and Europe
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combined by the same period.
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For India, the experience with energy security, chiefly

with the OPEC crisis of 1973 had differing ramifications as compared to Western
industrialized countries. Although at the time, Indian energy consumption was low in
comparison to industrialized counterparts, it affected key sectors of India’s economy,
forcing the country towards enhancement of energy diversification efforts with both
traditional and new partners. 454
As Figure 5.4 shows, the largest growth in consumption of oil in the post-Cold
War era has been in Asia. Therefore both of these mass populous countries, particularly
since the turn of the century, ambitiously courted energy rich countries to secure access.
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The biggest ramification of the Chinese and Indian search for energy is that it has

rendered their own NOCs as alternatives to the technologically savvy Western firms.
Although the state owned agencies of both these countries are still years behind their
Western counterparts as it relates to better efficiency in the upstream sectors, and
certainly on transportation, it is their sheer internal market demand that has enticed many
producing countries, in OPEC and beyond. This had been particularly important for
producing countries that have no access or have been denied access to Western
technology. For OPEC during this period, this would have been Libya, Baathist Iraq, Iran,
or even Algeria. As consumption gradually increased in the first decade of the 2000s,
OPEC Member States, though still unable to collectively act on strategic matters,
gradually regained some market leverage and diversification options because of China
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and India. Not only did this provide the energy producers with new opportunities of fiscal
gain, but also explicitly tied them to the internal developments of many rising developing
countries.
American policy failure: Fallout from interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan
With the awesome power that the US did inherit after the end of the Cold War, came
more vulnerability. It is here where the 9/11 attacks and the US invasion of Iraq would
come to affect the internal functionality of OPEC. When the United States entered the
Middle East subsystem militarily in the first Gulf War, to counter and contain an
irredentist Iraq, it introduced itself, more than ever in its historical dealings with the
region, as both a regional country and a hegemon, becoming an integral actor within the
Middle East. From that decisive victory in the spring of 1991, the American role
gradually aggrandized to being the sole guarantor of regional stability, expanding its
military apparatus in the Gulf Cooperation Council states (GCC), heavily arming their
militaries, increasing frequency of US naval operations in the Persian Gulf, as daily
sorties kept intact the no-fly zones of an increasing emasculated Iraq. For the next decade,
the US strategy remained unvaried as the region witnessed a host of economic and
political revisions that ultimately laid the groundwork for current regional realities:
American attempts to implement the Oslo Accords (at the time seen as a breakthrough in
the perennial Israeli-Palestinian conflict), Turkey’s socio-economic progression, the
beginnings of the spike in oil prices (now seen as a threshold to the enhancement of the
sovereign wealth funds of many Persian Gulf States), and the protracted strangulation of
Iraq.
However, a parallel undercurrent was also taking shape beneath many US
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sponsored peace efforts between Israel and the Palestinians, economic development in
regional US-aligned nations, and the common wisdom that promulgated the stability of
the status quo. Over time, the conventional narrative began to unravel in the face of the
Palestinian Intifada of 2000, the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in that same year –
leaving Hezbollah in a much stronger position, the American inability to subjugate Iran
with economic warfare, the overall failure of President Clinton’s peace efforts at the end
of his tenure, and Afghanistan’s descent into fratricide (with patches of the country under
the firm grip of the Taliban). Moreover, the no-fly zones implemented by the coalition
forces as a result of Saddam’s proclivities towards his Shī'ah and Kurdish populations led
to the ipso facto formation of two semi-autonomous regions within Iraq proper – the
forerunner for the difficulties that the US would face in the current occupation. The
September 11th attacks not only extended the military dimensions of the United States
within the region, but also transformed the American accepted wisdom on how stability
and US objectives could be sustained in the Middle East and, fundamentally altering the
logic behind the use of force.
It was in this backdrop that the US interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq
in 2003 need to be measured against. Though the US emphatically succeeded in
overthrowing the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, the host government of Al-Qaeda’s
apparatus, and the entrenched Baathist autocracy in Iraq, the cost for American actions
has yet to be fully tallied. To date, the financial expenditures of the wars have been
projected to tally at $4-6 trillion. 456
These expenditures appear at a time where the American economic paradigm of
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governance has been openly critiqued internationally (by reason of exorbitant national
debt and an unregulated financial sector). Moreover, the human costs of the wars have
approached 7,000 coalition deaths (of which almost 5,000 are American), coupled with
an untold amount of Iraqis and Afghans who have since perished. As the years have
passed since the initiation of the Iraq conflict, numerous historical analyses and
commentaries, both in print and in film, emanating from an eclectic pool of observers,
have been produced regarding American regional intervention. Yet, no matter how
critical or laudatory they may be to the current state of US military involvement in the
Middle East, there is an inferred harmony amongst them; that is, outside of conventional
air power, with which the US has unquestioned superiority amongst all other actors,
American power projection capability has weakened – some claiming dramatically so.
While the war with Saddam was a result of the new, post-9/11 approach that the
United States adopted towards the Near East (i.e. preventative military intervention), it
was also a byproduct of the efficiency and speed that characterized the early months of
the US intervention into Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom. Consequently, with
the intervention in Iraq, and the rapid fall of Saddam’s fragmented military, the US
perception of its regional position was arguably at its zenith. Nevertheless, this
assessment was at best incomplete, and now, in hindsight, grossly inaccurate. With the
US transitioning from a fighting to an occupational force, the American claim, both
within Iraq and Afghanistan, was becoming suspect.
Intrastate dynamics
The US interventions in the Middle East would create the conditions where the most
consequential internal state dynamics that transpired during this period was in the Iraqi
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political scene. This was not only because of Iraq’s importance in OPEC as it pertains to
collective production and decision-making. The US intervention in Iraq and the creation
of a new post-Baathist political system would begin the process of bringing back Iraqi
production capacity in the global market. And from these internal events in Iraq,
subsequent regional ramifications that would affect the entire Middle East would
gradually lead to the irrevocable altering of the balance of power, setting the stage for a
shift of power in OPEC consensus, and creating new alliances in the region and beyond.
Iraq
In Iraq, as the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) systematically dismantled the
entrenched Baathist socio-political infrastructure, the fragility of the state itself was
glossed over while the strength of civil society was idealistically overestimated. What is
more, the existence of two semi-autonomous entities within Iraq for more than a decade,
specifically the Northern Kurdish portion, had greatly eroded the notion of an Iraqi state.
457

In other words, if there had ever existed a unitary sense of Iraq, the years that followed

the 1991 defeat of Saddam Hussein had now questioned that assumption to many
differing factions within the country. The incapability of the US military, the CPA, and
Iraq’s fragile elected government to restore domestic order as mass looting, sectarian war,
and internecine bloodshed continued, manifested the occupation’s shortcomings.
Although the violence within Iraq has significantly declined since late 2007, the
overarching political reconciliation amongst the country’s disparate factions has yet to be
realized, still lacking the qualities of political permanence. If violence were to return to
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previous levels, the threat of the Iraqi state being ripped asunder still looms on the
horizon, inviting intervention by regional actors, particularly, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and
most certainly Iran. Additionally, the deep sense of frustration amongst many Westernallied Arab regimes, chiefly the Arab states of OPEC, about regional systemic alterations
associated with US actions acts as a compounding force upon an increasingly
questionable American regional strategy.
But with the Iraq intervention, although the political and security situation within
the country significantly worsened in the occupation period, Iraq’s oil sector did begin
the long process of revitalization. This dynamic not only affected the country’s exports
potential, but would also alter its power position within OPEC, a process that is still
underway. For the first time since the 1970s, Iraq would once again become a magnate
for major oil firms, not just the traditional technologically advanced Western
multinationals, but increasingly NOCs from China, India, and the African continent. 458
Ironically, the same set of factors that has kept Iraq’s political system paralyzed, which
directly affects its internal security, has also, by default, created the conditions for mass
investment from abroad. These factors are the inability of the central government in
Baghdad to unify state policy vis-à-vis oil production, differing perspectives on oil
exports held by varying regions of the country, and the larger question of
decentralization/federalism. As result, what differing regions of Iraq have done, most
notably the Northern Kurdish-speaking portion of the country, is to invite foreign capital
and expertise into their regions so that their oil production would not be dependent upon
Baghdad, whom degrees of autonomy is wanted. The result has been massive investment
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of foreign oil companies, such as BP, ExxonMobil, and Chevron’s presence in Northern
Iraq, NOCs, such as Russia’s Gazprom and the China National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC) throughout the country, while smaller European and Asian firms fill in the gaps.
459

As Figure 5.3 shows, since 2003, despite the political and security chaos in Iraq,
the country has steadily made measured advances in oil production. Indeed, the only
impediment that has kept Iraq from advancing further in its oil production has been the
political paralysis of its new, post-Baathist leadership. And with this advance in
production, by reason of the technological influx that has come into the country, has
come a revision of the country’s oil reserves. According to OPEC’s 2013 Annual
Statistical bulletin, Iraq now owns roughly 11.7% of the proven oil reserves in the world,
making it the fourth in OPEC and fifth in the world. 460
Venezuela
As the US intervened in Iraq, internal changes were also taking place in Venezuela.
Historically, successive Venezuelan governments not only were considered reliable
partners for the US in regional trade initiatives but also had cooperated, often times
intensely, on oil policy. With the rise of Hugo Chavez in the late 1990s, the US would
gradually begin to realize that its relationship with Venezuela was to undergo a
significant change. Chavez’s democratic rise was not just an internal issue for Venezuela,
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his Bolivarian allies within Venezuela sought to utilize the country’s vast oil reserves and
export potential for social programs at home.

462

Yet, to do that effectively, Chavez

sought to revitalize the Venezuelan presence in OPEC, not just ceremonially but in terms
of decision-making. Though a founding Member, the decision-making influence of
Venezuela in OPEC had long declined, primarily because it could not keep up with
initially Iranian, and then Saudi output. 463
Chavez’s rise, first from his failed coup-attempt in the early 1990s with his
military colleagues, 464 then to the civilian-led populist campaign that brought him to
power, fundamentally challenged the entrenched ruling elite that had run Venezuela for
more than two generations. However, though the Chavez administration would become
known as revitalizing the socialist model in the 21st century, his initial economic and
social policies were quite moderate, only to be considered center-left. 465 It was only after
a series of constitutional referendums, and particularly after Chavez’s survival from a
2002 coup attempt, that his administration really embarked on socialist policies at home,
and supporting like-minded governments abroad.
In order pay for the increased expenditures at home, the Chavez administration
understood that significant changes needed to be implemented to the country’s oil sector,
which had usually relied on Western capital investment and technology – even since
nationalization. And since the coup attempt against him had severally degraded his once
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normal relations with the US and much of the West, Venezuela gradually reached out to
both Russia and China for technological assistance with its oil industry, and to other
fellow OPEC NOCs.
However, increased Venezuelan production was simply not enough. In order to
change the dynamics of oil as it pertains to the Venezuelan economy, and to subsidize
what was becoming an increasingly activist foreign policy, the Chavez administration had
to reach out to OPEC. Throughout the early years of his tenure, Hugo Chavez would
become a renewed voice of collaboration among Member States that often did not trust
each other. Through Venezuelan initiatives, harkening back to Organization’s formation,
Caracas introduced new ideas for cooperation to the Member States that had undergone
traumatic years prior. Chavez’s efforts did bring forth modest results. Beginning in 2001,
oil prices began their slow climb back. It was during this very period that OPEC countries
would gradually begin renewed cooperation on price defense measures and a renewed,
but ultimately unsuccessful, commitment to stick by their quota responsibilities and not
overproduce. Chavez’s ability to personally corral the diverse leaders of OPEC countries
greatly assisted the Group in arriving at some form of tactical cooperation.
Interstate relations
By 2004, what started with Venezuela’s initiative at short-term, tactical compromises in
order to increase revenue broadened out into a more functional, working relationship
among Member Countries. The biggest item on the agenda was to recapture OPEC’s
ability to fundamentally influence global supply and demand dynamics. And price
defense measures, a failing legacy of the 1980s and 1990s, was simply not enough.
OPEC’s post-1980 policy of scaling production, either through measured cutbacks via the
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quota system or more extreme measures, had rendered the Organization’s power over the
market a short-term enterprise. In the mid-1980s and sporadically in the 1990s, this
policy, often times, had virtually no effect because of the oversaturation of the market.
But by 2004, OPEC gradually began to realize that their efforts to recapture influence
would need the Organization to start implementing long-term strategies that would
benefit all consumers, as opposed to short-term measures intended to protect producers.
At OPEC’s 132nd meeting in Vienna, Austria in September of 2004, Member
States began to implement this very concept. In reacting to the increasing oil prices
(which would only rise further in the years ahead), OPEC began the process of once
again regaining influence over prices, with the secondary goal of presenting the
Organization as a force for stability in the global economy. In their press release, OPEC
revealed that the Group would be unilaterally increasing production to offset prices,
which was a stark contrast from past behavior:
Having reviewed the current oil market, the Conference noted that higher
crude oil prices are a result of such factors as the demand surge earlier in
the year, especially in North America, China and Asian countries,
geopolitical factors and concern about adequacy of spare capacity to meet
possible supply disruptions, exacerbated by the significant impact of
speculators and by tightness experienced in the downstream industry. It
also observed that OPEC’s timely actions had been effective in ensuring
that the market remains well supplied, resulting in commercial OECD
stocks build-up to levels close to normal, thus succeeding in reversing the
OPEC Reference Basket price trend down to levels around $38/b. In the
light of the foregoing, the Conference decided to raise the OPEC
production ceiling (excluding Iraq) by 1.0 mb/d, to 27.0 mb/d, with effect
from November 1, 2004, in order to bring prices down further to a more
sustainable level, whilst, at the same time, vigilantly monitoring market
developments. In taking this decision, the Organization reiterated its commitment to take action to stabilize the market at prices reasonable to both
producers and consumers. Taking into consideration the market outlook
for 2005, with its concomitant uncertainties, especially in the first and
second quarters, the Conference further decided to convene an (Extraordinary) Meeting in Cairo, Egypt, on December 10, 2004 to review
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market developments and take whatever measures are deemed appropriate
at that time. Taking this decision in recognition of the importance of
maintaining oil market stability for the benefit of the world economy, as
well as consumers and producers, the Conference expressed its
expectation that non-OPEC oil producers will take concrete measures to
actively share with the Organization the responsibility of maintaining
price and market stability in 2005 and thereafter. 466
OPEC’s actions in 2004 and in subsequent years to balance crude supply to meet demand
were neither new nor revolutionary. But the rediscovery of this very concept, and in
many respects, this responsibility of the Organization to the global economy, after almost
twenty years of infighting, consensus breakdown, and paralysis was neither expected nor
predicted. This was particularly true in light of the many obituaries that were written for
the Organization, by friends and foes alike.
In the following year, OPEC’s Acting Secretary General, Adnan Shihab-Eldin,
sought to assure markets on OPEC’s role in price stabilization. As prices were gradually
rising, he reiterated “OPEC’s commitment to ensure adequate supplies”, affirming “the
Organization stands ready to take the necessary decisions to maintain market stability.”
467

Moreover, in the same period, OPEC made efforts to reach out to other important

international organizations, exemplified in their third meeting with the International
Energy Agency in 2005 concerning the energy outlook in the Middle East and North
Africa.
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More importantly, the Organization reached out the European Union to

facilitate a broader dialogue on energy concerns, and in June of 2005, held its first
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official European Union-OPEC Energy Dialogue. 469
But the Organization’s ability to continuously act as a stabilizer of global prices
had its limits, ultimately reaching its potential in 2006. In virtually every press release of
that year, as prices were steadily rising, OPEC would continuously reaffirm that the
market was well supplied, and thus there was no need for additional output into the
market. 470 And in July of that year, as price increases no longer could be ignored, the
Organization addressed this new dynamic in the global economy:
OPEC has noted with concern the strong upward pressure on oil prices of
the past few days and wishes to reassure the market of its continuing
commitment to order and stability, to the benefit of producers and
consumers alike. Geopolitical developments, over which OPEC has no
influence, have been behind this sudden rise in volatility, and these have
come at a time when the market was already out of line with today’s
supply and demand fundamentals, with speculation playing a significant
role in driving up prices. It has also occurred in spite of the fact that the
market remains well-supplied with crude, and, with crude volumes
continuing to enter the market well in excess of demand, OECD stocks are
above their five-year average levels. This healthy state of the upstream
sector has been very much due to OPEC’s abiding commitment to market
stability, with prices at fair and equitable levels, in support of sound
world economic growth, in particular with regard to the needs of
developing countries. OPEC’s MCs have increased crude oil production
substantially since the recent heightened state of volatility first manifest
itself in spring 2004, as well as accelerating their plans to bring onstream new production capacity to meet continued demand growth and reestablish a comfortable cushion of spare capacity. However, to be truly
effective in increasing stability and moderating prices, OPEC requires the
full support of the other major players in the market, on both the producer
and consumer sides. All parties gain from market stability and so all
parties must contribute to it. In welcoming the major advances that have
been made in dialogue and cooperation within the industry in recent years,
OPEC recognizes the potential for this to provide tangible benefits in the
present volatile market conditions. 471
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Subsequently, in its September 2006 meeting, the Organization essentially reaffirmed this
view by stating “crude oil supply in recent years has continued to exceed growth in
demand — the rebound in non-OPEC supply in 2007 is predicted to be at its highest level
since 1984 — and that market fundamentals indicate a clear imbalance between supply
and demand”. 472 OPEC was confirming that though they will not allow systemic shocks,
such as 1973 or 1980 to occur again, this new era of gradual price increases was one in
which they felt not only comfortable with, but would most likely defend: “the
Organization will continue its proactive policy of supporting market stability by restoring
a balance between supply and demand, at prices reasonable to both producers and
consumers and conducive to continued world economic growth”. 473
This same approach remained OPEC’s policy throughout 2007, exemplified by its
familiar refrain that “oil markets remain well supplied and market fundamentals do not
require any additional supply from the Organization at this time”.

474

But as prices

climbed to the highest they had been in over a generation, OPEC’s cautious, albeit
content approach with more revenue for Member States, needed to provide an answer for
the changing market conditions. OPEC’s Secretary General, Abdalla Salem El-Badri,
was ultimately compelled to defend the Organization in the face of insinuations about
purported responsibility by the Group for rising prices:
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High oil prices, which we are now witnessing, are not a consequence of
insufficient crude supplies. Inventory data, continues to demonstrate that
crude stocks are ample. US crude stocks are now at nine year highs, while
OECD stocks are healthy, and are above their five year average. This data,
therefore, shows us very clearly, that current high oil prices are not in any
way related to crude supplies. Inadequate refinery capacity, ongoing
glitches in US refinery operations, geopolitical tensions and increased
speculation in the futures market are, however, driving high oil prices. So
even if OPEC were to supply the market with additional crude at this time,
these refinery-related problems mean that any extra barrels would not be
refined into products. OPEC is closely observing developments in the
global oil market, including the current price trend. If the Organization
sees any evidence that oil prices are rising because of a shortage of crude,
which does not exist at this time, it will not hesitate to act immediately to
alleviate any such deficit. 475
El-Badri analysis concerning limited refining capacity in North America, which
incidentally was also occurring in Europe and the Far East, in addition to the geopolitical
tensions in the Middle East were fundamentally correct. American investment in refining
capacity had lagged, primarily because in the immediate years of the post-Cold War era,
the rapid and massive consumption trends from China and India were simply not
expected. Therefore, the US, with its European counterparts, not expecting the rising tide
of consumption post-2000, allowed its refining capacity to stagnate. Moreover, as
mentioned previously, the Middle East, in the aftermath of the US intervention in Iraq,
was a different place. And the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, in that
the latter fought the technologically advanced Israeli military to a standstill, was not only
a turning point in regional politics, but also what many considered the heralding of new
era of conflict.
But pointing out these issues, although they were temporary, did little to relieve
the situation in the global oil market. As 2007 drew to a close, OPEC increasingly
475

Ibid, 52-53.

300

became aware that many in the global economy were attributing the substantial increase
in the price of oil to OPEC’s inaction. These concerns, once again, forced OPEC’s
Secretary General to the podium”
OPEC is carefully watching developments in the oil market and has
observed with concern the recent escalation in oil prices. While the
Organization does not favor oil prices at this level, it strongly believes
that fundamentals are not supporting current high prices and that the
market is very well supplied. There has been no interruption in crude
supplies and OECD commercial inventory levels remain above five-year
levels. Forward cover, which stands at 53.5 days, is at a comfortable level.
The rising oil prices which we are currently witnessing are, however,
largely being driven by market speculators. Persistent refinery bottlenecks
and seasonal maintenance work, ongoing geopolitical problems in the
Middle East and fluctuations in the US dollar, also continue to play a role
in pushing oil prices higher. Additional political tensions, seen during
recent days, are also pressurizing oil prices upwards. OPEC continues to
strive for a balanced market and a fair price that is favorable for both
consumers and producers. As part of its mission to keep the market well
supplied, and as agreed in September, the Organization will raise output
by 500,000 b/d from 1 November 2007. Member Countries are in the
process of implementing their share of this increase. OPEC will continue
to monitor the global oil market and will respond to any supply disruption,
so as to ensure the market remains well supplied during the winter months.
The decision to increase output by half million b/d was thought by the Organization to at
least have a psychological effect on the global economy, possibly to roll back the
influence of speculation about future supply. An indirect, albeit significant, result of the
rising consumption patterns coming from China and India was the rebirth of the
‘exhaustibility theory’ of the 1970s. This new variation was labeled as “peak oil”,
popularized by the fusion of two interconnected strands of thought: resource wars and the
ramifications of climate change.
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both the policy-making and business communities, it was important for the Organization
to show it had at least attempted to pacify prices. But as 2008 began, and well into the
summer, limitations in global refineries, Middle East tensions (including heightened
tension between the US and Iran), and open conflict between Russia and Georgia (which
created additional supply disruption fears), all compounded by speculation, drove prices
to their highest level since the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war. Yet with the arrival of the
US financial crisis in the fall/winter of that year, drying up credit in advanced economies,
slowing consumption down and significantly reducing oil prices, OPEC once again,
entered into a period of uncertainty.
Ending the Rebalancing Era
Nevertheless, the newfound tactical cooperation amongst Members brought about
tangible, positive results for the Organization during this period, allowing them to take
advantage of the circumstances surrounding global oil supply and demand dynamics.
However, uncertainties about the accommodation of the new Iraq (and its economic and
political ramifications) has still kept OPEC from returning to its pre-1980s unity. From a
political standpoint, the rise of a new political system in Baghdad has evoked the ire of
Saudi Arabia and their Persian Gulf allies, ostensibly because it would empower a
political group in Iraq that’s always been disenfranchised in the former countries. From
an economic standpoint, the full integration of Iraq in the global economy would
gradually erode the power of OPEC’s traditional major producers, of which Saudi Arabia
has long been dominant.
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Needless to say, though these lingering political disputes are still extant, they did
not impede the slow recentralization of OPEC. Even though the traditional Iranian/Saudi
divide is still alive, along with the newfound concerns of Iraq from specifically the
Persian Gulf monarchies, Member States were able to take advantage of the remarkable
growth in the global economy from 2001-2008. During this period, the altered nature of
the global oil industry, primarily the rapidly growing consumption from East, allowed
OPEC Member States to reap economic windfalls that it hadn’t seen since the end of the
1970s. For many OPEC Members, the hyper infusion of capital into their economies,
because of the high price of oil, would help create the large sovereign wealth funds that
would be crucial during the current, still unnamed era, where many of OPEC’s Arab
Members have to deal with the fallout of the Arab Spring of 2011-Present, a changing
regional balance of power, shifting relations with the US, and changing demographics.
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CONCLUSION

The post-2008 phase of OPEC’s institutional life has yet to be defined. This era will most
likely take years to fully take shape, and within its wider context, several key trends and
factors – possibly which are entirely new – will affect how OPEC behaves. However
three particular trends that will be crucial in how this current phase of OPEC’s
development evolves.
The first concerns the permanent fallout of the financial crisis that began in the
fall of 2008. While the ramifications of this crisis has touched virtually every region of
the world, the most consequential factor that would affect OPEC and the nature of the oil
industry is what the financial crisis will do to consumption trends. Will certain regions of
the world that were growing or slated for growth before the financial crisis, no longer
grow, and thus consume less energy?
As Figure 5.4 shows, the consumption patterns for 2009 dropped from the prior,
clearly indicating the impact of the global financial crisis on world oil demand. And as
expected, with this consumption drop, in the face of steady and growing supply, crude oil
prices for 2009, as shown in Figure 5.2, significantly fell. Although they have recovered
since the crisis, the recovery has been anemic and tenuous, as the health of diverse
markets, chiefly the EU, still remain in doubt. For OPEC in particular, the immediate
years after the financial crisis has seen prices partially rebound, but have also severally
affected the recapturing of its market share recover. As Figure 5.1 shows, OPEC’s market
share of global oil production dropped 5% in 2010 from 2008 figures.
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On the reverse side, will new consumption patterns from Asian economies create
a new relationship with OPEC Members, in the same way that the US and UK forged a
bond with the House of Saud or other Persian Gulf monarchies in the early part of the
20th century? In the last decade, a fundamental shift has happened in the direction of oil
exports from the Persian Gulf. Though Venezuelan exports will always have a heavy
presence in the Western Hemisphere, for the other Members of OPEC, exports to the Far
Eastern economies (India, China, South Korea, Japan, etc.) rose astronomically. By the
time of the 2008 financial crisis, most Persian Gulf exports were travelling to Eastern
markets.
Such a change in consumption patterns, if history is a guide, will invariably alter
the relationship between certain OPEC Member States (such as Saudi Arabia and their
Persian Gulf allies) with that of the United States. Moreover, the recently renewed
tensions between the Russian Federation and the US and EU over Ukraine will
undoubtedly affect OPEC Member States’ export policies. Since the 1979 Iranian
Revolution, there has been a systematic US attempt, aided and facilitated by the EU, to
reduce and weaken Iranian oil exports.
This dynamic indirectly led to Europe’s reliance on Soviet, and then later Russian
oil and natural gas exports. As a result, for Russia, Europe had been a market they had
dominated for the entirety of the post-Cold War period, having no real viable rival that
could help Europe diversify. Yet, if the relationship between Russia and the EU
deteriorates – a likely possibility in the wake of Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian
territory – Europe would then need to reach out to viable alternative hydrocarbon
suppliers. Because of its location, the size of its oil and natural gas reserves, and relative
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ease of transport to Europe, Iran is the most likely and plausible alternative. But for the
EU to make this diversification decision vis-à-vis the Iranians, a necessary rethinking of
the sanctions regime on Iran needs to happen.
The second factor that would affect the current era of OPEC’s institutional life
concerns the ultimate fallout from the Arab Revolutions of 2011 to the present. As it is
virtually impossible to separate Middle East politics from OPEC’s functionality,
decision-making, and ultimately behavior, the trajectory of the Arab Spring, and whether
they will impact other OPEC Members, as it violently did in Libya in mid-2011, will be
crucial for the Arab Member States and also for the Organization as a whole. For the
Arab Members of OPEC that have or are currently being affected by the fallout of
political turmoil, the main impact has been a halt or reduction in production. For Libya in
particular, the protests that developed in early 2011, which coincided with other protests
in North Africa, eventually led to civil war, NATO intervention into the country, and a
whole scale regime change. As a result, large swaths of Libya’s infrastructure were
destroyed, oil production plummeted, and the Libyan oil industry, including personnel,
was severally damaged. Though there is now an elected government in Libya, its ability
to function, to control Libyan territory, and operate Libya’s critical infrastructures,
especially its oil sector, is extremely limited.
For Arab Members that have yet to experience the Arab Spring or fear its arrival,
oil revenue directed towards calming social unrest has totally changed their traditional
approaches to prices and profits. For Saudi Arabia in particular, the current, ongoing
Bahraini political instability, which required Saudi and UAE troops to enter the country
in support for the Bahrain monarchy, has a distinct possibility of affecting domestic Saudi
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stability. Thus, Riyadh has moved to pacify public discontent with lavish subsidies.
However, for the Saudis, this has impacted the country’s ability to withstand periods of
low oil prices. And when considering their relations with Iran, and the ‘oil production
weapon’ that they have historically used against Tehran (by overproducing and hurting
Iranian revenues), this option will increasingly become more difficult for the Saudis. And
it has yet to be determined how other major producers, such as Kuwait or Iraq will be
affected.
The third and final factor concerns the future of the unconventional side of the oil
industry, particularly the rise of shale oil and natural gas and tight oil. While these
technologies have been around for several years, it has only been since 2008 that they
have become viable enough to replace output from some conventional suppliers, albeit on
a very limited basis. For these unconventional technologies, the key determining factor
that would make them competitive with conventional supplies (i.e. OPEC oil) is the cost
of recovery. It is important to note, there still exists a wide gap between how much it
costs to recover oil from conventional sources vs. unconventional sources. Although
individual figures do vary, recovery costs for OPEC crude and other conventional oil
producers is roughly less that 1/10th that of unconventional production.
Indeed, it was the major spending and growth spurt that started at the turn of the
century and ended with the financial crisis that pushed the price of crude oil to
unprecedented levels and thus made unconventional production economically feasible.
Therefore, due to this recovery cost dynamic, for unconventional supplies to have an
impact in the market vis-à-vis conventional producers, the cost of crude must be quite
high. Assuming that recovery costs for unconventional supplies do not decrease much, in
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this scenario, the interests of the unconventional producers will become align with
traditional OPEC Member States, particularly those with hawkish views on oil. Such an
outcome would be a first for the global oil industry, changing alliances and rendering old
rivalries relics of the past.
Yet, if the unconventional side of the oil industry becomes more efficient and
cheaper, there could, with time, develop a serious risk to OPEC market share and the
production rationale of other producers, not unlike what transpired in the 1980s. And
with the uncertainty in regards to the cost, comes also uncertainty vis-à-vis the
environment. The environmental effects of large-scale hydraulic fracking and shale oil
and natural gas production have yet to be fully tested.
But within these three major trends, the four determinants that have created the
context in which OPEC makes its decisions, and thus behaves, will still continue to
impact how this Organization engages with others and itself in the international system.
And it is within the confluence of these determinants that the longevity and survivability
of OPEC is seen. OPEC’s capacity to stay together and to continue is precisely because it
is not solely an economically based organization and certainly not a cartel. OPEC is an
intergovernmental organization where politics and economics, from the domestic to the
global, merge and interact for all its Member States. It is a forum of otherwise mediumstrength States, all from the developing world, that do not enjoy any real, objective status
or power in any other global institution. It is still an Organization where the
overwhelming majority of its Members find, at least some utility, in remaining. And
finally, its survivability, is not dependent on ideology or alliances, but one the
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fundamentals of the dominance of hydrocarbons in the current international system – a
reality that will not change easily or anytime soon.
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